Becton v. City of Raleigh Police Department et al

Filing 11

ORDER dismissing plaintiff's action as frivolous. Signed by US District Judge James C. Dever III on 8/22/2011. (Sawyer, D.)

IN TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

No.5:10-CV-297-D

CHARLES DAVID BECTON,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)

CITY OF RALEIGH POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER

)
)
)
)
)

Charles David Becton ("Becton" or "plaintiff'), a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed this
actionpursuantto42U.S.C. § 1983 [D.E.I]. Becton names as defendants the City ofRaleigh Police
Department, Raleigh Police Chief Harry Dolan, Raleigh Police Officer J.K. Layman, Wake County
Sheriff Donnie Harrison, Wake County Senior Resident Superior Court Judge Donald W. Stephens,
and Wake County Clerk of Court Nancy Freeman. Id. at 1-2. Becton seeks leave to proceed in
fonna pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 [D.E.2]. On October 14,2010, Becton filed a motion for
a copy ofthe court's local rules and for ''the U.S. Marshals [to] serve each named Defendant" [D.E.
10]. As explained below, the court dismisses the complaint as frivolous and denies plaintiff's
motion.
Section 1915 provides that courts shall review complaints in which prisoners seek relief from
a governmental entity or officer and dismiss any case that is "frivolous or malicious," that "fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989). A case is frivolous ifit "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 325. Claims that are legally frivolous are "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory
and include claims ofinfringement ofa legal interest which clearly does not exist." Adams v. Rice,
40 F3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted). Claims that are factually frivolous lack an
"arguable basis" in fact. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. The standard used to evaluate the sufficiency
ofthe pleading is flexible, and a pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94
(2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). Erickson, however, does not undermine the "requirement
that a pleading contain 'more than labels and conclusions.'" Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F3d 298,
304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007»; see
Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009); Nemet Chevrolet. Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com.
Inc., 591 F 3d 250, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2009); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F 3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
On June 10,2010, Becton was convicted in Wake County of felony breaking and entering
and larceny, and was sentenced as a habitual felon. See N.C. Dep't of Corr., Offender Pub. Info.,
http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/opilviewoffender.do?method=view&0ffenderID=0025948

(last

visited Aug. 22, 2011); see Compl. ~ 11. Becton challenges various pretrial proceedings, including
the evidence which formed the basis for his arrest, issues with getting released on bond, and
attempts to procure DNA swabs from him and submission of DNA evidence to the State Bureau
of Investigation in violation of his privacy rights, the failure of the Wake County clerk's office to
file things, and a failure to arraign him or conduct a hearing "on any pretrial motions that were
properly filed with the court." Compl. ~ 11, 14, 16, 18-20,23-24. Becton further contends that
defendant Judge Stephens "consulted with all of the above named defendants and conspired with
them" in order to obtain evidence to convict him. Id. ~ 17. Finally, Becton asserts an equal

2

protection claim on the ground that he "is an Afro-American male and all of the above named
Defendants are white" and thus "acted in conformity that discriminates against Blacks, Latinos and
other minorities." Id. ~ 22. Plaintiff asserts violations of his "4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendment"
rights, and seeks declaratory relief, $225,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages from each defendant, and court costs. Id. W15, 28-33.
To recover money damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a plaintiff must show that the underlying conviction has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance ofa writ ofhabeas corpus. See Heck v. Humph.n;!y, 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994).
"A district court must undertake a case specific analysis to determine whether success on the claims
would necessarily imply the invalidity ofa conviction or sentence." Thigpen v. McDonnell, 273 F.
App'x 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished). Here, Becton contends that his
conviction is invalid.

Because Becton's conviction has not been overturned or otherwise

invalidated, Becton may not proceed with his section 1983 claim.
Moreover, Becton has named several defendants who are either immune from or otherwise
not amenable to suit under section 1983. As for defendant Judge Stephens, "[f]ew doctrines were
more solidly established at common law than the immunity ofjudges from liability for damages for
acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction." Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547,553-54 (1967).
As for the defendant City of Raleigh Police Department, it is not a person amenable to suit. See

Cooper v. Brunswick Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 7:1O-CV-14-D, 2011 WL 738610, at *4 n.2
(E.D.N.C.Feb. 7,2011)(collectingcases),reportandrecommendationadoptedby2011 WL 736670

3

(B.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011) (unpublished). As for defendant Harrison, plaintiffs claims against
Harrison do not involve allegations of any specific act or omission by Harrison, but instead are
based on Harrison's supervisory position. However, the doctrine of respondeat superior generally
does not apply to a section 1983 claim. See,~, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49; Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436U.S. 658, 694(1978); Carterv. Morris, 164F.3d215, 220-21 (4thCir. 1999); Shaw
v. Stromi, 13 F.3d 791, 798-99 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, Becton's claims against these defendants are
dismissed as frivolous.
As for Becton's difficulties in being released on bond, neither the Due Process Clause ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Eighth Amendment provides an absolute right to be released on
bond. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987). Thus, Becton has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and this claim is dismissed.
As for Becton's allegations ofracial discrimination, the equal protection clause provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first
demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and
that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v.
Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648,654 (4th Cir. 2001). Becton has not stated that he was treated differently
from any person with whom he is similarly situated. Although pro se litigants are held to less
stringent pleading standards than attorneys, the court is not required to accept as true legal
conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See,~, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-52; Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555; Coleman v. Md. Ct. ofAppeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
2011 WL 500227 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1016). Becton has not made plausible allegations
to support his equal protection claim.

4

As for Becton's allegations ofconspiracy, to allege a conspiracy under section 1983, Becton
must allege "that the [defendants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in
furtherance ofthe conspiracy which resulted in [the plaintiff's] deprivation ofa constitutional right
...." Hinkle v. City ofClarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). Mere conclusory allegations
ofa conspiracy do not demonstrate the "meeting ofthe minds" element.

See,~,

Simmons v. Poe,

47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995). Becton fails to plausibly allege a "meeting of the minds"
between any of the named defendants to violate his constitutional rights. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 304 n.5. Thus, Becton has failed to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.
For the reasons stated, the court DISMISSES plaintiffs action as frivolous under 28 U.s.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff's motion for a copy ofthe court's local rules and for ''the U.S. Marshals
[to] serve each named Defendant" [D.E. 10] is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk ofCourt is directed

to close the case.
SO ORDERED. This ft day of August 2011.

~ ...DA~~
~SC.DEVERm
Umted States District Judge

5