Justice v. White, et al

Filing 30

ORDER denying 29 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and denying 16 Motion for Entry of Default and Motion for Default Judgment - Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 09/18/2013. (Baker, C.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:13-CV-548-FL
THEODORE JUSTICE,
Plaintiff,
v.
PETER WHITE, Vance County Sheriff;
SAMUEL BOOTH CURRIN, Vance
County District Attorney; ALLISON S.
CAPPS, Vance County Assistant
District Attorney; HENRY W. HIGHT,
Jr., Senior Resident Superior Court
Judge; THOMAS S. HESTER, JR.,
Chairman Vance County; and TERESA
JUMO, LPN, Vance County Detention
Center
Defendants.

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ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action by complaint filed August 1,
2013, as amended August 30, 2013. Various motions have been filed in the action, including
plaintiff’s motion for entry of default and default judgment (DE 16), filed August 27, 2013, against
defendants Samuel Booth Currin, Allison S. Capps, and Henry W. Hight, Jr. Where there is no basis
in law or fact for the relief requested, said motion is DENIED.
A motion to dismiss was filed August 29, 2013, by this same group of defendants (DE 19),
directed against the August 1, 2013, complaint, as well as a motion to dismiss (DE 26), directed
against the August 30, 2013, amended complaint. The motions are not yet fully ripe, where
plaintiff’s response time has not yet run.
Also pending is a motion for preliminary injunction, just filed by plaintiff (DE 29) on

September 16, 2013. Plaintiff alerts on the face of the motion that he also seeks a temporary
restraining order as well as a preliminary injunction, “to ensure in the event he is returned to the
Vance County Detention Center that he would receive proper medical care.” While the response
time has not yet expired, where plaintiff also seeks a temporary restraining order, given the nature
of the sought-after injunctive relief, the court turns its immediate attention to this filing, and the
overarching request therein for a preliminary injunction.
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed
on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3]
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy,” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), which “may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22;
see Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011).
In an order granting a preliminary injunction, the court must make “specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law” and on appeal such factual findings “shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.” Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Rule 52(a)).
With respect to findings of fact and conclusions of law, a preliminary injunction is decided “on the
basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the
merits.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A party thus is not required to
prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing,” and the findings of fact and conclusions
of law made by a court in ruling on a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.
See id.
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Having carefully considered the necessary factors, on that showing now before this court, the
court cannot today find good cause for entry of a preliminary injunction. As noted, the remedy is
an extraordinary one, which only may be awarded upon a clear showing of entitlement. No clear
showing has been made.

As such, the court dispenses with continued briefing, where it is

unnecessary to hear from defendants.
This court’s attention soon will be drawn to the motions to dismiss of record, filed on behalf
of defendants Samuel Booth Currin, Allison S. Capps, and Henry W. Hight, Jr., upon receipt and
review of plaintiff’s response, and any reply filed in the matter. The other defendants have sought
and been allowed more time within which to make their responses to plaintiff’s allegations. When
the pleadings are framed, the court’s initial order will enter, illuminating the parameters for the
parties’ joint conference in preface to submission of any suggested plan for the schedule of the case.
Occasionally, the court may defer that process, however, in order to promote disposition first of any
preliminary motion, such as that made by defendants Samuel Booth Currin, Allison S. Capps, and
Henry W. Hight, Jr., in the case. The court now signals here its intention to defer the parties’
conference activities pending disposition of any motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion for entry of default and default judgment (DE 16),
filed August 27, 2013, against defendants Samuel Booth Currin, Allison S. Capps, and plaintiff’s
motion for preliminary injunction (DE 29), filed September 16, 2013, are DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this the 18th day of September, 2013.
_________________________
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge

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