Brown v. Colvin

Filing 30

ORDER DENYING 24 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and GRANTING 27 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 9/4/2014. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:13-CV-141-BO

CHARLOTTE BROWN for T.B.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings. [DE 24, 27]. A hearing on this matter was held in New Bern, North Carolina, on
August, 20, 2014. The Commissioner appeared via video feed. For the reasons detailed below,
plaintiffs motion is DENIED and defendant's motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision
of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
The minor plaintiff, by and through his mother, protectively filed for supplement security
income (SSI) pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act on February 20, 2007. Plaintiff
alleged disability beginning on February 1, 2007. The Social Security Administration denied
plaintiffs application initially and upon reconsideration. On January 26, 2010, plaintiff and his
mother both appeared and testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The
ALJ denied plaintiffs claim, and the Appeals Council denied his first request for review on
September 13, 2011. After considering additional information, the Appeals Council denied
plaintiffs second request for review on March 22, 2013, and the ALJ' s decision became the final

decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
DISCUSSION
When a social security claimant appeals a final decision ofthe Commissioner, the district
court's review is limited to the determination of whether, based on the entire administrative
record, there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings and whether the
Commissioner employed the correct legal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389,401 (1971). Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence which a reasoning mind
would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987,
989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). If the
Commissioner's decision is supported by such evidence, it must be affirmed. Smith v. Chafer, 99
F.3d 635,638 (4th Cir. 1996).
"An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled for the purposes of this
subchapter if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which
results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). In evaluating whether an individual under the age of 18
is disabled, an ALJ uses a sequential multi-step process. First, a claimant must not be able to
engage in a substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. Second, a claimant must have a
severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. Id. Third, to be found disabled, a claimant's impairment must be of sufficient duration,
defined as lasting or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,
and must either meet, medically equal, or functionally equal an impairment listed by the

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regulations (Listing). Id In determining whether an impairment functionally equals a Listing, the
ALJ assesses the claimant's functioning in six areas: 1) acquiring and using information; 2)
attending and completing tasks; 3) interacting and relating with others; 4) moving about and
manipulating objects; 4) caring for yourself, and 6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a. A claimant must have a marked limitation in two areas or an extreme limitation in one
area for his impairment to functionally equal a Listing. !d.
Here, after finding that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: loss of right eye, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and
headache. [Tr. 34]. The ALJ then found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that either medically or functionally equaled a Listing. [Tr. 34-35]. In making his
findings at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had less than marked limitation in the
areas of acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating
with others, and health and physical well-being, and no limitation in the areas of moving about
and manipulating objects and caring for yourself. [Tr. 41-46].
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that he had marked limitations 1 in the
domains of attending and completing tasks, and health and physical well-being. [DE 25]. The
ALJ' s decision on these issues is supported by substantial evidence. In formulating the findings
on both domains, the ALJ relied upon of two state agency physicians and two state agency
psychologists, all of whom opined that plaintiff had a less than marked limitation in the both
domains after reviewing available medical evidence. [Tr. 449-50, 453, 479-80]. The ALJ also

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While plaintiffs memorandum argues that the ALJ failed to find plaintiffs impairment in the
health and physical well-being domain was less than marked, D.E. 25 at 3-4, the Court interprets
this as an argument that the ALJ failed to find plaintiffs impairment was marked, as the ALJ did
find plaintiffs impairment was less than marked in this domain.
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relied upon Plaintiff's first grade teacher, who opined that he had no problems in these domains
and that his medication rendered him able to complete tasks. [Tr. 190, 194]. Plaintiff's arguments
that the ALJ should have relied on the statement of his second grade teacher, who opined that he
had some problems in each of the two domains at issue are unavailing. The second grade teacher
only knew Plaintiff for a short period oftime, approximately two months, and had no knowledge
of his medication status. [Tr. 256, 260]. Additionally, substantial other evidence, in the form of
the opinions and medical evidence discussed above, supports the ALJ's opinion.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate his and his mother's
credibility. [DE 25]. This argument fails, as the ALJ did consider plaintiff's allegations of
disabling symptoms. [Tr. 36-40]. When making the credibility determination, the ALJ addressed
plaintiff's medical complaints, including his ADHD and visual impairments. [Tr. 38, 40]. The
objective medical evidence in the record revealed that the combination of therapy and
medication effectively controlled plaintiff's ADHD, though there was some noncompliance, and
that plaintiff was doing well with the optical prosthesis and had 20/20 vision in his remaining
eye. [Tr. 36, 40]. The ALJ did give some credibility to plaintiff's testimony, as evidenced by the
findings ofless than marked impairment in four domains, rather than no impairment. [Tr. 41, 43,
44, 46]. Plaintiff's arguments that the ALJ failed to assess the credibility of plaintiff's mother
likewise fail, as the credibility regulations pertain only to the allegedly disabled individual. 20
C.P.R. § 416.929(a). Having fully considered the record, the Court finds that the ALI's
credibility assessment of plaintiff is supported by substantial evidence, as are the overall findings
regarding plaintiff's lack of disability. Thus, because substantial evidence supports his decision
and the correct legal standard was employed, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 24] is
DENIED, and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 27] is GRANTED. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

RRENCE W. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DIST

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