Morgan v. Brittany Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. et al

Filing 33

ORDER granting 25 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and denying 32 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 4/4/2013. Copy mailed to pro se plaintiff via US Mail at addresses on record. (Marsh, K)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:12-CV-462-D

ROBERT JOSEPH MORGAN,
Plaintiff,

v.

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BRITTANYWOODSHOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., TALIS
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER

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On July 24, 2012, Robert Joseph Morgan ("Morgan"), proceeding prose, filed this action
against defendants Brittany Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. ("BWHA"), Talis Management
Group, Inc. ("TMGI"), Richard A. Black, Theodora E. Black, Dennis Dewitt Lucas, and Betty
Vanessa Watkins [D.E. 4]. The Blacks, Lucas, and WatkinsareneighborsofMorganinatownhouse
complex in Raleigh, North Carolina. Id. Morgan has on-going disputes with these neighbors about
parking in the community. Morgan alleges that the parking disputes have led to arguments, threats,
and petty vandalism among the neighbors. BWHA is the homeowners association in the townhouse
complex, and TMGI is the private management company ofBWHA. Id. Morgan has complained
about his neighbors to the Raleigh Police Department, BWHA, and TMGI, but remains unhappy.

Morgan summarizes his cause of action in paragraph four of the complaint. He states:
Acts complained of in thiscasearedeprivationofrights (42 U.S.C. § 1983: US codesection 1983) and privileges in common area of a managed community and breach
of fiduciary duty involving use of, nuisance and enjoyment of a private managed
common areas shared: parking areas, woods, and park setting, with mail box and

trash/recycling bins in common area of Daltrey Court in Brittany Woods
Townhomes, Common areas owned and deeded in Wake County, State of North
Carolina to: Brittany Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. And managed by Talis
Management Group, Inc.
ld. ~ 4.
On November 26,2012, BWHA and TMGI filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. 25]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). BWHA and TMGI
contend that Morgan had failed to plausibly allege that they are state actors; therefore, Morgan's
section 1983 claim against them fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See [D.E.
26]. On February 8, 2013, Morgan filed an incoherent response in opposition [D.E. 31].
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted" tests whether the complaint is legally and factually sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Cm:p. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Ap_peals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct.
1327 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). In construing Morgan's
complaint, the court has considered his pro se status and held the complaint to a less stringent
standard than a pleading drafted by a lawyer. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)
(per curiam). Nonetheless, Morgan still must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Seeid.;lqbal,556U.S.at678;BaldwinCnty. WelcomeCtr. v.Brown,466U.S.147, 150--51 (1984)
(per curiam). Moreover, in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court need not
accept a complaint's legal conclusions drawn from the facts and need not accept as true unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.

See,~'

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A person seeking to pursue a section 1983 claim must plausibly allege ''that the charged state
actor (1) deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,

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and (2) that the deprivation was performed under color of the referenced sources of state law found
in the statute." Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F .3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). "[M]erely
private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, fails to quality as state action." Id. at
181 (citations and quotations omitted). A private party is considered a state actor under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 if ''the deprivation [is] caused by the exercise of some right of privilege created by the State
... [and] the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may be fairly said to be a state
actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivm 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48-49 (1988).
BWHA and TMGI are private entities. Essentially, Morgan alleges that BWHA and TMGI
should have done more than refer him to the Raleigh Police Department in order to resolve his ongoing disputes with his neighbors. This allegation about the behavior of BWHA and TMGI,
however, falls well short of constituting state action.

See,~,

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; Phillips, 572

F.3d at 180--81; Moore v. Williamsburg Reg'l Hosp., 560 F.3d 166, 178 (4th Cir. 2009); Jennings
v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686,701 (4th Cir. 2007) (en bane); Hollyv. Scott, 434 F.3d 287,291 (4th
Cir. 2006); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310--16 (4th Cir. 2001); Goldstein v. Chestnut
Ridge Vol. Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 341-49 (4th Cir. 2000); DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499,
506--09 (4th Cir. 1999); Dowe v. Total Action Against Poveey in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653,
658-QO (4th Cir. 1998); S.P. v. City ofTakoma Park, 134 F.3d 260,269 (4th Cir. 1998); Andrews
v. Fed. HomeLoanBankofAtlan!i!, 998 F.2d214, 219-20 (4th Cir. 1993). Thus, Morgan has failed
to state a claim under42 U.S.C. § 1983 againstBWHA and TMGI (or any other defendant), and the
court grants the motion to dismiss. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state law claims against any of the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, the court
dismisses any such state law claims without prejudice.
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In sum, the court GRANTS BWHA' sand TMGI' s motion to dismiss [D.E. 25] and declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims against any defendants. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Moreover, the court DENIES Morgan's motion for a temporary restraining
order [D.E. 32]. Morgan may seek to pursue any state law claims against any defendant in state
court.
SO ORDERED. This A:_ day of April2013.

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