Ricks, Jr. et al v. Armstrong International, Inc. et al
ORDER GRANTING 53 Ford's Motion to Dismiss, 65 Terex's Motion to Dismiss, 68 Armstrong's Motion to Dismiss, 71 Ingersoll Rand's Motion to Dismiss, 74 Trane's Motion to Dismiss, 77 Velan Valve's Motion to Dism iss, 80 Wabco's Motion to Dismiss, 106 SPX's Motion to Dismiss. The ourt sua sponte dismisses the plaintiff's fourth claim for relief as to all defendants. The remaining claims may proceed in their entirety. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 6/9/2014. (Fisher, M.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
JOHN SAM RICKS, JR. and BRENDA RICKS,
ARMSTRONG INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
AURORA PUMP COMPANY; et al.,
This matter is before the Court on eight separate defendants' motions to dismiss. The
motions are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motions are
GRANTED. Further this Court sua sponte DISMISSES plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief as to all
This action arises out of plaintiff John Sam Ricks, Jr.'s exposure to asbestos-containing
products alleged to be manufactured or otherwise attributable to defendants. Plaintiffs allege that
Mr. Ricks's exposure to the products caused his mesothelioma and damages. Plaintiffs assert
causes of action against these eight defendants and an additional twenty-four non-moving
defendants for negligence, breach of implied warranty, willful and wanton conduct, false
representation/fraud, failure to warn, and loss of consortium.
Defendants Ford Motor Company ("Ford") [DE 53], Terex Corporation ("Terex") [DE
65], Armstrong International, Inc. ("Armstrong") [DE 68], Ingersoll Rand Company
("Ingersoll") [DE 71], Trane U.S., Inc. ("Trane") [DE 74], Velan Valve Corp. ("Velan") [DE
77], WABCO Holdings Inc. ("W ABCO") [DE 80], and SPX Corporation ("SPX") [DE 106]
have all moved individually to dismiss the fourth cause of action, false representation/fraud,
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have not responded to any of the motions to
dismiss. Because they seek the same relief, put forth similar arguments, and are unopposed, the
Court will deal with them as one for purposes of this order.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS.
A Rule 12(b)( 6) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint.
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). When ruling on the motion, the Court
"must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (citing Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007)). Although complete and detailed factual allegations are not required, "a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals ofthe elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a court need not accept
as true a plaintiffs "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern
Shore Mkts. v. JD. Assocs. Ltd., 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A trial court is "not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In order to state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege: "(1) [f]alse representation or
concealment of a material fact, (2) reasonably calculated to deceive, (3) made with intent to
deceive, (4) which does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured party." Ragsdale v.
Kennedy, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (N.C. 1974). Allegations of fraud must be pled with particularity
- including the "time, place and content of the fraudulent representation, identity of the person
making the representation and what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or
representations." Terry v. Terry, 273 S.E.2d 674,678 (N.C. 1981); see also US. ex rel. Wilson v.
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2008); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). "Mere
generalities and conclusory allegations of fraud will not suffice." Sharp v. Teague, 439 S.E.2d
792, 797 (N.C. App. 1994) (quotation omitted); see also Strum v. Exxon Co., USA, 15 F.3d 327,
331 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the complaint only contains vague and conclusory allegations of fraud against all
defendants collectively. No specific misrepresentations are alleged against any defendant. There
are no particular allegations as to the time, place, and speaker of any false representations, the
way in which plaintiffs relied on the representations, or what benefit the defendants might have
obtained as a result. Therefore the complaint fails to sufficiently allege fraud in that it fails to
state a claim for which relief can be granted. Accordingly the defendants' motions are granted
and claim four of the complaint is dismissed as to defendants Ford, Terex, Armstrong, Ingersoll,
Trane, Velan, W ABCO, and SPX.
SUA SPONTE 12(b)(6) DISMISSAL.
The Court is not required to ignore an obvious failure to allege facts setting forth a
plausible claim for relief. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). In
such a circumstance, the Court is authorized to dismiss a claim sua sponte under FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). See United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1995)
(affirming the district court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiffs claims); see also Saifullah v.
Johnson, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27369, *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 1991) (unpublished) ("A court
may, on its own initiative, dismiss a civil complaint for failing to state a claim."). However,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are normally required. Saifullah, at *2 (holding that the
rule regarding pro se plaintiffs and Rule 56 established in Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309,
310 (4th Cir. 1975), should apply equally to prose plaintiffs subject to sua sponte dismissals).
Here, plaintiffs are represented by counsel. Plaintiffs have been put on notice by the eight
motions to dismiss on the grounds that their fourth claim fails to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have elected not to respond to any of those motions to dismiss. Thus the
Court finds that plaintiffs have had adequate notice and opportunity to respond regarding the
sufficiency their fourth claim for relief.
Because the false representation/fraud claim is not pled with particularity in respect to
any of the defendants, it does not state a claim for which relief can be granted with respect to any
of the defendants. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief,
the false representation/fraud claim, as to all defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiffs
fourth claim for relief is DISMISSED as to defendants Ford, Terex, Armstrong, Ingersoll, Trane,
Velan, WABCO, and SPX. The Court sua sponte DISMISSES plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief
as to all defendants. The remaining claims may proceed in their entirety.
_g_ day of June, 2014.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?