Edwards v. Astrue

Filing 32

ORDER GRANTING 22 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and DENYING 27 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. This matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 2/27/2014. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:12-CV-821-BO
OUIJA EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner ofSocial Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. A
hearing was held on these matters before the undersigned on February 5, 2014, at Raleigh, North
Carolina. For the reasons discussed below, this matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the final
decision ofthe Commissioner denying her claim for disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB)
and supplemental security income (SSI) pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB and SSI on September 27, 2010, alleging disability since
September 9, 2010. Plaintiffs claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. After conducting
a hearing and considering the claim de novo, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff
was not disabled in a decision issued on April 11, 2012. The decision of the ALJ became the final
decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review, and
plaintiff then timely sought review of the Commissioner's decision in this Court.

DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, this Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited
to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is supported by substantial evidence and whether
the Commissioner employed the correct legal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence consists of more than a mere scintilla of
evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 ( 1971 ). The Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner if the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ uses a multi-step process. First, a
claimant must not be able to work in a substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Second,
a claimant must have a severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities. Id Third, to be found disabled, without considering a claimant's
age, education, and work experience, a claimant's impairment must be of sufficient duration and
must either meet or equal an impairment listed by the regulations. Id Fourth, in the alternative, a
claimant may be disabled if his or her impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant
work and, fifth, if the impairment prevents the claimant from doing other work. Id The claimant
bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step
five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
After finding that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and she had not engaged in
any substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had
the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis, residuals from knee replacement surgery, and
obesity. The ALJ went on to find that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

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impairments that met or equaled a listing at step three, and found that plaintiff had a residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work with only occasional postural activities. At
step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a customer service
clerk and receptionist. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled.
The ALJ found that plaintiffs depression and anxiety were not severe impairments at step
two of the sequential process. This decision was based on the ALJ' s comparison of plaintiffs
symptoms to the paragraph B criteria of Listing 12.00C and her finding that plaintiffs depression
and anxiety cause no more than minimal limitations on her ability to perform basic mental activities.
In making this finding, however, the ALJ failed to discuss any of the relevant medical evidence that
would suggest that plaintiffs depression and anxiety caused more than minimal limitations. For
example, though plaintiff denied having depression or anxiety in September 2010, a consultative
examiner in November 2010 diagnosed plaintiff with depressive disorder and opined that plaintiff
appeared to be very depressed, that plaintiffs ability to interact with peers was questionable, and that
her emotional stability in a competitive work environment was questionable. Tr. 397. In March
2011, plaintiff was diagnosed with moderate recurrent major depressive disorder and generalized
anxiety disorder and reported that she had difficulty concentrating and her social isolation had
worsened. Tr. 489-90. Though the ALJ notes Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores of
60 in her decision, in November 2010 the consultative examiner assigned plaintiff a GAF of 55 and
in May 2011 she was assigned a GAF of 44. Tr. 506. Because this evidence was not addressed by
the ALJ at step two, the Court cannot conduct a meaningful review of the ALJ's decision and a
remand for further consideration and explanation is appropriate.
Additionally, even if plaintiffs depression and anxiety were properly determined not to be
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severe impairments, the ALJ was required to address both severe and non-severe impairments in
formulating plaintiffs RFC. SSR 96-8p. Indeed, non-severe impairments "may--when considered
with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments--be critical to the outcome of a claim." Id.
As the record does not reflect that these conditions were fully considered when determining
plaintiffs RFC, remand is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the
pleadings [DE 22] is GRANTED and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 27]
is DENIED. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing.

SO ORDERED, this

r 7day ofFebruary, 2014.

~y~
UNITED STATES DISTRIC JUDGE

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