Yates v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Inc., et al

Filing 484

ORDER - The motion (DE 459) by defendant Honeywell International, Inc., for reconsideration of the court's September 30, 2014, order on summary judgment is GRANTED. The motion (DE 462) by defendant Ford Motor Company for summary judgment and to dismiss plaintiff's remaining claims is GRANTED. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to all claims asserted by plaintiff. As a result, the clerk is DIRECTED to terminate as moot the remaining pending motions and to close the case. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 12/17/2015. (Baker, C.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:12-CV-752-FL

REBECCA FUQUAY YATES,
Individually and as Executor of the
Estate of GRAHAM YATES,
Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY and
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL,
INC., successor-in-interest to Bendix
Corporation f/k/a Allied-Signal, Inc.,
Defendants.

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ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the motion (DE 459) by defendant Honeywell
International, Inc. (“Honeywell”), for reconsideration of the court’s September 30, 2014, order on
summary judgment. Also before the court is the motion (DE 462) by defendant Ford Motor
Company (“Ford”) for summary judgment and to dismiss plaintiff’s remaining claims. Plaintiff did
not respond and the time period to do so has passed. In this posture the issues raised are ripe for
ruling. For the following reasons, defendants’ motions are granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brings claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium related to allegations that
Graham Yates contracted mesothelioma from defendants’ brake products. In the court’s September
30, 2014, order on summary judgment, the court determined that product liability claims based upon
negligence and failure to warn remained for trial.

On June 29, 2015, as pertinent to the instant motions, the court excluded testimony of
plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Eugene Mark (“Mark”), and certain portions of testimony of plaintiff’s expert,
Dr. Arnold Brody (“Brody”), pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589
(1993) (the “Daubert order”). That same date, the court also allowed filing of an amended complaint
by plaintiff, which amended the party names and claims to account for the death of former plaintiff
Graham Yates.
Following the court’s Daubert order, on July 2, 2015, defendant Honeywell filed the instant
motion to reconsider the court’s September 30, 2014, summary judgment order, as a result of the
court’s exclusion of expert testimony in its Daubert. Defendant Ford filed the instant motion for
summary judgment and motion to dismiss all claims against it, also as a result of the court’s Daubert
order.
On July 7, 2015, plaintiff moved to continue trial, noting an intention to file a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s Daubert order, and seeking time to obtain a different causation expert.
That same date, the court directed plaintiff to file a motion for reconsideration by July 10, 2015, with
response and reply briefs due as prescribed by the Local Civil Rules. The court stayed briefing as
to the defendants’ dispositive motions pending resolution of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
The court denied the motion to continue insofar as it sought time to obtain a different causation
expert.
On November 5, 2015, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s
Daubert order. The court directed response, if any, to the instant dispositive motions by December
3, 2015.
COURT’S DISCUSSION

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A.

Standard of Review
1.

Motion for Reconsideration

Unless certified as final, “any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the
action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
“[A] district court retains the power to reconsider and modify its interlocutory judgments, including
partial summary judgments, at any time prior to final judgment when such is warranted.” Am.
Canoe Assoc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 514-15 (4th Cir.2003). “The power to
reconsider or modify interlocutory rulings ‘is committed to the discretion of the district court,’ and
that discretion is not cabined by the ‘heightened standards for reconsideration’ governing final
orders.” Saint Annes Dev. Co. v. Trabich, 443 F. App’x 829, 832 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting American
Canoe, 326 F.3d at 514-15)); see also Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d
1462, 1473 (4th Cir.1991) (stating that interlocutory orders “are left within the plenary power of the
Court that rendered them to afford such relief from them as justice requires”).
“[D]octrines such as law of the case . . . have evolved as a means of guiding that discretion.”
Am. Canoe Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 515 (citing Sejman v. Warner–Lambert Co., Inc., 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th
Cir.1988)). According to the law of the case doctrine, “earlier decisions of a court become law of
the case and must be followed unless ‘(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different
evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the issue,
or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.’” Am. Canoe
Ass’n, 326 F.3d at 515 (quoting Sejman, 845 F.2d at 69).

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2.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence
of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the
moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party then must affirmatively demonstrate with
specific evidence that there exists a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). Only disputes between the
parties over facts that might affect the outcome of the case properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
B.

Analysis
1.

Negligence and Failure to Warn Claims

Defendants move for summary judgment, or for reconsideration of the court’s September
30, 2014, order on summary judgment, on the basis that there is no genuine issue of fact regarding
the causation element of plaintiff’s negligence and failure to warn claims in light of the court’s
Daubert order. Where the court in its September 30, 2014, order relied upon expert testimony of
Mark in concluding that plaintiff had brought forth sufficient evidence on causation to proceed to
trial (See Order at 6-11, 19, 41), and where the court in it’s Daubert order excluded testimony of
Mark, the court finds good cause now to reconsider its September 30, 2014, summary judgment
ruling. Summary judgment in favor of defendants is warranted where plaintiff lacks evidence
sufficient to establish the causation element of plaintiff’s negligence and failure to warn claims. See
Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 69 F.3d 712, 716 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1995).

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2.

Breach of Implied Warranty Claims

Plaintiff asserts a breach of implied warranty claim in the amended complaint. The court
previously dismissed plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim in its September 30, 2014, order,
(see DE 217 at 43), and defendant Ford seeks dismissal of the claim on that basis. Where the court
previously dismissed the claim, and where plaintiff does not assert any basis for maintaining the
claim in this action upon defendant’s motion, the claim must be dismissed.
3.

Design Defect Claim

Defendant Ford argues that, to the extent plaintiff continues to assert a design defect claim
as component of plaintiff’s negligence claim, such design defect claim was abandoned previously
upon summary judgment and fails for lack of evidentiary support in the record. Defendant Ford has
demonstrated an absence of evidence supporting a feasible alternative design, as an essential element
of the claim. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 NC 440, 471-72 (2004). Where plaintiff does
not oppose the motion, and where plaintiff has not affirmatively demonstrated with specific evidence
that there exists a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial, summary judgment as to this aspect
of plaintiff’s negligence claim is warranted.
4.

Loss of Consortium Damages

Defendant Ford argues that plaintiff’s claim for damages based upon loss of consortium must
be dismissed because it is subsumed within plaintiff’s wrongful death claim asserted on behalf of
the estate of Graham Yates. Where the court has determined that summary judgment or dismissal
as a matter of law is warranted as to all of plaintiff’s substantive claims in this action, plaintiff’s
claim for damages based upon loss of consortium necessarily must be dismissed. Defendant’s

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separate argument in support of dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for damages based upon loss of
consortium is moot.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the motion (DE 459) by defendant Honeywell International, Inc.
(“Honeywell”), for reconsideration of the court’s September 30, 2014, order on summary judgment
is GRANTED. The motion (DE 462) by defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) for summary
judgment and to dismiss plaintiff’s remaining claims is GRANTED. Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment as to all claims asserted by plaintiff. As a result, the clerk is DIRECTED to
terminate as moot the remaining pending motions and to close the case.
SO ORDERED, this the 17th day of December, 2015.

_____________________________
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge

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