Brandon v. Colvin

Filing 37

ORDER granting 31 Motion for Attorney Fees. Plaintiff's counsel is awarded fees in the amount of $4,112.50. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 2/19/2015. (Marsh, K)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:13-CV-556-BO
LYNN HANKS BRANDON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs Motion for attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). [DE 31]. For the
reasons discussed below, plaintiffs motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Brandon sought appellate review of the Commissioner's decision before this Court
on August 6, 2013. On August 28, 2014, a hearing was held in Raleigh, North Carolina, after
which this Court remanded the matter back to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Plaintiffnow seeks an award of attorney's fees in the amount of$4,112.50 for 23.5 hours of
work spent on the appeal. Defendant argues that plaintiffs failure to allege that the
Commissioner's position was not substantially justified renders plaintiffs Motion deficient. In
the alternative, plaintiff argues that the government's position was substantially justified.
DISCUSSION
Under the EAJA, parties who prevail in litigation against the United States are entitled to
payment for reasonable attorney's fees unless the United States was "substantially justified" in
its litigatory position. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In order to establish eligibility for an award
under the Act, the claimant must show that he is (i) the prevailing party; (ii) that the

government's position was not substantially justified; (iii) that no special circumstances make an
award unjust; and (iv) that the fee application was submitted to the court within thirty days of
final judgment and was supported by an itemized statement. See Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d
65 5, 656 (4th Cir. 1991 ). In "determining whether the government's position in a case is
substantially justified, we look beyond the issue on which the petitioner prevailed to determine,
from the totality of the circumstances, whether the government acted reasonably in causing the
litigation or in taking a [particular] stance during the litigation." Roanoke River Basin Ass 'n v.
Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, the Commissioner attacks only the substantial justification prong, first contending
that plaintiffs Motion is defective for failing to allege that the Commissioner's position was not
substantially justified. Assuming without deciding that plaintiff did, in fact, initially fail to allege
that the Commissioner's position was substantially unjustified, the Court finds that plaintiff
cured that defect by so alleging in her reply. [DE 35].
The Commissioner next contends that the government's position was substantially
justified. Review of the record and arguments presented in this matter reveal this not to be the
case. As detailed in the Court's order remanding the case to the Commissioner [DE 29], the
residual functional capacity formulated by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) has absolutely
no support in the record. Accordingly, the Appeals Council should have remanded the matter
back to the ALJ on its own and the Commissioner should have conceded that point when faced
with this litigation. As such, the Commissioner's position in contesting the litigation to the extent
it did here could not satisfy a reasonable person, and an award of fees is appropriate.
"Once the district court determines that plaintiffs have met the threshold conditions for an
award of fees and costs under the EAJA, the district court must undertake the 'task of

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determining what fee is reasonable."' Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239,253 (4th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). In determining the amount of a fee, a court considers, inter alia, the extent of
plaintiffs success, the novelty and complexity of the issues presented, the experience and skill of
the attorney, and the typical range of compensated hours in a particular field. Dixon v. Astrue,
No. 5:06-CV-77-JG, 2008 WL 360989, *3-*4 (E.D.NC. Feb. 8, 2008). A court has great
discretion to determine the fee award so long as the fee is reasonable. Hyatt, 315 F .3d at 254.
Here, plaintiff requests $4, 112.50 for 23.5 hours of work. Plaintiff was successful, and
plaintiffs counsel has demonstrated that he is an experienced attorney in the Social Security
field. The Court has further reviewed the amount of time expended and the rates at which
counsel has billed and finds that they are reasonable and that the amount requested will not result
in a windfall to counsel. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.4 (1983); see also Quade ex

rel. Quade v. Barnhart, 570 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1167-1168 (D. Ariz. 2008) (noting that the "Court
will not micromanage an attorney's approach to a case"); Attia v. Astrue, No. 1:06-cv-00778SMS, 2008 WL 2620376, *3 (E.D.Ca. July 3, 2008) (finding fifty-one hours reasonable where
brief was lengthy, administrative record was lengthy, and counsel was experienced).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for EAJA fees is GRANTED and plaintiffs
counsel is awarded fees in the amount of$4,112.50.
SO ORDERED, this

_L!_ day of February, 2015.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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