Hawley v. Astrue

Filing 32

ORDER GRANTING 23 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and DENYING 25 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. This matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this order. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 11/14/2013. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:12-CV-645-BO
TONYA B. HAWLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner ofSocial Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. A
hearing was held on these matters before the undersigned on October 30, 2013, at Raleigh, North
Carolina. For the reasons discussed below, this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffbrought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the final
decision ofthe Commissioner denying her claim for disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB)
and supplemental security income (SSI) pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Plaintiff filed for bothDIB and SSI alleging disability since October 1, 2001. Plaintiffs claims were
denied initially and on reconsideration. After conducting a hearing' and considering the claim de
novo, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff was not disabled in a decision issued
on April 15, 2011. The decision ofthe ALJ became the final decision ofthe Commissioner when
the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review, and plaintiff then timely sought review

'At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to May 30, 2008.

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of the Commissioner's decision in this Court.
DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, this Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited
to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is supported by substantial evidence and whether
the Commissioner employed the correct legal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence consists of more than a mere scintilla of
evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971). The Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner if the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ uses a multi-step process. First, a
claimant must not be able to work in a substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Second,
a claimant must have a severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities. !d. Third, to be found disabled, without considering a claimant's
age, education, and work experience, a claimant's impairment must be of sufficient duration and
must either meet or equal an impairment listed by the regulations. !d. Fourth, in the alternative, a
claimant may be disabled if his or her impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant
work and, fifth, if the impairment prevents the claimant from doing other work. !d. The claimant
bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step
five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
After finding that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and that she had not engaged
in any substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged onset date at step one, the ALJ
determined that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: residuals from cervical spine fusion,
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degenerative disk disease of the lumbosacral spine, fibromyalgia, a history of cubital tunnel
syndrome, anxiety, and dysthymia. The ALJ went on to find that plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listing at step three, and found that
plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with manipulative and
mental restrictions. At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant
work, and found at step five that, considering plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC,
jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled through the date of his decision.
The ALJ makes an RFC assessment based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). In determining plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ considered the opinions of
several of plaintiffs physicians, as well as the opinion of a consultative examiner. The opinion of
a treating physician must be given controlling weight if it is not inconsistent with substantial
evidence in the record and may be disregarded only if there is persuasive contradictory evidence.

Coffmanv. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514,517 (4th Cir. 1987); Mitchellv. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.
1983). Even if a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, it still may be
entitled to the greatest of weight. SSR 96-2p. An ALJ must provide specific reasons for the weight
given to a treating physician's opinion. !d. "Judicial review of an administrative decision is
impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the administrator." DeLoatche v.

Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiffs hand specialist, Dr. Messer, provided a treating source statement in March 2007,
one year before plaintiffs amended alleged onset date. In that statement, Dr. Messer opined that,
seven weeks following a right ulnar nerve transposition, plaintiff could return to light work but

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could not lift more than ten pounds. Tr. 3 70. The ALJ rejected this treating opinion as to plaintiffs
lifting restriction because it was given prior to plaintiffs amended alleged onset date. However, as
the ALJ found in his severe impairment analysis, plaintiff continued to suffer from some effects of
cubital tunnel syndrome, and the ALJ pointed to no evidence in the record indicating that Dr.
Messer's lifting restriction was no longer applicable when he summarily rejected it.
The ALJ further elected to give only some weight the opinion of the consultative examiner,
" [s] ince the assessment does not address the claimant's ability to lift/carry weights". Tr. 30. Though
the Commissioner now argues that only some weight was given because the ALJ could not afford
full weight to a treating source opinion that did not address every exertional (or non-exertional)
limitation, post-hoc rationalization may not form the basis upon which this Court can find that the
ALJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. See Sees. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery, 332
U.S. 194, 196 (1947) ("[A] reviewing court ... must judge the propriety of [agency] action solely on
the grounds invoked by the agency.").

Moreover, the consultative examiner's opinion as to

plaintiffs manipulative limitations is unclear at best. The opinion states that "[t]here are no
manipulative limitations on reaching, handling, feeling, grasping, and fingering frequently limited
by [plaintiffs] neck pain and upper extremity weakness." Tr. 228. Again, though the Commissioner
would have the Court interpret such opinion to mean that plaintiff could engage in manipulations
frequently, it is the province of the ALJ to consider such statement and to explain fully his reasons
for attributing particular meaning and weight to it.
The explanation provided in support of the ALJ's decision to reject the above opinions of
plaintiffs physicians was inadequate. Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ' s decision to decline to afford controlling weight to plaintiffs treating physicians opinion
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regarding plaintiffs lifting abilities. Additionally, the opinion of the consultative examiner is
unclear, as is the ALJ's treatment of such opinion. Remand on these grounds is therefore
warranted; because remand is warranted on these grounds alone, the Court declines to consider
plaintiffs remaining arguments.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 23] is GRANTED and
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 25] is DENIED. This matter is
REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.

SO ORDERED, this /

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day ofNovember, 2013.

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UNITED STATES DISTRIC JUDGE

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