Jones v. Elks et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 12/12/2016. (Stouch, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:16-CV-78 BO
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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NEIL ELKS, in his official capacity as Pitt )
County Sheriff, JEFF PHILLIPS, in his
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individual capacity, RANDY GENTRY, in )
his individual capacity, and THE
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CINCINATTI INSURANCE COMPANY, )
as surety,
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Defendants. )
MAURICE JONES,

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has responded, defendants have
replied, and the matter is ripe for ruling. For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion is
granted in part and plaintiff's remaining claims are remanded to Pitt County Superior Court for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was formerly employed as a Detention Officer/Reserve Deputy by the Pitt
County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 2, 2012, his position was
changed from Deputy Sheriff Basic to Detention Officer Basic. Plaintiff was ultimately
terminated from his employment on February 22, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that he was treated
more harshly than other deputies and employees who are Caucasian and who engaged in similar
conduct as plaintiff.

Plaintiff filed this action in Pitt County Superior Court alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Plaintiff further alleges
claims for wrongful discharge in violation of North Carolina public policy, violations of the
North Carolina constitution, and tortious interference with contract. [DE 1-1].
DISCUSSION
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). When acting on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the court
should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993). A
complaint must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In response to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiff takes no position as to defendants'
arguments regarding the plausibility of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [DE 17]. Rather,
plaintiff requests that this Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining
state law claims and remand the action to Pitt County Superior Court. Having reviewed that
allegations in plaintiffs complaint and defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 due
process claim, the Court finds dismissal of this claim is appropriate as plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege that he had a property interest in his employment with the Pitt County
Sheriffs Office. See, e.g., Whitesell v. Town of Morrisville, 446 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 (E.D.N.C.
2006) ("The procedural safeguards of the due process clause extend to plaintiffs 'continued
employment only if [he] had a property interest in that employment.'") (citation omitted).
As the basis for federal question jurisdiction in this Court is properly dismissed, and there
appears to be no basis for this Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims, the

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Court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs remaining
state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because defendants have argued that plaintiffs
remaining claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the Court finds that the
interests of economy and fairness require that the remaining claims be remanded rather than
dismissed. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1988) (noting court's
inherent power to remand removed claims once federal claims have been disposed of); see also

Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 616 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying Carnegie-Mellon
to claims brought after the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss [DE 14] is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs
remaining claims are hereby REMANDED to Pitt County Superior Court. The clerk is
DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED, this~ day of December, 2016.

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