Wong v. Countyline Auto Center Inc. et al

Filing 5

ORDER - Plaintiff's action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's motions for hearing and direct assignment (DE 1) are DENIED. Plaintiff's motion to seal is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein. The clerk is DIRECTED to maintain plaintiff's filings under seal but the case docket and the instant order are not sealed. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 6/4/2024. A copy of this Order was sent via US mail to Susanne Wong at 3537 Dr. Martin Luther King Blvd., Unit 290, New Bern, NC 28562. (Collins, S)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
NO. 4:24-CV-83-FL
SUSANNE WONG,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTYLINE AUTO CENTER INC.
d/b/a Lexus of Pembroke Pines, a Florida
based automobile dealership; TOYOTA
FINANCIAL SERVICES SECURITIES
USA CORPORATION; TQI EXCHANGE,
LLC,
Defendants.

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ORDER

This matter is before the court on its own initiative to address the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. Also pending are plaintiff’s motion to seal, for direct assignment, and
for hearing (DE 1). For the following reasons, this matter is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motions for direct assignment and for hearing are denied. Plaintiff’s
motion to seal is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced this action June 3, 2024, in the form of a “special bill in equity for
specific performance & declaratory relief” against defendants, who are alleged to be “a Floridabased automobile dealership doing business in conjunction with Toyota Financial Services
Securities USA Corporation and TQI Exchange, LLC, operating collectively through several
dealerships located throughout the State of Florida and North Carolina.” (Comp. (DE 2) at 1).

Plaintiff asserts declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of defendants’ alleged “breach of
fiduciary duty,” and she seeks a release of “all rights, assets, interest, rents, issues, proceeds and
titles by nature associated with the account related to this matter and the Estate of ‘SUSANNE
WONG’TM/ ‘Susanne Wong’ to the implied surety, now subrogee under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation, substitution, and exoneration and the doctrine of quia timet.” (Id. at 3).
By way of summary, plaintiff alleges in an accompanying statement of facts that she “bears
antecedent claim and superior title to the Estate of principal debtor, ‘SUSANNE WONG’TM/
‘Susanne Wong’, a Florida organization, including but not limited to all collateral, assets, funds,
rights, titles, interests.” (Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 1). Plaintiff alleges that she “is a sentient being,
born on the land/country of the State of Florida, temporarily visiting the State of North Carolina.”
(Compl. (DE 2) at 1). She alleges she “leased a 2021 Lexus NX300” from defendants in Florida
on May 24, 2021, and that defendants sent her recently a statement bearing a “total balance of”
$26,982.06, and a “buyer’s order” bearing a total of $27,295.35. (Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 2, 4).
Plaintiff further alleges that she “remains in possession of said Automobile and claims full title by
nature and accepts as grantee absolute.” (Id. at 6).
In her motions, plaintiff seeks to have the matter “assigned to local Judge” at New Bern,
to seal the case “to protect the nature of all rights,” and to schedule the matter for an “evidentiary
hearing[] with the chancellor or clerk in private” before June 14, 2024. (Pl’s Mot. (DE 1) at 2).
COURT’S DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties, nor can a defect in subject-

matter jurisdiction be waived by the parties.” Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc.,
369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004). “Accordingly, questions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be

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raised at any point during the proceedings and may (or, more precisely, must) be raised sua sponte
by the court.” Id. (emphasis in original).
“The Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in
those specific instances authorized by Congress.” Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir.
1968). “A court is to presume, therefore, that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and
until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper.” United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 274 (4th
Cir. 2008). “[W]hen the inquiry involves the jurisdiction of a federal court,—the presumption in
every stage of a cause being that it is without the jurisdiction of a court of the United States, unless
the contrary appears from the record.” Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337
(1895).
“Furthermore, the complaint must state on its face the grounds for its jurisdiction.”
Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. “[T]he facts providing the court jurisdiction must be affirmatively
alleged in the complaint.” Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, MD., 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir.
1999). “These rules are applicable to diversity as well as to the ‘Federal question’ jurisdiction of
the District Courts.” Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. “The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that
federal question jurisdiction not exist unless a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff’s
properly pleaded complaint.” Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Drain, 237 F.3d 366, 370 (4th
Cir. 2001).
“Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear only those cases in which
a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”
Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 249 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 2001); see Goldsmith v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 845 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1988) (“The mere existence of a disputed

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issue of federal law does not confer federal question jurisdiction.”). Likewise, “diversity
jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from . . . plaintiff.”
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). The amount in controversy in
excess of $75,000 also is determined “by reference to the plaintiff’s complaint.” JTH Tax, Inc. v.
Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 2010); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
“Pro se complaints are to be read liberally.” White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir.
1989). “However, liberal construction does not require [the court] to attempt to discern the
unexpressed intent of the plaintiff, but only to determine the actual meaning of the words used in
the complaint.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013). Liberal construction also
“does not undermine the requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions.”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008).
B.

Analysis
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of this court’s subject matter jurisdiction over

this case, either by virtue of federal question or diversity jurisdiction. The court addresses these
components of federal subject matter jurisdiction in turn below.
1.

Federal Question

A federal question does not “appear[] on the face of” plaintiff’s complaint. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp., 237 F.3d at 370. To the contrary, plaintiff asserts only common law claims
for “breach of fiduciary duty,” and for equitable and injunctive relief, to declare plaintiff’s right
and title to property in the form of a leased vehicle. (Compl. (DE 2) at 3; Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 1).
Plaintiff asserts, variously, that the instant case is a “special trust matter under the maxims of
equity,” (Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 6), and a “private trust matter” with defendants “appointed as
fiduciary trustee(s) [who] received delivery of special deposit” from plaintiff, (Compl. (DE 2) at

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2), and an action for “equitable subrogation, substitution, and exoneration,” (id. at 3), which do
not constitute claims under federal law. See, e.g., Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ Franchising, LLC,
757 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a plaintiff’s request to “foreclose on the equitable
lien awarded by the Guilford County court is manifestly a cause of action created by state law”).
The substance of plaintiff’s claim, liberally construed, is to relieve plaintiff of liability to
defendants for a private commercial transaction, (see Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 1-8), which is not a
matter of federal law.
Plaintiff’s references to historic federal documents and the Constitution in the complaint
and accompanying papers, along with references to other historic state documents and laws, are
not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. See Interstate Petroleum Corp., 249 F.3d at
219. For example, in a section of plaintiff’s complaint captioned “jurisdiction and notice of
conflict and variance of law,” plaintiff asserts:
In the event the interpretation of words, doctrines, ideas, principles and laws are in
conflict, then the interpretations shall be governed by that of English Chancery,
established in the State of North Carolina as early as 1713, ratified by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, and American Equity Jurisprudence and North Carolina Constitution
circa 1776 which protection arises under my country governed by the written “We
The People”, “The Constitution for the united states of America” 1776, Article
Three, Section Two, Clause One, Maxims of Equity, and private trust law: equity,
the soul, intent, and spirit of the law, shall always prevail.
(Compl. (DE 2) at 1). References to the Constitution and federal laws in this manner do not
“establish[] either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Interstate Petroleum
Corp., 249 F.3d at 219. Similarly unavailing is plaintiff’s assertion that “conflict and variance of
law . . . demands a court at equity ruled by the exclusive equity jurisprudence under Article Three,
Section Two, Clause One of the Constitution of the [U]nited [S]tates of America 1776, whereby
exclusive equity jurisprudence shall always prevail in the course of these special matters.”
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(Compl. (DE 2) at 2; see also Pl’s Mot. (DE 1) at 3 (stating “Article III, § 2, subdivision 1 of the
written constitution authorizes such proper jurisdiction”)). Such references to the Constitution and
equity, untethered from the basis for any claim under federal law, does not meet “the requirement
that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 304 n.5.
Likewise, plaintiff’s assertions that she “demands civilian due process on both Federal and
State levels,” and that her rights “secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution” shall not be destroyed, (Compl. (DE 2) at 2), are insufficient to confer federal
question jurisdiction. These assertions do not demonstrate “that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.” Interstate Petroleum Corp. This is especially so under the circumstances
of the instant action, where defendants are not alleged to be “state actor[s],” and plaintiff does not
allege any facts plausibly giving rise to a federal constitutional or civil rights claim. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
Accordingly, plaintiff does not “allege in h[er] pleadings the facts essential to show
jurisdiction” on the basis of a federal question. Pinkley, 191 F.3d at 399.
2.

Diversity Jurisdiction

Plaintiff also does not plead the necessary components of diversity jurisdiction. As an
initial matter, she has not alleged “each defendant is a citizen of a different State from . . . plaintiff.”
Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 373. To the contrary, plaintiff alleges she “is a sentient
being, born on the land/country of the State of Florida, temporarily visiting the State of North
Carolina,” and that one of the defendants is a “Florida-based automobile dealership.” (Compl.
(DE 2) at 1). Plaintiff further alleges that the “principal debtor, ‘SUSANNE WONG’TM/ ‘Susanne
Wong’,” is “a Florida organization, including but not limited to all collateral, assets, funds, rights,

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titles, interests.” (Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 1; see Pl’s Cover Sheet (DE 4) at 1 (stating “county where
action arose” is “[b]roward”)). As such, plaintiff suggests both she and one of the defendants is a
citizen of Florida, precluding diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s assertion that she is “temporarily visiting the State of North Carolina,” and
provision of a New Bern, North Carolina” address in her signature block, (Compl. (DE 2) at 1, 5),
are not determinative of the instant jurisdictional inquiry, because “residency is not sufficient to
establish citizenship.” Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 937 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2008). The court
also takes judicial notice that plaintiff filed suit in 2023 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida providing address in Davie, Florida. See Wong v. American Express
Company, Case No. 0:23-CV-61454-AHS (Doc. 1 July 31, 2023) at 10. Thus, plaintiff has not
pleaded diverse citizenship of the parties necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction.
Furthermore, plaintiff has not pleaded an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00.
Rather, she alleges that defendants have demanded of plaintiff the sum of $27,295.35, and plaintiff
suggests she has no obligation to pay this amount. (See Pl’s Mem. (DE 3) at 4-6). Plaintiff also
alleges no damages and pleads “no dollar demand.” (Pl’s Cover Sheet (DE 4) at 1; see Compl.
(DE 2) at 3). Accordingly, an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000 also is not established
“by reference to the plaintiff’s complaint.” JTH Tax, Inc., 624 F.3d at 638; see 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).
In sum, plaintiff fails to make either an “affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis” or
an allegation of “facts supporting jurisdiction” Pinkley, 191 F.3d at 399. Accordingly, the
complaint must be dismissed “without prejudice” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 403.
“A dismissal for lack of . . . subject matter jurisdiction . . . must be one without prejudice, because
a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.” S.

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Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175,
185 (4th Cir. 2013).
Finally, with respect to plaintiff’s motions, where the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, plaintiff’s motions for hearing and direct assignment necessarily must be denied.
Regarding plaintiff’s motion to seal, plaintiff has not demonstrated a basis in law or in fact for
sealing the case in its entirety, including the instant order. However, the court directs the clerk to
maintain plaintiff’s filings under seal where she has marked each page as “private – proprietary –
restric[t]ed – confidential.” (E.g., Pl’s Mot. (DE 1) at 1; Compl. (DE 2) at 1); Pl’s Mem. (DE 3)
at 1).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, on the court’s own initiative, plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motions for hearing
and direct assignment (DE 1) are DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion to seal is granted in part and denied
in part as set forth herein. The clerk is DIRECTED to maintain plaintiff’s filings under seal but
the case docket and the instant order are not sealed. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of June, 2024.

_____________________________
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge

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