Connor v. Wake County et al
Filing
88
ORDER denying without prejudice 64 Motion in Limine - Granting 74 Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply - Granting in part and denying in part 60 Motion for Summary Judgment (counsel should read order in its entirety) - Finding as moot 87 Mo tion to Continue - The court orders a court-hosted settlement conference - United States Magistrate Judge Robert B. Jones, Jr. is hereby appointed as settlement master - The conference will be conducted at a time and place selected by Magistrate Judg e Jones upon notice to the parties - The trial of this matter is hereby continued from the court's April 13, 2015, calendar and will be scheduled for pretrial conference during the June 15, 2015, civil term. Signed by Senior Judge Malcolm J. Howard on 3/12/2015. (Lee, L.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:12-CV-701-H
RAINA CONNER, Administratix
of the Estate of Adam Wade
Carter
Plaintiff,
v.
WAKE COUNTY, SHERIFF DONNIE
HARRISON, in his official and
individual
capacities,
TAVARES
THOMPSON,
in
his
official
and
individual
capacities,
KELLY
S.
MITHCELL, in her official and
individual capacities, JOHN
AND
JANE
DOES
1-10,
Individually and in their
official capacities as Deputy
Sheriffs of Wake County, and
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, in its capacity as
Surety on the Official Bond
of
the
Sheriff
of
Wake
County,
Defendants.
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ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
replied.
attaching
Plaintiff has responded, and defendants have
Plaintiff has also filed a motion to file a sur-reply,
her
proposed
sur-reply.
motion to file a sur-reply.
Defendants
object
to
the
Defendants have also filed a motion
in limine to exclude plaintiff’s expert witness.
also
responded
replied.
to
the
motion
in
limine,
and
Plaintiff has
defendants
have
These matters are ripe for adjudication.
The court has reviewed plaintiff’s motion to file a surreply
as
well
as
defendants’
objections
thereto.
The
court
GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to file a sur-reply, and the sur-reply
is considered in the court’s decision on the motion for summary
judgment herein.
BACKGROUND
This
February
matter
11,
arises
2012.
out
A
of
Wake
the
death
County
of
Adam
Sheriff’s
Carter
Deputy
on
was
dispatched to the home where Adam Carter was staying in response
to a 911 call from his uncle.
Within minutes of the deputy’s
arrival at the scene, Carter was fatally shot.
brought
by
the
decedent’s
mother,
Raina
This case was
Conner.
The
Third
Amended Complaint in this matter seeks compensatory and punitive
damages arising out of eight causes of action including three
claims
pursuant
to
42
U.S.C.
§ 1983
(a
Monell
claim,
an
excessive force claim and an inadequate training and supervision
claim)
wanton
and
claims
misconduct,
for
negligence/gross
negligent
negligence/willful
hiring/retention,
assault
and
and
battery, North Carolina Constitutional claims, and Liability of
Official Bond.
2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 11, 2012, Adam Carter was staying at the home
of his uncle Todd McElfresh.
hospitalized
for
emotional
Carter, who had recently been
and
substance
abuse
issues,
was
intoxicated and had become emotionally distraught and wanted to
be
transported
Hospital
back
(“Holly
McElfresh
to
a
Hill”).
and/or
psychiatric
Carter
No
one
facility,
Holly
phone
answered
to
attempted
the
Hill
when
Holly
call
Hill,
so
McElfresh called 911 and requested assistance in having Carter
transported
to
transferred
McElfresh
a
to
treatment
a
informed
facility.
dispatcher,
the
dispatcher
McElfresh’s
defendant
that
Kelly
Carter
had
call
was
Mitchell.
recently
received in-patient care for mental health and substance abuse
issues and needed transport to a mental health facility.
Wake
County Sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to the house at 5425
Live
Oak
Trail,
Raleigh,
to
respond.
Wake
County
Sheriff’s
Department Deputy Tavares Thompson (“Deputy Thompson”) was first
to arrive at the scene. After briefly conferring with McElfresh,
Deputy Thompson followed McElfresh into the residence.
Upon
entering the home, Deputy Thompson saw Carter at or near the top
of a four-step stairwell leading from the foyer or entryway up
to a living area.
Carter
began
McElfresh told Carter that his ride was here.
descending
the
stairs.
3
At
some
point,
Deputy
Thompson
realized
Carter
had
a
knife
in
his
hand.
Deputy
Thompson told Carter to drop the knife several times.
Carter
did not comply, and Thompson fired two shots, killing Carter.
While the above provides a general framework for the events
of February 11, 2012, the details of the brief time (mere second
to minutes) between Deputy Thompson entering the residence and
the firing of his weapons are disputed. These factual issues are
heavily briefed by the parties, and the court need not repeat
them in great detail.
Chief among the disputes are (1) exactly
where Deputy Thompson was standing in relation to the front door
(whether back against a wall or directly in front of the door);
(2) the position of the knife during Carter’s descent on the
stairs (whether he changed hands, raised the knife, etc.); and,
(3) Carter’s speed and agility in descending the stairs (whether
falling down drunk or lunging at the deputy).
the
evidence
party,
here
in
the
the
light
most
plaintiff,
the
favorable
court
However, viewing
to
notes
the
the
non-moving
following
evidence: Thompson testified that he saw Carter with the knife
in
his
hand
while
Carter
was
on
the
second
step
and
Thompson had just crossed the threshold of the front door.
front door remained opened at all times.
in his hand was a small paring knife.
while
The
The knife Carter had
Carter slowly staggered
down two steps while holding on to the wall to support himself.
4
McElfresh testified that Carter never rushed toward Thompson or
made any aggressive moves or steps.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal
Rules
material
of
fact
Civil
exists
Procedure
and
the
judgment as a matter of law.
477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
bears
the
initial
when
moving
no
genuine
party
of
entitled
is
issue
to
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
The party seeking summary judgment
burden
of
demonstrating
genuine issue of material fact.
the
absence
of
a
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving
party
may
not
rest
on
the
allegations
or
denials
in
its
pleading, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, but "must come forward with
'specific
facts
showing
trial.'"
Matsushita
that
Elec.
there
Indus.
is
Co.,
a
genuine
Ltd.
v.
issue
Zenith
for
Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Summary
judgment
is
not
a
disputed factual issues.
Supp.
123,
125
(E.D.N.C.
vehicle
for
the
court
to
resolve
Faircloth v. United States, 837 F.
1993).
Instead,
a
trial
court
reviewing a claim at the summary judgment stage should determine
5
whether a genuine issue exists for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249.
In
making
this
determination,
the
court
must
view
the
inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.
United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).
Only disputes
between the parties over facts that might affect the outcome of
the
case
properly
preclude
the
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
entry
of
summary
judgment.
The evidence must also be such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Id. at 248.
Accordingly, the court must examine "both
the materiality and the genuineness of the alleged fact issues"
in ruling on this motion.
II.
Faircloth, 837 F. Supp. at 125.
Analysis
A. Excessive Force Claim
Whether excessive force was used is determined by applying
a
standard
of
objective
circumstances of a case.
reasonableness
to
the
particular
In Clem v. Corbeau, the Fourth Circuit
held:
Indisputably, the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable seizures bars police officers from using
excessive force against a free citizen, like Clem. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865,
104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Whether an officer has used
excessive force is judged by a standard of objective
6
reasonableness. Id. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. We do
not inquire into an officer's motives, intentions, or
tendencies,
and
instead
determine
“whether
a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances would
have concluded that a threat existed justifying the
particular use of force.” Elliott, 99 F.3d at 642
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865).
Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 549-50.
Each set of facts and
circumstances of the specific case must be carefully observed,
taking “care to consider the facts from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, and avoid judging the officer’s
conduct with the ‘20/20’ vision of hindsight.”
Id., (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97).
Since
deadly
force
is
unmatched
against
countervailing
governmental interests, deadly force is justified only where a
reasonable officer has “sound reason to believe that a suspect
poses
a
others.
threat
of
serious
physical
harm
to
the
officer
Id. (quoting Elliott, 99 F.3d at 642).
or
Where no
immediate threat exists, deadly force is not justified.
Here, there are substantial fact questions in dispute which
preclude the entry of summary judgment as to the excessive force
claim.
Defendants’
argument
in
support
relies on defendants’ version of the facts.
of
summary
judgment
Because these facts
are in dispute and because when the facts are viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff a reasonable jury could
find for plaintiff, summary judgment is inappropriate.
7
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary
functions
“from
liability
for
civil
damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.”
(1982).
To determine whether a public official is entitled to
qualified
facts
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
immunity,
the
court
must
examine:
(1)
whether
the
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right;
and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at
the
time
of
defendant’s
alleged
misconduct.”
Pearson
v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
The court may look to either aspect of
the test first when determining the issue of qualified immunity.
Id.
at
236.
It
is
well-established
that
a
law
enforcement
officer may not employ deadly force against an individual who
does
not
supra.
present
an
immediate
threat
of
harm.
See
Graham,
As summary judgment on the excessive force claim is
precluded because of disputed facts, so also is a decision on
qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.
8
C. Monell Claim and Inadequate Training and Supervision 1
It
is
well
settled
that
a
supervisor
may
not
incur
liability pursuant to a subordinate’s violation of § 1983 under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.
F.2d
926,
otherwise
928
(4th
be
held
Cir.
1977).
liable
in
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
However,
certain
a
supervisor
circumstances
may
for
constitutional injuries inflicted by his or her subordinates if
a plaintiff demonstrates:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a “pervasive and unreasonable risk” of
constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge
was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices,”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative
causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the
particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
To establish
the first element, a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor
had knowledge of conduct by the subordinate where the conduct
posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury
to the plaintiff.”
Id.
A pervasive and unreasonable risk of
harm requires evidence that the “conduct is widespread, or at
least has been used on several different occasions.”
1
Id.
To
In her response, plaintiff notes she does not oppose the motion for summary
judgment as it relates to Wake County. Therefore, summary judgment is granted
as to defendant Wake County.
9
establish
the
second
element,
plaintiff
must
show
“continued
inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.”
Slakan
v.
Fourth
Porter,
737
F.2d
368,
373
(4th
Cir.
1984).
The
Circuit has held that “a showing of mere negligence will not
meet”
the
“very
high
standard”
of
deliberate
indifference.
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).
establish
the
liability
of
a
supervisor,
there
Finally, to
must
be
an
affirmative causal link between the inaction of the supervisor
and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
Slakan, 737 F.2d at
376.
A
local
government
entity
cannot
be
held
liable
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory of liability.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
under
Monell v.
Instead, to
establish liability of the government entity, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) a government actor deprived the plaintiff
of her federal rights, and (2) the harm was the result of an
official policy or custom of the local entity.
326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003).
Lytle v. Doyle,
The court notes that the
Sheriff is a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and is not an arm
of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Boyd. v. Robeson
County, 169 N.C. App. 460.
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to support a
finding
that
defendants
violated
10
plaintiff’s
constitutional
rights and the court, therefore, assumes so for purposes of this
claim. Therefore, the issue before this court is whether there
is sufficient evidence that the constitutional violation was the
result of an official policy or custom of the the Sheriff for
Wake County.
The Fourth Circuit has held that there are four ways that a
local
government
entity
may
be
held
liable
for
a
policy
or
custom:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written
ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of
a person with final policymaking authority; (3)
through an omission, such as a failure to properly
train
officers,
that
“manifest[s]
deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4)
through a practice that is so “persistent and
widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with
the force of law.”
Id., 326 F.3d at 471 (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 218).
Here, as to both the inadequate training and supervision
claim
and
the
Monell
claim,
plaintiff
argues
that
defendant
failed to properly train officers on how to respond to mentally
and/or emotionally disturbed individuals.
Defendant argues that
Sheriff Harrison is entitled to summary judgment on these claims
because
plaintiff
has
policies or training.
presented
no
evidence
of
inadequate
Defendant argues that the Wake County
Sheriff has not failed to properly train its officers and that
its training exceeds the state-mandated minimum of training for
11
its
deputies.
Defendant
notes
that
the
Sheriff’s
policy
regarding the use of force tracks applicable case law, in that
it allows deadly force when the officer is facing imminent death
or
serious
bodily
harm.
All
Wake
County
deputies
received
training on dealing with mentally ill individuals in Basic Law
Enforcement
Training.
Additionally,
the
Sheriff’s
Office
conducted an in-service training in 2010 specifically focusing
on interactions with mentally ill persons.
Defendant
that
any
additionally
such
failure
argues
was
constitutional violation.
the
that
there
“moving
is
force”
no
evidence
behind
the
Defendant argues that plaintiff has
produced no evidence that the training provided was deficient in
any
way
or
that
a
written
policy
specific
mentally ill individuals is necessary.
to
dealing
with
Furthermore, plaintiff
has not introduced such a policy from any other law enforcement
agency in Wake County, North Carolina, or from anywhere in the
United States.
Plaintiff does cite to the Internal Association
of Chiefs of Police statement regarding dealing with emotionally
disturbed
individuals.
Defendant
also
argues
that
even
if
plaintiff has shown a deficiency in training, there has been no
showing
that
additional
training
have changed the outcome.
or
different
policies
would
In other words, defendant contends
12
plaintiff
cannot
show
a
causal
link
between
the
failure
in
training or the deficient policy and the death of Adam Carter.
Plaintiff
“practically
counters,
no
noting
training”
regarding
emotionally disturbed persons.
remember
anything
encounters.
he
that
Thompson
situations
received
involving
At his deposition, he could not
learned
about
how
to
handle
such
Thompson did admit in his deposition that it would
be better practice to have a backup officer with him.
Plaintiff
argues that the evidence demonstrates there is no consistent or
reasoned
response
individuals.
to
encounters
with
emotionally
disturbed
Plaintiff contends that the evidence shows that
defendant was deliberately indifferent to a “glaring need” for
proper
training
and
policies
regarding
interactions
with
emotionally disturbed individuals.
Plaintiff
support
of
points
her
to
inadequate
the
following
training
and
record
her
evidence
Monell
in
claim,
specifically the causal link between the lack of training and
Mr. Carter’s death:
•
Wake County Sheriff’s Department had no written policies or
procedures related to suicide-by-cop encounters despite a
study indicating 36% of all officer-involved shootings can
be characterized as suicide by cop.
•
The Department provides no training regarding the response
strategy of tactical withdrawal and no field training
regarding suicide-by-cop incidents.
13
•
The number of shooting incidents involving Wake County
Sheriff’s Department personnel and emotionally disturbed
persons show a variety of responses and evidence a lack of
proper training.
Plaintiff notes that despite direct knowledge of the prior
incidents in Wake County, defendant Harrison failed to implement
proper training and failed to implement any written policies or
procedures
related
to
interactions
with
emotionally
disturbed
persons.
The court finds that plaintiff has brought forth enough
evidence to survive summary judgment.
he
is
entitled
inadequate
to
judgment
as
to
training/supervision
Defendant has not shown
the
Monell
claims
claim
and
regarding
the
Deputy
Thompson.
D. Defendant Mitchell
As
relates
to
plaintiff
plaintiff’s
to
has
claim
dispatcher
failed
to
of
Kelly
inadequate
Mitchell,
come
forward
inadequate training of Mitchell.
training
defendant
with
any
as
it
contends
evidence
of
Wake County telecommunicators
attend a forty-hour telecommunicator school.
Additionally, the
Sheriff’s Office provides sixteen hours of training each year.
On
February
supervisor.
11,
2012,
Mitchell
was
a
telecommunicator
Additionally, plaintiff has shown no causal link
between any lack of training and Mr. Carter’s death.
14
The court
agrees and finds that plaintiff has failed to come forward with
any evidence of inadequate training of Mitchell.
summary
judgment
is
granted
as
to
inadequate
Therefore,
training/Monell
claims as they relate to defendant Mitchell’s actions.
As
to
any
claims
directly,
plaintiff
critical
information
asserted
argues
to
against
that
Mitchell
Thompson
and
defendant
failed
that
a
Mitchell
to
jury
provide
should
determine whether defendant Mitchell shares in liability for the
improper response to this call.
Defendant notes that plaintiff
cites no case law in support of her claims against Mitchell.
Second, Thompson admits in his deposition that he knew other
officers
were
also
responding.
He
testified
Mitchell
gave
information regarding the need for a CIT officer, but he did not
hear it on the radio.
entitled
to
summary
The court finds defendant Mitchell is
judgment
as
to
any
claims
purportedly
asserted against her directly.
E. State Law Negligence Claims: Claims for Negligence,
Gross Negligence, Willful and Wanton Misconduct,
Negligent Hiring and Retention
Plaintiff,
in
her
response,
acknowledges
that,
under
current law, insurance policies such as that purchased by Wake
County which purport to not cover claims for which governmental
immunity would be a defense have been held enforceable.
Thus,
plaintiff concedes that governmental immunity remains a defense
15
to plaintiff’s official capacity state-law claims except to the
extent of the limited relief provided by the Sheriff’s bonds.
It
is
acknowledged
in
defendants’
brief
that
if
it
were
determined that Sheriff Harrison was negligent, then the $20,000
provided
would
by
not
the
have
Ohio
Casualty
governmental
bonds
immunity
would
from
apply,
meaning
$0.01-20,000
he
of
a
claim but, as described more fully in defendants’ memorandum,
would have immunity for any claim in excess of $20,000.
Furthermore,
as
public
officials,
Sheriff
Harrison
and
Deputy Thompson are immune from claims based on negligence in
their individual capacities. “Generally, ‘a public official is
immune
from
personal
liability
for
mere
negligence
in
the
performance of his duties, but he is not shielded from liability
if his alleged actions were corrupt or malicious or if he acted
outside and beyond the scope of his duties.’” Perry v. Pamlico
Cnty., No. 4:13-CV-107-D, 2015 WL 690896, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Feb.
18, 2015), quoting Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C.App. 422, 428, 429
S.E.2d 744, 747 (1993), implied overruling on other grounds in
Boyd v. Robeson County, 169 N.C.App. 460, 621 S.E.2d 1 (2005).
Therefore, the negligence claims are dismissed against Harrison
and Thompson in their individual capacities.
16
F. Assault and Battery
Defendant’s only argument for dismissal regarding assault
and battery depends on summary judgment being entered on the
excessive force claim under § 1983.
summary
judgment
is
DENIED
as
to
Therefore, the motion for
the
claim
for
assault
and
battery against defendant Thompson.
III.
Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Expert
Defendants move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
to exclude plaintiff’s expert witness, Melvin Tucker (“Tucker”)
from
offering
any
opinion
in
this
matter.
responded, and defendant has replied.
Plaintiff
has
Defendants argue that
plaintiff’s expert should be excluded from testifying because he
relied
on
insufficient
information
in
forming
his
opinion,
specifically that he erroneously relied on several assumptions
not
established
in
the
record
and
policy to establish the standard.
on
an
inappropriate
model
Furthermore, they contend
Tucker’s opinion regarding what Deputy Thompson could have done
is not relevant.
specialized
Plaintiff counters, noting that Tucker has
knowledge
regarding
law
enforcement
practices
and
procedures, properly sought to ascertain all relevant facts and
that his opinions are proper and should not be stricken.
17
The court finds no reason to
exclude plaintiff’s expert
witness from testifying, noting that plaintiff will, of course,
be required to lay the proper foundation for submission of Mr.
Tucker
as
an
expert
at
the
time
of
trial.
At
that
time,
defendant will have an opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff’s
expert
as
to
his
qualifications.
Additionally,
if
he
is
accepted as an expert, the court will also entertain at that
time
any
motions
to
appropriate
and
as
defendants’
motion
strike
portions
by
in
limine
the
parties.
to
desired
of
his
exclude
testimony
as
Therefore,
plaintiff’s
expert
witness from testifying is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to file a
sur-reply [DE #74] is GRANTED.
Defendants’ motion to exclude
plaintiff’s expert witness [DE #64] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [DE #60] is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
Specifically, defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is DENIED as to plaintiff’s claim of excessive
force as well as inadequate training and supervision and Monell
except
as
they
pertain
to
defendant
Mitchell.
The
motion
is
GRANTED as to the claims regarding defendant Mitchell, and she
is dismissed. Furthermore, the motion for summary judgment is
DENIED as to plaintiff’s claim for assault and battery against
18
defendant
Thompson.
The
remaining
state
law
claims
are
dismissed against the parties in their individual capacities due
to
public
parties
official
in
immunity
their
official
and
are
dismissed
capacities
due
to
against
the
governmental
immunity except as to the limited application of the bond as
described more fully supra.
As consented to in the plaintiff’s
memorandum, defendant Wake County is DISMISSED as a party, and
plaintiff’s direct claim under the North Carolina Constitution
(Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for Relief) is DISMISSED.
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 101.2, EDNC, and Rules 16 and
53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ORDERS a
court-hosted settlement conference.
United
States
Magistrate
Judge
Robert
hereby appointed as settlement master.
B.
Jones,
Jr.
is
Magistrate Judge Jones
is directed to meet with the parties and supervise negotiations,
with
an
issues.
aim
toward
Magistrate
reaching
Judge
an
Jones
amicable
resolution
is
full
given
of
authority
the
to
establish such rules as he may desire, which shall be binding
upon the parties and their counsel during the course of the
conference.
place
The conference will be conducted at a time and
selected
by
Magistrate
Judge
parties.
19
Jones
upon
notice
to
the
In
order
to
allow
sufficient
time
for
the
settlement
conference, the trial of this matter is hereby continued from
the
court’s
April
13,
2015,
calendar.
This
matter
will
be
scheduled for pretrial conference during the undersigned’s June
15, 2015, civil term.
A specific trial date will be set at or
following the pretrial conference, with trial to commence no
sooner than two (2) weeks after the pretrial conference.
parties’ joint motion to continue [DE #87] is deemed moot.
This 12th day of March 2015.
____
__________________________________
Malcolm J. Howard
Senior United States District Judge
At Greenville, NC
#26
20
The
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