Jackson v. The University of Phoenix, Inc.

Filing 16

ORDER GRANTING 8 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Compel Arbitration. Plaintiff Joshua Jackson is compelled to arbitrate his claim against defendant. Plaintiff's claims are dismissed in their entirety without prejudice. The clerk is directed to close the file. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 2/17/2014. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:13-CV-736-BO

JOSHUA JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC.,
a subsidiary of APOLLO GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant University of Phoenix, Inc.'s motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 [DE 8]. The motion is ripe
for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and
arbitration is COMPELLED.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant. On October 20, 2013, plaintiff filed his
complaint against defendant alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims under
Title VII and Section 1981, and claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach
of contract. Defendants argue that plaintiff is precluded from pursuing his claims in this Court by
a written arbitration agreement.

DISCUSSION
I.

PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS PARTY TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

Defendant's argument as to whether this this case should be dismissed and plaintiff
should be compelled to arbitrate is based on the idea that plaintiff is a party to an arbitration
agreement between himself and defendant. Mr. Jackson disputes that this is case. [DE 10 at 3].
He denies that he signed an acknowledgment agreeing to be bound by the arbitration agreement.
[DE 10 at 2]. He further disputes that he manifested any specific intent to accept the terms of the
arbitration. [Id.]. Plaintiff includes a declaration that states that he never knowingly placed his
signature, by handwriting or electronically, on any document acknowledging his acceptance of
an arbitration clause. [DE 11]. Plaintiff also attempts to cast doubt on the validity of the signature
defendant does possess. [DE 10 at 5]. Further, he argues that it is suspicious that he would have
signed an arbitration agreement only months before his termination, but not in the three
preceding years that he was employed by defendant. However, the evidence provided by
defendant in its reply brief shows that plaintiff has no basis to claim that he was not a valid party
to the arbitration agreement.
Notably, plaintiff not only electronically acknowledged receipt of defendant's 2011
employee handbook, including the arbitration agreement, but he also electronically
acknowledged defendants 2008, 2009, and 2010 employee handbooks all of which contain
similar versions of the arbitration agreement. [DE 13-1 Ex. A-1]. Further, plaintiffs loose
allegation that his arbitration acknowledgement signature is fraudulent is entirely unsupported.
He offers only his own statement with the statements of two other employees that speculate that
defendant prepared and submitted fraudulent documents to the Court. [DE 11]. He offers no
evidence that factually supports his claim. Other courts have found valid and enforceable

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arbitration agreements exist even where a plaintiff submits a declaration speculating that the
employer's copy of the electronic signature is fraudulent. See e.g., Morgan v. United Healthcare
Servs., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61723, *7-10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2013) (granting

defendant's motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff speculated that defendant was capable
of tampering with a signature to an arbitration agreement); Castro Rosas v. Macy 's, Inc., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121400, *13-15 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (enforcing arbitration agreement
and holding that plaintiffs claims that defendant fraudulently affixed plaintiffs signatures to
acknowledgement forms were unconvincing where the personal information required for
completion of the on-line forms suggest that only the plaintiffs themselves could have
completed them). Here, as in Castro Rosas, defendant has security measures in place that protect
an employee's access to his personal information including his human resources paperwork such
as handbook acknowledgement forms. [DE 13-1]. Such measures include passwords that are
only known to the employees themselves. [!d.]. Plaintiffs argument that his electronic signature
on the 2011 acknowledgment form was fraudulent and therefore he is not a party to the
arbitration agreement is wholly unconvincing in light of defendant's evidence.
II.

THE ARBITRATION AGRREMENT REQUIRES THE ARBITRATOR, NOT
THE COURT, TO DETERMINE IF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT
TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

Ordinarily, in deciding whether to compel arbitration, the Court must determine (1)
whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement
covers the dispute. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002). However, there is
an exception to this general rule where "the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise."
AT&T Tech. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); see also First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("The question 'who has the primary power

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to decide arbitrability' turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter."). In such cases, the
Court examines the underlying contract to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to
commit the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Rent-A -Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.
Ct. 2772, 2777-78 (2010) ("An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional
antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the court to enforce, and the FAA
operates on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.").
Here, the parties have clearly and unmistakably provided that the arbitrator should decide
the gateway issues of whether an enforceable agreement exists and whether that agreement is
applicable to the claims raised by plaintiff. The arbitration agreement states:
Except as it otherwise provides, this Arbitration Agreement is intended to apply to
the resolution of disputes that otherwise would be resolved in a court of law, and
therefore this Arbitration Agreement requires all such disputes to be resolved only
by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or
jury trial . Such disputes include without limitation disputes arising out of or
relating to interpretation or application of this Arbitration Agreement, including
the enforceability, revocability, or validity of the Arbitration Agreement or any
portion of the Arbitration Agreement.
[DE 9 Ex. 3 at 29]. Accordingly, any arguments as to the applicability of the arbitration
agreement to plaintiffs claims should be decided by an arbitrator not this court. Because the
questions of enforceability, outside of the issue of fraud and validity of the initial agreement
determined by this Court above, and applicability to plaintiffs claims should be determined by
the arbitrator, this Court does not rule on these issues.
Upon the granting of a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must determine whether to
stay or dismiss plaintiffs lawsuit. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (stating that when an arbitration
agreement governed by the FAA covers claims that have been asserted in a lawsuit, the Court
having jurisdiction over the case must compel arbitration and either dismiss the action or stay
further judicial proceedings until arbitration has been held). "Notwithstanding the terms of§ 3,
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however, dismissal is a proper remedy when all of the issues presented in a lawsuit are
arbitrable." Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th
Cir. 2001 ). Reviewing the terms of the contract at issue in this matter, the Court finds that all of
plaintiffs claims are subject to arbitration. Moreover, plaintiff did not offer any arguments or
authority as to why a stay would be more appropriate than dismissal of their claims under these
circumstances. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims are dismissed and this action is terminated.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss [DE 8] is GRANTED and
plaintiff Joshua Jackson is compelled to arbitrate his claims against defendant. Plaintiffs claims
are DISMISSED in their entirety without prejudice. The clerk is directed to close the file.
SO ORDERED.
This the

l_!J_ day of February, 2014.

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