Mission Essential Personnel, LLC v. Worldwide Language Resources, Inc., et al

Filing 77

ORDER: Plaintiff's 35 motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and defendants' 51 cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff's 76 objection to Magistrate Judge Webb's order of September 24, 2013 is OVERRULED. No party requested a jury trial. Thus, the matter is set for a bench trial to begin at 2:00 p.m. on December 19, 2013. The trial will continue, if necessary, on December 20, 2013, and conclude on that date. The court will enter a separate trial management order. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 9/27/2013. (Sawyer, D.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:12-CV-294-D

MISSION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)

)

ORDER

)
WORLDWIDE LANGUAGE RESOURCES,
)
INC., and INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT )
SERVICES, INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

The parties in this case compete in the specialized business of providing linguist support to
the United States military overseas, including in Afghanistan. [D.E. 1] 2-3, [D.E. 33], [D.E. 40] 1.
At all relevant times, defendant WorldWide Language Resources, Inc. ("WWLR") was a
subcontractor to defendant International Management Services, Inc. ("IMS") in connection with
IMS' s contract with the NATO Support Agency (''NSPA") to provide linguists in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom- Afghanistan. [D.E. 1] 3, [D.E. 40] 2. To that end, WWLR and IMS
recruit, vet, and train qualified linguists who then deploy overseas and serve alongside troops.
Mission Essential Personnel, LLC ("MEP") also seeks to recruit, vet, and train linguists and provide
them to the United States military via government contracts. The contracts for the companies and
the linguists apparently are very lucrative. Moreover, given the stringent security clearance and
language skills requirements, the parties spend substantial resources recruiting, vetting, and training
linguists and compete fiercely for qualified linguists. [D.E. 52] 4.
Once the linguist completes training, defendants provide the linguist with a contract in which
the linguist agrees to work for one of the defendants for a set period of time. Id. 5. The contracts

specify a scheduled start date and scheduled end date. Defendants claim that the project to which
a linguist is to be assigned is identified in the contract and that once a linguist signs the contract, the
linguist deploys overseas within a matter of days. Id. 7-8.
On May 25, 2012, MEP filed a declaratory judgment action against defendants. See [D.E.
1]. The court has jurisdiction based on diversity. Id. 1-2. MEP asks the court to declare that the
contracts between the linguists and the defendants are unenforceable. See id. 6-9. According to
MEP, defendants have threatened to sue MEP in tort ifMEP seeks to offer employment to any of
the linguists under contract with the defendants. See id. MEP contends that the requested
declaratory judgment would negate defendants' threatened lawsuit. See id.
On December 11, 2012, MEP filed a motion for summary judgment [D.E. 35]. On January
15, 2013, defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and an opposition to MEP' s motion
for summary judgment [D.E. 51]. Eachsidetimelyrespondedandreplied. See [D.E. 51, 52, 66, 68].
Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken as a whole, no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Libecy Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Com. v. Catrett,477U.S. 317,323 (1986). Oncethemovingpartyhasmet
its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, Anderson,
4 77 U.S. at 248-49, but "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Com., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis
removed) (quotation omitted). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Anderson,477 U.S. at 249. In
making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom
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in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
"When cross-motions for summary judgment are before a court, the court examines each motion
separately, employing the familiar standard under Ru1e 56 of the Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure."
Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming. L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351,354 (4th Cir. 2011).
As for MEP's motion for summary judgment, MEP filed it on December 11, 2012. See
[D.E. 35]. On that same date, MEP filed on the docket an entry entitled "Memorandum in Support
ofD.E. 35 Motion for Summary Judgment" with attached exhibits. See [D.E. 37]. This document,
however, is a copy of the motion at [D.E. 35] with numerous exhibits, and not a memorandum in
support of the motion. Given that the docket in this case has numerous filings and docket entry
captions, the court has reviewed the docket to determine if MEP ever filed with the court a
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, but has not located one. Although
MEP did not file a memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment with the court, it
apparently served the memorandum on defendants. See [D.E. 47] 1-2.
Local Civil Ru1e 7.1 (d) states that a motion "shall be filed with an accompanying supporting
memorandum." Local Civil Ru1e 7.l(d), EDNC. MEP did not comply with this local ru1e, and a
court may deny a party's motion for failure to comply with Local Civil Ru1e 7.1. See Higgins v.
Spence & Spence. PA., No. 5:07-CV-33-D(1), 2009 WL 536069, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2009)
(unpublished) (collecting cases); Masinick v. Am. Craftsmen. Inc., No. 5:07-CV-461-BR, 2008
WL 483456, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2008) (unpublished); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon,
365 F. Supp. 2d 671, 673 (E.D.N.C. 2005); accord Fayetteville. Cumberland Cnty. Black Democratic
Caucus v. Cumberland Cnty., 927 F.2d 595 (table), 1991 WL 23590, at *2-3 (4th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (affirming district court's denial of motion based on party's violation of

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predecessor to Local Civil Ru1e 7.1). Accordingly, MEP's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 35]
is denied.
As for defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, defendants initially challenge
MEP' s ability to seek declaratory relief concerning the contracts between defendants and the
linguists. In support, defendants note the general principle that a party does not possess standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action concerning rights and obligations under a contract to which it
is neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary. See,~' Grondal v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1220 (E.D. Wash. 2010); MardianEquip. Co. v. St. Pau1Fire&Marine Ins. Co., No. CV-052729, 2006 WL 2456214, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006). Nonetheless, a specific threat of
litigation concerning a contract directed at a non-party to the contract can be sufficient to give rise
to a case or controversy under Article ill of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 in certain
circumstances.

See,~'

GTE Directories Pub. Corp. v. TrimenAm.. Inc., 67 F.3d 1563, 1567-70

(11th Cir. 1995); Lufthansa Sys. lnfratec GmbH v. Wi-SKY Inflight. Inc., No. 3:10CV745-JAG,
2011 WL 862314, at *7-9 (E.D. Va. Mar. 9, 2011); Arbitrationchampions.com v. Councilors of the
N.C. State Bar, No. 07CV00246, 2007 WL 4180768, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 16, 2007); see generally
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (discussing relationship between Article ill case-orcontroversy requirement and the Declaratory Judgment Act); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 23~0 (1937) (same).
Here, MEP contends, and defendants do not contest, that defendants threatened to sue MEP
in tort ifMEP hired any linguists under contract with defendants. MEP filed this action in order to
obtain a declaration of the rights and obligations arising under the contracts between defendants and
the linguists. When MEP filed the action it sought to contact, recruit, and hire linguists under
contract with defendants. In response, defendants repeatedly told MEP that such conduct wou1d,

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inter ali!b constitute tortious interference with contract and that defendants would sue MEP in tort
if it hired any linguists under contract with defendants. MEP filed this lawsuit to obtain a
declaration that the contracts between the linguists and defendants are unenforceable under North
Carolina law. Under these circumstances, an actual case or controversy exists under Article III.
See,~' GTE Directories Pub. Com., 67 F .3d at 1567-70; Lufthansa Sys. Infratec GmbH, 2011

WL

862314, at *7-9. Thus, the court has jurisdiction.
As for the merits, the parties agree that North Carolina law governs the contracts at issue
between the defendants and the linguists. After agreeing on the choice of law, the parties do not
agree on much else. Having reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to MEP (the nonmovant), the court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist. Accordingly, defendants'
cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

In sum, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 35] is DENIED, and defendants'
cross-motion for summary judgment [D.E. 51] is DENIED. Plaintiff's objection [D.E. 76] to
Magistrate Judge Webb's orderofSeptember24, 2013 is OVERRULED. Nopartyrequestedajury
trial. Thus, the matter is set for a bench trial to begin at 2:00p.m. on December 19,2013. The trial
will continue, if necessary, on December 20,2013, and conclude on that date. The court will enter
a separate trial management order.
SO ORDERED. This J..1_day of September 2013.

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