Benjamin v. Iman et al
Filing
50
ORDER denying 34 Motion for Reconsideration and granting 43 Motion for Summary Judgment - Signed by Chief Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 05/17/2011. (Baker, C.)
n'J THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLn'JA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO.5:09-CV-553-FL
CHRISTOPHER BENJAMn'J,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, DALE IMAN,
DOUG HEWITT, TERRIE HUTAFF,
GREG SCHAEFER, GERALD DIETZEN,
ERNEST LOVE, WILLIE MCDONALD,
STANLEY SADLER, STEVEN BULLARD,
and MAYOR ANTHONY G. CHAVONNE,
Defendants.
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ORDER
This matter comes before the court upon plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of this
court's order dismissing all but one of his claims (DE # 34). Also before the court is the motion of
defendant Ernest Love ("Love") seeking summaryjudgment on plaintiff s sole remaining claim (DE
# 43). These motions have been fully briefed, and the issues raised are ripe for adjudication. For
the reasons that follow, plaintiff s motion for reconsideration is denied, and defendant Love's motion
for summary judgment is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on December 28,2009, by filing a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and attaching a copy of his proposed complaint. The
proposed complaint contained causes of action for racial and religious discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq., and violations
of plaintiffs First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985. On frivolity review pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a magistrate judge recommended
dismissing plaintiffs Title VII claims against the individual defendants. The court adopted that
recommendation on April 15,2010.
On May 14, 2010, defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). By order entered August 5,2010, the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The
court found that plaintiffs Title VII claim was barred by the statute oflimitations. The court further
concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a Sixth Amendment claim, a double jeopardy claim under
the Fifth Amendment, a § 1983 municipal liability claim, a § 1985 conspiracy claim, or a state law
claim for employment discrimination. Finally, the court concluded that defendants Gerald Dietzen,
Willie McDonald, Stanley Sadler, and Steven Bullard were entitled to qualified immunity on
plaintiff s remaining claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed all claims except for the § 1983 claim
against defendant Love for violation of plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
On February 22, 2011, more than six months after the court's dismissal order, plaintifffiled
a document titled "Plaintiff Appeals Judges Order to Dismiss the Following Charges." Plaintiff
argues in that filing that the court erred in finding that his Title VII action was barred by the statute
oflimitations, that the court erred in granting qualified immunity to any of the defendants, and that
the court erred in dismissing his § 1985 claim. By order entered March 8, 2011, the court notified
the parties that it was treating the filing as a motion for reconsideration.
Defendants timely
responded in opposition to the motion, and plaintiff did not file any reply.
On March 22, 2011, defendant Love filed a motion seeking summary judgment on the
remaining § 1983 claim against him. He argues that plaintiffs employment was terminated due to
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plaintiffs poor job performance, not religious discrimination. Defendant Love also asserts that
plaintiff was provided with an appropriate religious accommodation.
Plaintiff responded in
opposition on April 18, 20 II, in a filing titled "Plaintiff Motion for Denial of Defendant Ernest
Love, Etc. Motion for Summary Judgment."
STATEMENT OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
The undisputed facts, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are as follows. I On June 21,
2007, the City of Fayetteville (the "City") offered plaintiff employment as an Equipment Operator
II (i,e., a garbage truck driver). Plaintiff began working for the City a few days later, on June 25,
2007. Defendant Love was one ofplaintiffs supervisors. As a new employee, plaintiff was subject
to a one-year probationary period of employment.
In September 2007, plaintiff was granted leave to observe two religious holidays, Rosh
Hashanah and Sukkot. On November 20,2007, plaintiff requested to be allowed to leave work by
sunset on Friday evenings so that he could observe the Sabbath. The City agreed to honor his
request, informing plaintiff that it would secure a sunset schedule and ensure that his workday on
Fridays ended before that time. The City noted that it would reevaluate the request if circumstances
changed and that plaintiff might be required to use vacation time.
Particularly relevant to the instant suit are two instances of alleged discrimination by
defendant Love. First, on November 30, 2007, defendant Love observed plaintiff socializing with
1 Plaintiff disputes many of the following facts. Although plaintiff has submitted a great deal of documentary
evidence, cataloged at docket entries 35 through 37, he has submitted no affidavits or other evidence which conflicts with
these facts. Instead, plaintiffappears impermissibly to rely on denials in his memorandum opposing summary judgment
to create an issue of material fact. See Rountree v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd .. 933 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The
arguments of counsel, absent any evidence such as sworn affidavits accompanying objections to a motion for summary
judgment, fail to meet the evidentiary standard necessary to create a genuine issue of material fact."). Additionally,
where plaintifffailed to respond to defendant Love's requests for admission, he is deemed to have admitted the material
facts set forth herein. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).
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co-workers in the parking lot at approximately 5: 15 p.m., more than an hour after he had completed
work and a few minutes after sunset. Defendant Love wrote an email noting this fact, and it was
placed in plaintiff s personnel file. Second, on December 28, 2007, plaintiff called defendant Love
to inform him that he needed to leave early for religious reasons. Defendant dispatched another
driver to complete plaintiffs route. Although he was not required to, plaintiff chose to continue
working until 5:00 p.m., shortly before sunset.
During his first year of employment, plaintiff was involved in a number of accidents. For
example, on July 7, 2007, plaintiff damaged a mailbox while operating his garbage truck. On
September 7, 2007, he backed into a fire hydrant. On January 11,2008, while plaintiff was driving
his garbage truck, his coworker standing on the side of the truck hit his head on a stop sign. A City
investigation concluded that plaintiff had been driving carelessly at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff also received a number of disciplinary warnings. On December 10, 2007, he
received oral counseling for failing to complete his trash route in a timely manner and for removing
items from the trash for personal use. On May 28, 2008, plaintiff received a disciplinary action for
failing to properly complete a pre-trip inspection.
Although he did not receive any formal
disciplinary action for it, plaintiff also angrily resisted a request from another supervisor to assist
with a yard waste route on April 28, 2009.
In part because of the accidents and disciplinary warnings, plaintiff received poor
performance evaluations during his probationary year. On December 31, 2007, he received a
performance evaluation rating his work as "must improve." This evaluation was later rescinded and
replaced with another evaluation which offered more explicit instructions on how plaintiff could
improve his performance.
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On June 24, 2008, plaintiff received his one-year perfonnance evaluation. He was again
rated "must improve," based on his multiple vehicle accidents, poor work efficiency, and negative
disposition towards his supervisors. Also on that date, plaintiff received a notice of consideration
of dismissal. The recommendation was based on plaintiff s failure to perfonn assigned duties and
carry out directions, careless and/or improper use of city equipment, and violation of established
administrative policies and/or procedures. On August 8, 2008, after a pre-dismissal hearing,
plaintiff s employment with the City was tenninated.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Reconsider
I.
Standard of Review
The court "retains the power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments ... at any
time prior to final judgment when such is warranted." Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Fanns, Inc., 326
FJd 505, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936
F.2d 1462, 1469 (4th Cir. 1991)). "Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are not
subject to the strict standards applicable to motions for reconsideration of a final judgment," Am.
Canoe Ass'n, 326 F.3d at 514, but rather are "committed to the discretion of the district court," id.
at 515 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.. 460 U.S. I, 12 (1983)).
Nevertheless, while not bound by Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), the court may look to the general
principles embodied therein. See Fayetteville Investors, 936 F.2d at 1470.
2.
Analysis
The court declines to reconsider its dismissal of the other counts for a number of reasons.
First, plaintiff s motion for reconsideration, filed after the close of discovery and more than six
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months after entry of the order complained of, is deemed untimely. Cf. Robinson v. Wix Filtration
Com. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 412n.12 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a party moving for relief under Rule
60(b) must make an initial showing that its motion is timely). Second, the court finds that it
correctly assessed plaintiffs Title VII and § 1985 claims, as well as defendants' motion seeking
qualified immunity.
Where plaintiff identifies no error of law, but instead indicates "mere
disagreement" with the court's ruling, he is not entitled to reconsideration. See Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir.1993). Finally, in light of the record evidence and the court's
disposition of the remaining claim against defendant Love as set forth below, most (ifnot all) of the
dismissed claims are almost certainly meritless, rendering the dismissed defendants' reintroduction
into this case a futile endeavor.
Accordingly, where plaintiff s motion is untimely, does not identify any legal error
committed by the district court, and seeks to bring meritless claims against previously dismissed
defendants, it is DENIED.
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
1.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (holding that a factual
dispute is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit and "genuine" only if there is
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party). The party seeking
summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Com. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986). Once the moving party has met
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its burden, the nonmoving party then must affinnatively demonstrate with specific evidence that
there exists a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574,586-87 (1986).
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Analysis
Plaintiffs claim that defendant Love violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments stem from the alleged failure of defendant Love to grant him a religious
accommodation. "To establish a prima facie religious accommodation claim, a plaintiff must
establish that: (I) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment
requirement; (2) he or she infonned the [defendant] of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for
failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of
Richmond, 101 FJd 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)?
"If the
employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the [defendant] to show that it
could not accommodate the plaintiffs religious needs without undue hardship." Id. To satisfy this
burden, the defendant must demonstrate either "( 1) that [he] provided the plaintiff with a reasonable
accommodation for his or her religious observances or (2) that such accommodation was not
provided because it would have ... resulted in more than a de minimis cost to the employer."
E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles. Inc., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2 In Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2003), the Fourth Circuit reiterated that a municipal
employee may bring a § 1983 equal protection claim in lieu ofa Title VII claim. See also Campbell v. Galloway, 483
F.3d 258, 272 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Title VII does not provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination in employment,
... and public employees are entitled to bring a § 1983 action asserting Equal Protection claims."). Although this court
is unaware of any precedential Fourth Circuit decision describing the contours of a § 1983 religious accommodation
claim, the court of appeals has generally used the same framework developed under Title VII in evaluating race
discrimination claims under § 1983. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the
court employs Title VII's religious accommodation framework to plaintiffs action.
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In its previous order declining to dismiss the religious accommodation claim, the court relied
on plaintiff's allegations that defendant Love, motivated by religious animus towards
plaintiff, "circulated an email to plaintiff's other supervisors questioning the sincerity of plaintiff's
religious beliefs" and later "refused to allow plaintiff to leave his route as permitted by an
accommodation letter, hoping to force plaintiffto choose between his religious beliefs and keeping
his job." (Order [DE # 30] at p. 8.) However, the undisputed facts now before the court do not
support such allegations. Instead, the email entered into the record does not mention plaintiff's
religious beliefs, but simply notes that plaintiff remained socializing with his co-workers after being
permitted to end work early. Similarly, the evidence before the court indicates that defendant Love
did not refuse to allow plaintiff to leave his route as permitted by the accommodation.
In short, plaintiff has met only the first two elements ofa religious accommodation case: He
demonstrated a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement, and he
informed his employer of this belief. However, he has not shown that he was disciplined for failure
to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. Instead, the evidence demonstrates that
plaintiff was terminated (not by defendant Love, but by the City) for his multiple vehicle accidents,
failure to perform his job efficiently, and negative disposition towards his supervisors. Moreover,
the evidence shows that the City granted plaintiff a religious accommodation, and that defendant
Love did nothing to interfere with this accommodation. Accordingly, defendant Love's motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED. 3
3 Defendant Love also moves for summary judgment on what he perceives to be a standalone equal protection
claim. To the extent plaintiff makes such a claim, it fails where he has not demonstrated that "he has been treated
differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or
purposeful discrimination." See Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th CiT. 2001). The evidence shows that
plaintiffs employment was terminated for failure to comply with standards applicable to all probationary employees.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for reconsideration (DE # 34) is DENIED, and
defendant Love's motion for summary judgment (DE # 43) is GRANTED. Where all defendants
have been dismissed or been granted summary judgment in their favor, the Clerk of Court is directed
to enter judgment against plaintiff and to close this case.
).
SO ORDERED, this the
/7
day of May, 2011.
a
cd
OUIsEw.~ANA~
Chief United States District Court Judge
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