Gilreath v. Cumberland County Board of Education et al

Filing 125

ORDER denying 117 Renewed Motion for Directed Verdict, denying 117 Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, denying 117 Motion for New Trial, denying as moot 117 Motion for injunction or restraining order. Signed by Senior Judge W. Earl Britt on 1/27/2015. Copy of order to plaintiff via US Mail at 2926 Lambrusco Place, Fayetteville, NC 28306. (Marsh, K)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:11-CV-627-BR

JOSEPH GILREATH,
Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER
CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff Joseph Gilreath’s (“plaintiff”) “motion for
relief from a judgment or order, motion for injunction or restraining order, renewed motion for
directed verdict, renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and motion requesting new
trial.” (DE # 117.)

Defendant Cumberland County Board of Education (“defendant”) filed a

response, (DE # 120), to which plaintiff filed a reply, (DE # 121).

Plaintiff subsequently filed

an affidavit correcting a mistake he made in a prior affidavit attached to his reply.
I.

(DE # 123.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began his employment as a band director at Anne Chesnutt Middle School in
Fayetteville, North Carolina in 1993.

He suffers from ADHD and hypertension which allegedly

affect his short-term memory and his ability to manage multiple tasks and activities at the same
time.

On 4 November 2011, plaintiff filed this action against defendant, alleging violations of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
2014.

This case proceeded to jury trial on 3 November

At trial, plaintiff asserted two claims under the ADA: (1) failure to accommodate and (2)

retaliation.

At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, defendant moved for judgment as a matter of

law on both claims, and the court granted the motion as to the failure to accommodate claim.
At the close of all evidence, both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation
claim.

The court subsequently denied both motions and submitted the claim to the jury, which

returned a verdict in favor of defendant.

(DE # 109.)

Now before the court is plaintiff’s omnibus motion seeking to challenge the jury verdict.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), plaintiff renews his motion for judgment as a
matter of law on his failure to accommodate and retaliation claims. 1

(DE # 117, at 1.)

Plaintiff also moves, under Rule 60(b), for relief from the judgment on both claims.

(Id.)

In

the event the court denies his motions, plaintiff moves for a new trial on both claims pursuant to
Rule 59.

(Id.)

If the court grants a new trial, plaintiff requests, pursuant to Rule 65, “an

injunction or restraining order . . . that would prevent witnesses Thomas Hatch and/or Michael
Bain from testifying at the new trial due to perjury and/or fraud.” (Id.) The court will address
each of plaintiff’s motions in turn.
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law
Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff renews his Rule

50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on his retaliation and failure to accommodate
claims. Although plaintiff has filed a Rule 50(b) motion as to both claims, the court notes that
plaintiff never moved under Rule 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law on his failure to
accommodate claim, as that claim was dismissed when the court partially granted defendant’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Generally, a plaintiff cannot renew a Rule 50 motion

1

Although the parties refer to Rule 50 motions as motions for “directed verdict,” the court, consistent with
the language of Rule 50, will refer to such motions as motions for “judgment as a matter of law.”

2

that was never made. See Singer v. Dungan, 45 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that,
although subject to some exceptions, “the general rule [is] that a Rule 50(a) motion at the close of
all evidence is required to raise a Rule 50(b) motion”).

Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff’s

50(b) motion relates to his failure to accommodate claim, it will be denied.
A court should not grant a Rule 50(b) motion unless, “without weighing the evidence or
considering the credibility of the witnesses, [the court determines] that substantial evidence does
not support the jury’s findings.” Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir.
1999) (internal citation omitted).

In ruling on the motion, the court will view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002).
have found for defendant.

Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., 290

The court will only grant the motion if no reasonable juror could

Id.

In support of his motion, plaintiff contends that Thomas Hatch (“Hatch”) and Michael
Bain (“Bain”), both administrators at Anne Chesnutt Middle School during the time frame at
issue, gave false testimony at trial.

(DE # 117, at 5-14.) Plaintiff points to several alleged

inconsistent statements made by Hatch and Bain at trial and argues that the jury should not have
credited their testimony.

(Id. at 5-9.)

He contends that, in light of “possible perjury calling

the defense witnesses’ credibility into question, . . . no reasonable juror would conclude that the
defendant offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse employment actions taken
against the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 11.) 2

2

Plaintiff also argues that the “clean hands” doctrine entitles him to judgment as a matter of law, reasoning that the
alleged perjury of Hatch and Bain renders their hands unclean. (Id. at 12.) The “clean hands” doctrine, however,
is used to bar the claim of a party who comes to court with “unclean hands.” See McGovern v. Deutsche Post
Global Mail, Ltd., No. CIV. JFM-04-0060, 2004 WL 1764088, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2004) (“This doctrine prohibits
the court from granting relief to anyone who has engaged in inequitable, bad faith conduct”). As it is plaintiff who
brought the instant claims and is now seeking relief from the court, the “clean hands” doctrine has no application to

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Plaintiff’s entire argument in favor of his Rule 50(b) motion is based on the alleged
perjury of witnesses Hatch and Bain.

However, as noted above, the court may not consider the

credibility of witnesses in ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion. See Konkel, 165 F.3d at 279.
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

At trial, plaintiff’s counsel vigorously cross-examined both

Hatch and Bain, and the jurors remained attentive and had ample opportunity to form their
opinions of the witnesses’ credibility.

Further, the court instructed the jury regarding witness

credibility and inconsistent testimony. Without weighing the evidence or considering the
credibility of Hatch and Bain, the court finds that a reasonable juror could conclude that
defendant did not retaliate against plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA.

At trial, Hatch and

Bain provided several reasons, which a reasonable juror could have credited, for giving plaintiff
below standard ratings on his teacher evaluations.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s Rule 50(b) motion

will be denied.
B.

Plaintiff’s motion for relief from the judgment
Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff moves for relief

from the judgment on both the failure to accommodate and retaliation claims.

(DE # 117, at 1).

This rule allows the court to relieve a party from a final judgment in the following limited
circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
any of plaintiff’s motions.

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(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). This rule “is only to be invoked upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances.” Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiff contends that the alleged false testimony of Hatch and Bain amounts to fraud
under Rule 60(b)(3) and entitles him to relief from the jury verdict on his retaliation claim. (DE #
117, at 11, 15.) To succeed on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the movant must “demonstrate the
existence of a meritorious claim . . . [and] must also prove the misconduct complained of by clear
and convincing evidence and demonstrate that such misconduct prevented him from fully and
fairly presenting his claim or defense.” Square Const. Co. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 657 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1981).
The court finds that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden under Rule 60(b)(3). As
defendant argues, plaintiff has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Hatch and Bain
presented false testimony at trial. Both witnesses were subject to plaintiff’s extensive
cross-examination regarding their alleged false statements, and both provided credible
explanations of any perceived inconsistency between their past statements and their testimony at
trial. Further, even assuming that Hatch and Bain gave perjured testimony, plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that such misconduct prevented him from fairly presenting his case. Plaintiff has not
sufficiently established that the alleged perjured testimony was in any way material to the jury’s
verdict in favor of the defendant. Thus, his 60(b)(3) motion will be denied.

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Plaintiff further argues that Rule 60(b)(1) entitles him to relief from the judgment as a
matter of law in favor of defendant on his failure to accommodate claim, based on “the mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect of [his] previous counsel.” (Id. at 18.) Relief from
the judgment due to excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) is available only upon a showing that
the movant “was not at fault and that the nonmoving party will not be prejudiced.” Home Port
Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957 F.2d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff alleges that his counsel who
represented him in the early stages of the case failed to provide him with certain discovery material
that defendant produced and failed to include plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim in his
amended complaint. (Id. at 16-17.) He contends that inclusion of this claim would likely have
allowed for the introduction of additional evidence, which would have, in turn, supported the
claims he presented at trial. (Id. at 18.)
The court concludes that plaintiff has failed to make the required showing under Rule
60(b)(1). “[A] lawyer’s ignorance or carelessness do not present cognizable grounds for relief
under 60(b).” Evans v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 466, 472 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing
Universal Film Exchs., Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 576-77 (4th Cir. 1973)). Plaintiff’s complaints
regarding his original counsel’s carelessness are insufficient to invoke the extraordinary remedy of
Rule 60. The court also finds that granting plaintiff’s motion would prejudice defendant. It
appears that defendant provided plaintiff’s new counsel with the discovery material that plaintiff
alleges his prior counsel failed to provide him upon terminating representation. (DE # 117-11, at
6 (defendant’s response to plaintiff’s request for production of his personnel file indicating that
updated personnel file was provided to plaintiff’s new counsel).) Additionally, as defendant
argues, plaintiff’s new counsel had ample opportunity to seek leave of the court to amend the
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complaint in order to add a hostile work environment claim. Under these circumstances, granting
plaintiff’s motion based on the alleged carelessness of his prior counsel would be unfair and
prejudicial to defendant. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion will be denied.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the fact that he proceeded pro se “during [a] significant portion
of [the] discovery period,” and because “the discovery deadline was insufficient to facilitate
collection and trading of evidence due to transition of new counsel,” he is entitled to relief from the
judgment. (DE # 117, at 15.) Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that permits the court to grant
relief from the judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” A court may grant a 60(b)(6)
motion if “such action is appropriate to accomplish justice” and in the face of extraordinary
circumstances. Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 993 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). The court concludes that plaintiff’s complaints
regarding the discovery process do not present such extraordinary circumstances as to justify relief
under 60(b)(6).
C.

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial
Plaintiff requests a new trial on both his retaliation and failure to accommodate claims

pursuant to Rule 59, (DE # 117, at 1), which permits a court to grant a new trial “after a jury
trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in
federal court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).

Plaintiff contends that the alleged false testimony of

Hatch and Bain entitles him to a new trial.

(Id. at 9.)

In determining whether to grant a new trial based on perjury, the court “may weigh the
evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses.” Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp.
Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir. 1980).

A court should grant a new trial where: (1) the court is
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reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false; (2) that without
it, a jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) that the party seeking a new trial was
taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know
of its falsity until after trial. See Johnson v. Verisign, Inc., No. Civ.A.01-765-A, 2002 WL
1887527, at *12 (E.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2002).
As noted above, the court is not “reasonably well satisfied” that Hatch and Bain
presented false testimony at trial.

They both provided credible explanations of any perceived

inconsistency between their past statements and their testimony at trial. Further, the court cannot
conclude that without the alleged false testimony, the jury would have found in favor of plaintiff
on either the retaliation or the failure to accommodate claim. The alleged false testimony, in great
part, concerned only inconsequential details that would likely have had no material effect on the
jury’s verdict. Lastly, the alleged false testimony did not take plaintiff by surprise, and he was
able to adequately confront it at trial. His counsel tirelessly cross-examined Hatch and Bain on
the alleged inconsistent statements. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on the
alleged perjured testimony of Hatch and Bain will be denied.
In further support of a new trial, plaintiff maintains that he was unfairly surprised at trial.
(Id. at 19.) Plaintiff states that at trial the court mistakenly assumed that plaintiff had rested his
case when, in fact, he had more evidence to present.

(Id.)

In an abundance of caution, the

court re-opened evidence and allowed plaintiff to continue with his case-in-chief, although
plaintiff’s final witness was not present to testify.

Plaintiff then rested his case.

“[S]urprise does not warrant a new trial unless it deprives the party of a fair hearing.”
Twigg v. Norton Co., 894 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1990). The movant must prove he was
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reasonably and genuinely surprised, and that such surprise “resulted in actual prejudice.” Id.
Even assuming that plaintiff was reasonably and genuinely surprised when the court found that he
had rested his case, plaintiff suffered no actual prejudice.
Plaintiff also argues that his past teacher evaluations which defendant presented at trial,
as well as the time limit the court placed on plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony, amounted to unfair
surprise which entitles him to a new trial.

(Id. at 20.) The court finds that plaintiff was not

reasonably surprised by the defendant’s introduction of evidence pertaining to plaintiff’s past
teacher evaluations. As noted above, it appears that defendant provided plaintiff with his
complete personnel file prior to trial, and, thus, plaintiff could not have been reasonably surprised
by the introduction of such evidence at trial. 3 Even assuming such surprise was reasonable,
plaintiff has not proved that it resulted in an unfair trial. Lastly, the court concludes that the time
restriction placed on plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony was not unfair. Pursuant to Rule 611(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the court has discretion to “exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . avoid wasting time.”
Considering the wide latitude the court afforded plaintiff in presenting evidence throughout trial,
the time limit placed on plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony was well within the court’s discretion and did
not result in a reasonable surprise or actual prejudice. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial based on unfair surprise will be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion for relief from a judgment or order, renewed
motions, and motion requesting new trial, (DE # 117), are DENIED.
3

To the extent plaintiff

Plaintiff argues that his own counsel never provided him with the personnel file. However, because lawyers are
agents of their clients, the court’s conclusion does not depend on whether defendant provided the personnel file to
plaintiff’s counsel or to plaintiff himself.

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moves for an injunction or restraining order precluding Hatch and Bain from testifying at a new
trial, it is DENIED AS MOOT.
This 27 January 2015.

__________________________________
W. Earl Britt
Senior U.S. District Judge

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