Edwards v. Astrue

Filing 34

ORDER GRANTING 23 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and DENYING 25 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 1/13/2014. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
NO. 4:12-CV-252-BO
JANET EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner ofSocial Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. A
hearing was held on these matters before the undersigned on December 13,2013, at Raleigh, North
Carolina. For the reasons discussed below, this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffbroughtthis action under42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) forreviewofthe final
decision ofthe Commissioner denying her claim for disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB)
pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB on February 5,
2009, alleging disability since January 1, 2008. Plaintiffs claim was denied initially and on
reconsideration. After conducting a hearing and considering the claim de novo, an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff was not disabled in a decision issued on May 7, 2011. The
decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council
denied plaintiffs request for review, and plaintiff then timely sought review of the Commissioner's
decision in this Court.

DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, this Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited
to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is supported by substantial evidence and whether
the Commissioner employed the correct legal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence consists of more than a mere scintilla of
evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971). The Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner if the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ uses a multi-step process. First, a

claimant must not be able to work in a substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Second,
a claimant must have a severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities. Id. Third, to be found disabled, without considering a claimant's
age, education, and work experience, a claimant's impairment must be of sufficient duration and
must either meet or equal an impairment listed by the regulations. Id. Fourth, in the alternative, a
claimant may be disabled if his or her impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant
work and, fifth, if the impairment prevents the claimant from doing other work. I d. The claimant
bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step
five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
After finding that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and that there had been a
continuous period of twelve months during which she had not engaged in any substantial gainful
activity, the ALJ determined that plaintiffhad the following severe impairments: disc herniation, disc
bulge, history oflaminectomy October 2008, left atrophy of kidney, and depression. The ALJ went

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on to find that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
equaled a listing at step three, and found that plaintiff had a residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform light work with exertional and non-exertionallimitations. At step four, the ALJ found that
plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, but found at step five that, considering plaintiffs
age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that plaintiff could perform. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled.
The ALJ makes an RFC assessment based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Here, the ALJ failed to consider plaintiffs allegations of pain or to
weigh the credibility of her statements in light of objective medical evidence in the record. SSR 967p provides that when a medically determinable physical impairment exists that could reasonably
be expected to produce pain, the effects of the claimant's pain must be evaluated to determine the
extent to which the symptoms would affect the claimants ability to perform basic work activities.
Moreover, the ALJ is then required to make a finding about the credibility ofthe claimant's pain and
its effects.
The ALJ found as severe impairments plaintiffs disc herniation, bulge, and history of
laminectomy. The medical evidence further reflects that following her back surgery an MRI revealed
significant nerve root swelling with suggestion of edema and inflamation of the root. T r. 319. In
determining that plaintiffs surgery was apparently successful such that pain would have little or no
effect on plaintiffs ability to work, the ALJ relied on plaintiffs statements as reflected in treatment
notes, but did not mention plaintiffs hearing testimony that light sweeping and changing bed sheets
causes pain that requires her to take a break from her activity, Tr. 41-42, that sitting caused pain from
her thigh to her knee at a level of seven on a scale of one to ten, Tr. 51, and that she cannot sit long

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enough to balance her checkbook. Tr. 53. In the absence of consideration and analysis of this
evidence, the ALJ' s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. The absence of a
well-supported RFC also undermines the adequacy of the ALJ' s hypothetical posed to the VE, which
did not include any accommodation for pain such as a sit/stand option. A remand of this matter is
therefore appropriate in order for the ALJ to properly consider and weigh plaintiffs subjective
complaints of pain.
Additionally, though the ALJ chose to rely on plaintiffs statement that following surgery
"she was doing a lot better than she was" prior to surgery, the ALJ failed to address, though he did
mention, Dr. Lee's opinion that plaintiff should limit herself to sedentary work. Tr. 319. Though
the ALJ ascribed considerable weight to the findings of Dr. Lee, he failed to discuss why he rejected
Dr. Lee's opinion as to plaintiffs exertional abilities. Remand is also appropriate so that the ALJ
might clarify his treatment of Dr. Lee's opinion. 1
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 23] is GRANTED and
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 25] is DENIED. This matter is
REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.

SO ORDERED, this

__jJ_ day of January, 2014.

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Because the Court has found that remand is appropriate on these bases, it declines to
consider plaintiffs remaining arguments.
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