Sandoval-Zelaya v. A+ Tires, Brakes, Lubes, and Mufflers, Inc. et al

Filing 183

ORDER denying 178 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 12/4/2017. (Briggeman, N.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINAj
WESTERN DMSION
No. 5:13-CV-810-D

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ROSSEL SANDOVAL-ZELAYA,
SALVADOR MONTOYA, and
EDWARD HERNANDEZ, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

v.
A+ TIRES, BRAKES, LUBES, AND
MUFFLERS, INC., FLORES WELDING,
INC., JULIO FLORES, and MARIELLE
BELHASSEN,
Defendants.

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ORDER

On October 26, 2017, A+ Tires, Brakes, Lubes, and Muftlers, Inc., Flores Wel~, Inc., Julio

Flores, and Marielle Belhassen (collectively, "defendants'') moved forreconsideratiol of1his court's
order of September 28, 201; [D.E. 178]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. S9(e}, 60(a). On NovL 3, 2017,

plaintiffii responded in opposition [D.E. 179]. On November 17, 2017,

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replied [D.E.

181 ]. As explained below, the court denies defendants' motion for reconsideratij

Defendants seek ''reconsideration or clarifu:ation" of the portion of this lurt' s order of
September 28, 2017, concerning liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act

("FL~''). See [D.E.

178] l. Specifically, defendants seek relief under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(a)
to reconsider or clarify the court's holding concerning FI.SA liability for

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ask the court

that Salvador

Montoya worked. See id. at 1-2.
Plaintiffs oppose defendants' motion. See [D.E. 179] 6. Plaintiffs
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no~ J t this court did
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not rule on how often Montoya worlred uru:ompensatedhours. Id. Rather, the

""'jrt jerely held that

when Montoya did wmk such uru:ompensated hours, defendants are liable Wlder~iSA See id.

Plaintiffs also note that Rules 59(e) and 60(a) are not proper procedural vehicles to pursue relieffrom
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the court's interlocutory order. Id. at3; seeDillyv. S.S. Kresge, 606F.2d62, 62--63 (4thCir.1979).
Defendants concede that they should have sought relief concerning this clurt' s order of
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September 28, 2017, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and not Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(a).
See [D.E. 181] 2. Nonetheless, defendants argue that this court should reconsider or l1arify its order
concerning FLSA liability and Montoya. See id. at 4-5.
Jn this court's order of September 28, 2017, the court rejected defeodaDts1
argument that

"time spent loading trucks at defendants' shop before driving to the jobsite, or unloa'.ding the trucks
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after returning m the evenmg, 1s prer1mmary or post1mmary to prmc1pal activities

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der the Portal-

to-Portal Act." [D.E. 174] 14. Thus, such work is compensable under the FLSA. [d. at 14-15.
As for Montoya, the court wrote:
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Having determined that loading and unloading trucks was not exeiPpt

under the Portal-to-Portal Act, the court grants plaintiffs' motion forJ
summary judgment as to liability on Montoya's FLSA claims
stemming from defendants' failure to pay him for the time he spent
loading and unloading trucks, but denies summary judgment as tol
Hernandez's FLSA claim. The record shows that, at least in somdl
workweeks, Montoya would load and unload trucks and was not paid
for that time or intervening travel time. ·an each day MontbyJ
worked loading and unloading the trucks, his wor~day began whenh~
first started loading the truck and ended when he :finished unloading
the truck. Montoya is entitled to be paid for that work. To the exteni
the hours spent loading or unloading trucks made Montoya work in'.
excess of 40 hours worked per week in a given workweek, MontoyJ
is entitled to overtime pay. Although the parties dispute how man~
hours Montoya worked in a 'given workweek, that question is
properly addressed at the damages stage.

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Id. at 15-16. The court concludes that this portion of its order does not require reconsideration or
clarification.
In sum, the court DENIES defendants' motion [D.E. 178].
SO ORDERED. This _A__ day of December 2017.

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