Sain v. Quinn et al

Filing 35

ORDER denying without prejudice Goodyear's 28 Motion to Dismiss and granting defendant Quinn's 12 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Senior Judge Malcolm J. Howard on 12/27/11. (Lee, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

NO. 5:10-CV-505-H

ROBERT L. SAIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER

BILL QUINN, Human Resources
Manager and THE GOODYEAR TIRE
& RUBBER COMPANY,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on defendant Bill Quinn's
motion

to

dismiss

and

defendant

The

Goodyear

Tire

Plaintiff has

Company's ("Goodyear") partial motion to dismiss.
responded

to

both

motions,

Plaintiff

has

filed

an

further

filings

has

and

defendants

have

additional

sur-reply.

The

expired.

This

& Rubber

matter

is

replied.
time

for

ripe

for

adjudication.
BACKGROUND

On November 11, 2010, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
motion

for

leave

to

proceed

in

forma

attached his complaint to the motion.

pauperis

("IFP")

and

His IFP motion was denied

/

on November 22,

2010,

and on January 25,

2011,

after plaintiff

paid his filing fee, the complaint was docketed by the court.
Plaintiff purports to bring claims against defendants under
both Title VII,
Disabilities
U.S.C.

Act

1981

§

defendant

The

work

its

at

Plaintiff

42 U.S.C.

("§

("ADA"),

Tire

in

that
a

U. S. C.

North

alleges

he

Company

Carolina

defendants

timely

et

Rubber

&

the Americans with

12101

§

Plaintiff

Fayetteville,

alleges

accommodation

42

1981").

Goodyear

2000e et seq.,

§

in

was

and

("Goodyear")

[him]

violation

in

(Compl.

'4,6.)

Plaintiff

occurred from 2007 through 2009.

alleges

the

to

2007.

reasonable
of

the

which, he alleges was "discriminatory with respect to
race."

42

hired by

plant

"denied

manner"

seq.

ADA,
[his]

discrimination

Plaintiff filed a charge with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC)

2009 and/or April 3,

He received a right

2006.

(Compl.

'11.)

to sue letter from the EEOC on August 20, 2010.

on March 27,

(Compl. , 11.)

COURT'S DISCUSSION
I.

Defendant Quinn's Motion to Dismiss

Defendant

Quinn argues

that

neither

Title

VII

nor

the

ADA

provides for individual liability, even where that individual is
a

supervisor.

This

court

supervisor, such as Mr. Quinn,

agrees.

Because

an

individual

is not the plaintiff's "employer"

2

as

defined by

the

statues,

plaintiff's

claims

and the ADA fail as to defendant Quinn.
Servo

Inc.,

not

liable

violations"

Cir.

in

their

because

plaitniff's
(4 th

159 F.3d 177,

individual
an

1999)

(the

Baird

ADA

V.

does

1998)

("Supervisors are

capacities

Rose,

not

for

supervisor

indi vidual

"employer.") i

Lissau v. Southern Food

(4 th Cir.

180

under Title VII

192

"permit

Title

VII

not

the

is

F.3d 462,
an

action

471-72
against

individual defendants.").
Plaintiff
§

1981.

also attempts

can

court

not

reach

reveals

that

need

complaint

caption of

be

the

held

labile
this

complaint that Mr.
plaintiff's

v.

claims

129 S.Ct.

Twombley,

under

issue

defendant

complaint.

allegations against Mr. Quinn.

Iqbal,

claim under 42

The caselaw is not as clear as

supervisors

the

to bring a

§

to whether individual
1981.

because

Quinn's
There

However,

1937,

review

name

appears

only in

no

specific

factual

are

550 U.S.

544,

contain sufficient factual

(2009)
570

the

Mr.

Quinn.

See

Therefore,
Ashcroft

(2007)

allegations

(requiring that complaint
to be

"plausible on its

Defendant Goodyear's Partial Motion to Dismiss

3

v.

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

face") .
II.

of

Plaintiff has not alleged in his

against

1949

this

a

Quinn discriminated against him.
fail

U. S. C.

Defendant

Goodyear

it,

against

moves

arguing

Specifically,

that

for

dismissal

the

of

allegations

the

ADA

claims

untimely.

are

defendant Goodyear points to the well-settled law

that under the ADA a charge of discrimination must be filed with
the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory practice.
42 U.S.C.

§

12117(a).

"When the plaintiff fails to file such a

complaint in a timely fashion with the EEOC,
barred in federal court.
day

statute

Banking

&

of

the claim is time-

This filing requirement acts as a 180­

limitations

If

McCullough

v.

Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1994)

Branch

(citations

omitted) .
Goodyear argues that plaintiff filed his EEOC charge at the
earliest on March 27,
practice

must

have

Defendant

argues

occurring

on

2009,

occurred

that

February

meaning an alleged discriminatory
on

or

plaintif f' s
2,

2008

and

after

September

allegations
July

14,

28,

describe
2008.

2008.
events

However,

plaintiff in his reply, points to an April 2009 alleged failure
to accommodate.
would be timely,

Defendant admits that this allegation,

if true,

but asks this court to dismiss the others as

untimely.
The court finds,

at this stage of the litigation,

insufficient information as to the

timing of

there is

these events and

their relationship to each other to make a final determination
4

as

to

timeliness.

Therefore,

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

defendant

Goodyear's

motion

is

The issue of timeliness may be raised

again following some discovery and clarification of the alleged
events and their respective timing.
CONCLUSION

For

the

foregoing

dismiss is GRANTED,

reasons,

defendant

Quinn's

motion

and defendant Goodyear's partial motion to

dismiss is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This

t1~day of

to

December 2011.

Malcolm J. Howard
Senior United States District Judge
At Greenville, NC
#26

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