Macedon v. Castle et al

Filing 38

ORDER - Defendants' motions to dismiss [DE 14; DE 22; DE 26; DE 29] are GRANTED. The remaining motions [DE 7; DE 32] are DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff's complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 3/6/2025. (Pro se party has consented to receiving electronic service of all motions, notices, orders, and documents in civil cases in the Eastern District of North Carolina.) (Stouch, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:24-CV-66-BO-BM

MONICA BARNES MACEDON, Trustee
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
PITT COUNTY, JACKIE CASTLE,
Assistant Clerk of Superior Court,
THOMAS E. MCDONALD, Attorney,
BROCK & SCOTT PLLC in care of
U.S. BANK TRUST N.A., SELECT
PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC. (SPS),
RANDHIR GANDHI, CEO for SPS,
Defendants.

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ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on defendants ' motions to dismiss plaintiffs complaint.
The appropriate responses and replies have been filed, or the time for doing so has expired, and
the motions are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss are granted and
the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding in this action pro se, filed a complaint against Pitt County, North
Carolina, Thomas McDonald, Jackie Castle, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., and Randhir Gandhi
on April 29, 2024. [DE 1]. Her claims arise from a foreclosure sale conducted in Pitt County
regarding property at 2509 Jefferson Drive in Greenville, North Carolina. Plaintiff identifies
herself as "one of the sovereign people of North Carolina republic without minimum contact with
the State ofNorth Carolina". Id. 17. She alleges that the defendants have acted jointly and severally

in violating their obligation to support the United States Constitution; that foreclosure may only
happen on government property and thus trespass by wrongful interference with plaintiffs
possessory rights has occurred; that the property at 2509 Jefferson Drive did not qualify for a real
estate loan, deed of trust, or mortgage because plaintiff is not engaged in farming or ranching; that
the 2509 Jefferson Drive property did not qualify for foreclosure because banks have an interest
only in their bank buildings and any land financing would be for military purposes, which the 2509
Jefferson Drive property is not; and finally that the record incorrectly reflects that plaintiffs home
is a manufactured home on a military base when it is a brick-and-mortar home. Id. ,i,i 49-53.
Plaintiff seeks an emergency temporary injunction to stop the foreclosure sale scheduled for May
1, 2024. Plaintiff identifies trespass and invasion of privacy as the causes of action and cites to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $1 ,544,400, a permanent injunction
prohibiting defendants from depositing unauthorized materials on her land without plaintiffs
express consent, and ejectment of all documents which reference trespassers liens and title on the
property. Id. at 17-18.
Each of the defendants has filed a motion to dismiss. [DE 14; DE 22; DE 26; DE 29].
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claims, that
plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, that plaintiff has failed to
effect proper service, and that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Plaintiff
has been notified of her right to respond to the motions and has responded to the motions to
dismiss. [DE 18; DE 24; DE 33 ; DE 35 ; DE 36].

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DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. "Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be
considered when fairly in doubt." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (citation omitted).
When subject-matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction
to survive the motion. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co. , 166 F.3d 642, 647-50 (4th Cir. 1999). When a
facial challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction is raised, the facts alleged by the plaintiff in the
complaint are taken as true, "and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient
facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.
2009). The Court can consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion into
one for summary judgment. See, e.g. , Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
Rule 12(b)(4) authorizes dismissal for insufficient process, or a deficiency in the content
of the documents that have been served. Rule 12(b)(5) authorizes dismissal for insufficient service
of process, or a deficiency in service itself. See Washington v. Cedar Fair, L.P. , No. 3 :22-cv-244MOC-DSC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16559, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 2023). When a defendant
moves to dismiss for either insufficient process or insufficient service of process, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that service has been effected in accordance with the rules. Elkins v. Broome, 213
F.R.D. 273 , 275 (M.D.N.C. 2003). "Absent waiver or consent, a failure to obtain proper service
on the defendant deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Koehler v.
Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1998).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265,283 (1986). When acting on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the court should
accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable

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to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs. , Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). A complaint
must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S . 544, 570 (2007). In other words, the facts alleged must allow a court, drawing
on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009). The court
"need not accept the plaintiff s legal conclusions drawn from the facts, nor need it accept as true
unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem.
Hosp. , 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration and citation omitted).
" [A] prose complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). However, a court does not "act as an advocate for a prose litigant,"
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978), nor is it required to "'discern the
unexpressed intent of the plaintiff[.] "' Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801 , 805 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n. 3 (4 th Cir. 2006) (en bane)).
A. Motion to dismiss by Pitt County
Pitt County has moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Pitt County argues that neither the allegations in the complaint nor the
documents attached thereto attribute any alleged misconduct to Pitt County. In the complaint, Pitt
County is alleged to have exercised eminent domain over plaintiffs property and plaintiff alleges
that Pitt County may only take interest in public property under North Carolina law. [DE 1 ~~ 45,
46]. As Pitt County correctly argues, these allegations are legal conclusions and do not support
any claim for relief against Pitt County.

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In response, plaintiff argues that Pitt County can be liable for its policies and customs which
result in the deprivation of civil rights under Monell v. New York City Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that Pitt County is the trustee for the public trust and that it has a
duty and obligation to protect private rights, and that Pitt County has breached its fiduciary duty
to protect plaintiff. Plaintiff appears to argue that Pitt County is responsible for the acts of the
Register of Deeds and Clerk of Court.
First, neither the Clerk of Court nor the Register of Deeds is a Pitt County employee. N.C.
Gen. Stat.§ 7A-101(a); N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 153A-103 ; Sims-Campbell v. Welch , 239 N.C. App. 503 ,
507 (2015); see also Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984)
(municipal liability is not available under the theory ofrespondeat superior). Second, plaintiff has
failed to plausibly allege any policy or custom for which Pitt County could be held liable. See Lytle

v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463 , 471 (4th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff s claims against Pitt County are properly
dismissed.
B. Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity
Jackie Castle has moved to dismiss plaintiffs claims against her for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, asserting both Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity.
Attached to plaintiffs complaint is an order to allow foreclosure sale entered by defendant
Castle as Assistant Clerk of Superior Court of Pitt County. [DE 1-1]. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant Castle, acting as a judicial officer in Probate Court, exceeded her authority by entering
the order to allow foreclosure sale because, among other things, probate courts do not have
jurisdiction over the property of the living, only the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
could foreclose the subject property, and that Castle' s findings in the order to allow foreclosure
sale were erroneous. [DE 1 ,r,r 21; 33-34; 37-40].

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North Carolina clerks of superior court and their assistants are judicial officers for purposes
of foreclosure proceedings. N.C. Gen. Stat.§§ 7A-40; 7A-102; N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 45-21.16(dl).
Where a clerk of superior court or her assistant is acting pursuant to her judicial powers provided
by statute, she is a state judicial officer and any suit against her is a suit against the state, which is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment absent waiver or abrogation by Congress. Atascadero State

Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Alford v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Clerk of Superior Ct.,
No. 3:19-CV-156-MOC-DSC, 2019 WL 2881556, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 2, 2019); Day v.

Santaniello, No. 5:15-CV-165-FL, 2015 WL 13735398, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2015) ("Eleventh
Amendment immunity bars any claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys, judges,
and clerk of court in their official capacities."), report and recommendation adopted in part sub

nom. Day v. A. T Santaniello, No. 5: 15-CV-165-FL, 2015 WL 730644 7 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2015).
Plaintiff has not identified any waiver or abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
in her claims. See, e.g., Biggs v. N Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 241 (4th Cir.
2020) (Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity for§ 1983 suits).
Castle is also entitled to judicial immunity. As discussed above, assistant clerks of superior
court are judicial officers for the purposes of foreclosure proceedings. It is firmly settled law that
"a judge may not be attacked for exercising his judicial authority, even if done improperly."

Mullins v. Oakley, 437 F.2d 1217, 1218 (4th Cir. 1971). The only two circumstances in which
judicial immunity does not apply are when a judge acts outside of their judicial capacity or in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 - 12 (1991). Neither of those
circumstances appear here.
C. Rooker-Feldman and preclusion

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Defendants Castle, Select Portfolio, Randhir Gandhi, and Thomas McDonald each argue
that either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res judicata, or collateral estoppel further bar plaintiff's
claims against them.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction
over challenges to state court decisions. Friedman 's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F .3d 191, 196 (4th Cir.
2002). "The Rooker- Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to ... cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). "[I]f the state-court
loser seeks redress in the federal district court for the injury caused by the state-court decision, his
federal claim is, by definition, 'inextricably intertwined' with the state-court decision, and is
therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the federal district court." Davani v. Virginia Dep't of

Transp. , 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006).
Although plaintiff's claims are difficult to decipher, she appears to challenge the validity
of the foreclosure proceedings regarding the property at 2509 Jefferson Drive in Greenville.
Plaintiff alleges that the property is not in the State of North Carolina, that McDonald had no
standing to institute the foreclosure, that Select Portfolio Service and Gandhi lacked authority to
service a debt on the property, that Castle was acting as a probate judge and was without authority
to enter the order to allow foreclosure sale, and that the facts underpinning the decision were
erroneous. Accordingly, to grant plaintiff relief would require this Court to enter an order rendering
the foreclosure order ineffectual. Plaintiff's claims are therefore barred by Rooker-Feldman and
the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. See also Naylor v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
No. 3:15-CV-116-RJC, 2016 WL 55292, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 5, 2016) ("this Court and other

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courts have held that Rooker-Feldman prohibits a plaintiff from asserting federal claims attacking
a state court foreclosure action.").
"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of any claims that were or could
have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties." Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284,
287 (4th Cir. 2008). Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "bars the relitigation of
specific issues that were actually determined in a prior action." Id. Under North Carolina law, res
judicata applies where there is "(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) an identity
of the causes of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of the parties or their
privies in the two suits." Moody v. Able Outdoor, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 80, 84 (2005). Collateral
estoppel applies where "(1) the issues are the same as those involved in the prior action; (2) the
issues have been raised and actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the issues were material and
relevant to the disposition of the prior action and (4) the determination of the issues in the prior
action was necessary and essential to the resultingjudgment." Megaro v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151 ,
160 (4th Cir. 2023). " [C]ollateral estoppel precludes the subsequent adjudication of a previously
determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different claim." Whitacre
P 'ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 (2004).
In the order approving foreclosure sale, the assistant clerk of court found that the statutory
requirements for foreclosure had been met. Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from re-litigating those
issues, even where she has pled different claims. As the damages plaintiff seeks would stem from
issues which have been conclusively decided in a foreclosure proceeding, plaintiff is collaterally
estopped from raising the claims in her complaint, and she has therefore failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Funderburkv. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA ., 241 N.C. App. 4 15,
423 (20 15); see also Gray v. Fed. Nat '! Mortg. Ass'n, 264 N.C. App. 642, 650 (2019).

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Plaintiff argues in her oppositions that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to
non-judicial foreclosures, citing Matter of Lucks, 369 N.C. 222, 227 (2016). But in Matter of
Lucks, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a finding by a clerk or trial court that the

evidence presented was inadequate to authorize a foreclosure sale "does not implicate res judicate
or collateral estoppel in the traditional sense." Id. Here, the assistant clerk of court found that the
evidence was adequate to proceed to foreclosure . Matter ofLuck is inapposite. See Gray, 264 N.C.
App. 642, 647 (2019); Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-00263-FDW, 2017 WL
2490007, at *2 n.3 (W.D.N.C. June 8, 2017).
D. Failure to state a claim
Finally, the defendants argue that plaintiffs complaint fails to allege any plausible claims,
and the Court agrees. Plaintiffs claims amount to little more than legal conclusions and are
unsupported by factual allegations which would nudge her claims across the line from conceivable
to plausible. Plaintiff cites to a number of federal statutes in her claims but fails to specifically
allege how any of the defendants violated those statutes. For example, plaintiff alleges that Randhir
Gandhi, the CEO of Select Portfolio Servicing, is, as a servicer, governed by Title 12 of the United
States Code and has no authority over private property which is "not used as a bank building
maritime vessel, not properly used for money making, no authority to initiate a foreclosure or refer
property to anybody else to initiate anything against the property." [DE 1 1 44]. Plaintiff alleges
that any promissory note signed in one of the contiguous United States which is intended to
encumber her real property is void ab-initio and in violation of 12 U.S.C. §§ 615 and 616, portions
of the Edge Act, which concerns "corporation[ s] organized 'for the purpose of engaging in
international or foreign banking or other international or foreign financial operations[.]"' Bank of

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Am. Corp. v. Braga Lemgruber, 385 F. Supp. 2d 200, 207 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs claims are, at bottom, difficult to comprehend and at times nonsensical. 1
In sum, plaintiffs claims against defendant Castle are barred by Eleventh Amendment and
judicial immunity. Her claims against all defendants are further barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and collateral estoppel. Insofar as any claims are not barred, plaintiff has failed to state
any plausible claims for relief. Her complaint is appropriately dismissed with prejudice. 2
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, defendants ' motions to dismiss [DE 14; DE 22;
DE 26; DE 29] are GRANTED. The remaining motions [DE 7; DE 32] are DENIED AS MOOT.
Plaintiffs complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter
judgment and close the case.

SO ORDERED, this

_k day of March 2025.

TERRENCE W. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUD

Additionally, as McDonald has argued, a trustee, as Ms. Macedon is described in the complaint,
may not appear prose on behalf of a trust. Peterson v. City of Hickory, No. CIV. 5:07CV74, 2008
WL 2980096, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 30, 2008). Plaintiff, who does not allege that she is an attorney,
also may not proceed pro se on behalf of the United States. See Wojcicki v. SCANAISCE&G, 94 7
F.3d 240, 244-246 (4th Cir. 2020).
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Several defendants also argue that plaintiffs Rule 4 service was ineffective. In light of the
foregoing, the Court declines to reach this argument.
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