Hatley, et al v. Bowden, et al
Filing
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ORDER denying as moot 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting in part as to all causes of action asserted against it save plaintiffs' claim for negligence and denying as moot in remaining part 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; and granting in part as to plaintiffs' claim for negligence only but denying in remaining part 15 Motion to Amend Complaint - Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file their amen ded complaint in accordance with this order granting in part and denying in part their motion to amend within fourteen (14) days of entry of this order. Finally, where the claims against defendant Bowden in her official capacity only are duplicative of the claims against defendant Raleigh, these claims against defendant Bowden in her official capacity are DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 03/04/2014. (Baker, C.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:13-CV-765-FL
ANIKA HATLEY and AMY HATLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
OFFICER BOWDEN, in her Individual
and Official Capacities and the CITY OF
RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
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ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 6, by defendant City of Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”) (DE 9);
on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) by defendant The City of Raleigh (“Raleigh”)
(DE 11)1; and on plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint (DE 15). All motions
have been fully briefed, and issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, the court
will DENY AS MOOT defendant RPD’s motion to dismiss, GRANT IN PART and DENY IN
PART defendant Raleigh’s motion to dismiss, and GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART
plaintiffs’ motion to amend.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, who are mother and daughter, initiated this action on September 26, 2013, by
filing complaint in Wake County Superior Court against defendants Raleigh, RPD, and Bowden.
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Although defendant Raleigh is not named in the caption of plaintiffs’ complaint, it was served with process and
plaintiffs assert claims against it.
Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a claim for negligence. Defendants removed
the action to this court on November 1, 2013, and moved for an extension of time to respond to
plaintiffs’ complaint (DE 1, 6). Defendants’ motion for extension of time was granted (DE 8), and
on December 9, 2013, defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs responded to these
motions, and moved to amend their complaint (DE 14, 15). Plaintiffs’ motion to amend is opposed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint are as follows: On or about September 27, 2010,
plaintiff Anika Hatley,2 a sixteen (16) year old high school student, was in the Athens Drive High
School cafeteria. Compl. ¶ 9. The cafeteria was crowded and full of students. Id. A fight broke
out between two other students, and many other students gathered around to watch. Id. ¶ 10.
Plaintiff Anika Hatley was not among the crowd of watching students, and at some point moved near
to the cafeteria’s serving line. Id. ¶¶ 11, 17.
Defendant Bowden, a uniformed police officer, was present in the cafeteria as part of the
Student Resource Officer program, which places uniformed officers in Wake County School System
schools for security. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. She was not ordinarily assigned to the Student Resource Officer
position, but was filling in for the regular officer. Id. ¶ 12. Defendant Bowden moved to intervene
in the fight and disburse the watching crowd, spraying pepper spray at the fighting students, as well
as in all directions at the crowd, for over ten (10) seconds. Id. ¶ 15. The students reacted to the
pepper spray “forcefully and chaotically” and began running for the cafeteria exits creating “a
stampede condition.” Id. ¶ 16. As she moved with the crowd, plaintiff Anika Hatley was knocked
down and trampled by many other students, suffering serious injury. Id. ¶¶ 3, 17.
2
There is some discrepancy is to whether this plaintiff’s name is Anika Hatley or Annika Hatley as both spellings are
used in plaintiffs’ filings. As the case caption refers to her as Anika Hatley, the court will do the same.
2
Plaintiff Anika Hatley, and her mother, Plaintiff Amy Hatley, assert the following claims as
a result of this incident: (1) a claim against defendant Bowden in her individual and official capacity
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against defendant Raleigh on the basis of respondeat superior; (2) a
claim for negligence against defendant Bowden, and against defendant Raleigh on the basis of
respondeat superior; and (3) a claim against defendant Raleigh under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure
to train defendant Bowden.3
Plaintiffs also allege that
[u]pon information and belief, Pursuant to N.C. General Statute § 160A-485 or other
authority, the City of Raleigh had purchased and had in force on September 27th,
2013 liability insurance, or participated in a high risk pool, or adopted a city council
resolution creating a funded reserve meant to be the same as purchasing insurance
under N.C. General Statute § 160A-485 and waived any governmental immunity it
might have to the extent of such insurance as provided by the policy, terms of the
risk pool or adoption of such resolution.
Compl. ¶ 8.
COURT’S DISCUSSION
A.
Motions to Dismiss
1.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a claim is stated; “it does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A claim is stated if the complaint
contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In evaluating whether a claim is stated, “[the] court accepts all well-pled
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Plaintiffs purport to assert a fourth claim, but this claim is not a separate cause of action, but rather only lists medical
expenses allegedly paid by plaintiff Amy Hatley for her daughter’s injuries.
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facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party but does
not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
In other words, this plausibility standard requires a petitioner to articulate facts, that, when accepted
as true, demonstrate that the petitioner has stated a claim that makes it plausible he is entitled to
relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
2.
RPD’s Motion to Dismiss
As the court will grant in part plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, and where such
amended complaint no longer names RPD as a defendant, this motion is DENIED AS MOOT.
3.
The City of Raleigh’s Motion to Dismiss4
a.
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims Against Defendant Raleigh
In their first claim for relief against defendant Raleigh under § 1983, plaintiffs are seeking
to recover for a purported violation of “constitutional rights under the fourth and fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Compl. ¶ 20.a.
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Plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Bowden in her official capacity are duplicative of their claims against Raleigh
because “an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(recognizing that a suit against a state official in his official capacity “is no different from a suit against the State itself.”).
Thus these duplicate claims are DISMISSED. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The district
court correctly held that the § 1983 claim against Martin in his official capacity as Superintendent is essentially a claim
against the Board and thus should be dismissed as duplicative.”).
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.” Plaintiffs complaint does not, however, allege any seizure of plaintiff Amy
Hatley. Thus plaintiff Amy Hatley fails to state a claim for an unreasonable seizure under § 1983.
The complaint fails to allege the seizure of plaintiff Anika Hatley. “Because a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment always ‘requires an intentional acquisition of physical
control,’ . . . it does not extend to ‘accidental effects’ or ‘unintended consequences of government
action.’” Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 480 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). Thus, “one is ‘seized’ within the fourth amendment’s meaning only
when one is the intended object of a physical restraint by an agent of the state.” Rucker v. Harford
Cnty., Md., 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991). In this case, plaintiff Anika Hatley was not one of
the fighting students, nor in the crowd that gathered to watch the fight. See Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.
Defendant Bowden only aimed pepper spray at the fighting students and the crowd watching,
therefore no pepper spray was aimed at plaintiff Anika Hatley. See id. ¶ 15, 17. Indeed, the
complaint itself alleges that plaintiff Anika Hatley was injured, not by the pepper spray, but by being
knocked down and trampled by the crowd running from the pepper spray. See id. at ¶ 17. Where
plaintiff Anika Hatley was not the intended object of the pepper spray she was not seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore also lacks a claim for an unreasonable seizure
under § 1983.
In the alternative, even if plaintiff Anika Hatley had been seized, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims
against defendant Raleigh would still fail. Plaintiffs’ first § 1983 claim against defendant Raleigh
is based upon respondeat superior liability for the actions of defendant Bowden. It is well-
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established, however, that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Plaintiffs’ second § 1983 claim against defendant Raleigh alleges an unconstitutional policy
and custom of defendant Raleigh to inadequately supervise and train its police officers. A
municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services,436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official
government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011).
However, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a
claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. Thus, deficiencies in training “must rise to at least the degree
of deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for constitutional rights of persons” to give rise to
municipal § 1983 liability. Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 713 (4th Cir. 1999).
“[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. “A
pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. (quotations omitted). The
deficiency in training must also “make the occurrence of the specific violation a ‘reasonable
probability rather than a mere possibility.’” Semple, 195 F.3d at 713 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel,
824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiffs fail to make the requisite allegations to support municipal § 1983 liability for
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failure to train. Plaintiffs point to no prior incidents, or other factors, showing that defendant
Raleigh was on notice that a failure to specially train officers assigned to Wake County schools as
part of the Student Resource Officer program in dealing with students or certain crowd control
techniques was likely to lead to a constitutional violation. Plaintiffs thus have failed to plausibly
allege deliberate indifference on the part of defendant Raleigh, and therefore have not stated a claim
for a § 1983 violation based upon failure to train.
b.
Plaintiffs’ Negligence Claim Against Defendant Raleigh
In plaintiffs’ second claim for relief, they assert a claim for negligence against defendant
Raleigh. As plaintiffs allege new facts with respect to this claim in their proposed amended
complaint, and, as discussed below, the court does not find such proposed amendment futile with
respect to this claim, the court denies as moot defendant Raleigh’s motion to dismiss as to this
negligence claim.
c.
Plaintiffs’ Claim for Punitive Damages Against Defendant Raleigh
Plaintiffs request that this court award “punitive damages to Plaintiffs against the
Defendants, jointly and severally.” Compl. 6. It is well-established, however, that “§ 1983 does not
allow punitive damages against localities.” Berkley v. Common Council of City of Charleston, 63
F.3d 295, 307 (4th Cir. 1995). Similarly, under North Carolina law, “no punitive damages are
allowed against a municipal corporation unless expressly authorized by statute.” Long v. City of
Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 207 (1982); see also Iglesias v. Wolford, 539 F. Supp. 2d 831, 841
(E.D.N.C. 2008) (“Municipalities may not be held liable for punitive damages, whether under 42
U.S.C. 1983 or North Carolina law.”). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against
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defendant Raleigh is dismissed.5
B.
Motion to Amend
1.
Standard of Review
After twenty-one days have elapsed since the filing of responsive pleading, a plaintiff may
only amend his or her complaint with the court’s leave or by defendant’s written consent. Leave to
amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This liberal rule
gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits, rather than disposing of
them on technicalities. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 425 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Leave
to amend under Rule 15(a), should, however, be denied “when the amendment would be prejudicial
to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment
would be futile.” Id. at 426-47. Amendment is futile if the proposed amended claim cannot
withstand a motion to dismiss. See Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910, 917 (4th Cir. 1995).
2.
Analysis
Defendant Raleigh asserts that plaintiffs’ motion to amend is futile. The substantive claims
in plaintiffs’ amended complaint are the same as in their original complaint, and plaintiffs raise no
new facts in support of their § 1983 claims. As these claims were properly subject to dismissal in
plaintiffs’ original complaint, the proposed amendment (or lack thereof) with respect to these claims
is futile.
With respect to their negligence claim, in their proposed amended complaint plaintiffs allege
that,
[u]pon information and belief, the city of Raleigh had in force on September 27th,
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This ruling does not extend to plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against defendant Bowden in her individual
capacity.
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2013 an interim policy waiving sovereign immunity for claims valued up to
$1,000,000. The City of Raleigh established a self-funded reserve meant to be the
same as purchasing insurance under N.C. General Statute § 160A-485 for claims
valued in this range. Further, the City of Raleigh purchased insurance to the extent
that claims exceeded the value of $1,000,000.
Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 8.
“[A] county or municipal corporation is immune from suit for the negligence of its
employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of immunity.” Estate of
Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 198 (2012)
(quotations omitted). “[P]rovision of police services constitutes a governmental function protected
by governmental immunity.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 655 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing
Arrington v. Martinez, 215 N.C. App. 252, 257 (2011)). Nevertheless, “[a]ny city is authorized to
waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 160A-485(a). Failure to allege such a waiver bars a plaintiff from pursuing claims for
negligence in performing a governmental function against a North Carolina municipality. Collins
v. Franklin Cnty., 861 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676 (E.D.N.C. 2012).
Defendant Raleigh asserts that the proposed amendment is futile where plaintiffs do not
allege any factual content indicating that they meet the requirements of defendant Raleigh’s alleged
interim waiver policy. A plaintiff, however, need not plead specific details as to the precise contours
of a municipality’s policy waiving sovereign immunity to survive a motion to dismiss. See
Arrington v. Martinez, 215 N.C. App. 252, 263 (2011) (“Plaintiff made the required allegations in
her complaint that the City had purchased a policy of general liability insurance and had thereby
‘waived any applicable immunity defenses in tort[.]’”); see also Twombly 550 U.S. at 570 (“a
complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations”). Therefore the court does not find
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amendment futile as to plaintiffs’ claim for negligence, and will grant the motion to amend in this
part.
CONCLUSION
For reasons given, defendant RPD’s motion to dismiss (DE 9) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Defendant Raleigh’s motion to dismiss (DE 11) is GRANTED IN PART as to all causes of action
asserted against it save plaintiffs’ claim for negligence and DENIED AS MOOT IN REMAINING
PART. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend (DE 15) is GRANTED IN PART as to plaintiffs’ claim for
negligence only but DENIED IN REMAINING PART. Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file their
amended complaint – in accordance with this order granting in part and denying in part their motion
to amend – within fourteen (14) days of entry of this order. Finally, where the claims against
defendant Bowden in her official capacity only are duplicative of the claims against defendant
Raleigh, these claims against defendant Bowden in her official capacity are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED, this the 4th day of March, 2014.
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge
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