Blue v. Eutaw Shopping Center Inc.

Filing 15

ORDER denying 11 Motion to Dismiss - Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 8/1/2014. (Tripp, S.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:13-CV-842-D

JACKIE BLUE,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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EUTAW SHOPPING CENTER INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER

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On December 10,2013, Jackie Blue ("Blue" or "plaintiff') filed a complaint against Eutaw
Shopping Center Inc. ("Eutaw"), alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 ("ADA"). See Compl. [D.E. 1]. On January 10, 2014, Eutaw
answered the complaint, moved to dismiss for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, and filed a memorandum in support. See [D.E. 11-12]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). On
January 22, 2014, Blue responded in opposition [D.E. 14]. As explained below, the court denies the
motion to dismiss.

I.
Blue suffers from multiple sclerosis and cannot walk. See Compl. ~~ 4, 6. Blue frequently
shops at the Eutaw Village Shopping Center ("Eutaw Village") in Fayetteville, North Carolina, and
intends to continue shopping at Eutaw Village. See id. Eutaw owns Eutaw Village and leases space
to commercial tenants there. See id.

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1, 7.

Blue last visited Eutaw Village on August 7, 2013. See id. ~ 6 & Ex. A. Blue alleges that,
during that visit, she encountered various barriers to access in the shopping center's parking lot and

common areas. See id. ~~ 4-5, 10. Blue's complaint mentions certain barriers to access located in
space controlled by Robertson's Sandwich Shop ("Robertson's"), one of the shopping center's
tenants, but does not name Robertson's as a defendant. See id. ~ 5.
In her complaint, Blue alleges violations of Title III of the ADA, which grants rights to
disabled customers of businesses that qualify as places of public accommodation, such as Eutaw
Village. Blue seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees, costs, and litigation
expenses. See id. 7-8.
In its motion to dismiss Blue's complaint under Ru1e 12(b)(7), Eutaw contends that
Robertson's must be joined as a party to Blue's suit pursuant to Rule 19. See Mem. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss [D.E. 12] 2-3. Under Ru1e 19, the court employs a two-step inquiry.

See,~.

Home

Buyers Warranty Com. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 433-36 (4th Cir. 2014); Owens-Illinois. Inc. v.
Meade, 186 F.3d 435,440-42 (4th Cir. 1999); Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveaway
Co., 173 F.3d 915,917-20 (4thCir. 1999); Cnty. ofBrunswickv. Bond Safeguard Ins. Co., Nos.
7:12-CV-123-D, 7:12-CV-124-D, 2013 WL 663720, at *2-8 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2013)
(unpublished). First, under Ru1e 19(a), the court must determine ''whether a party is necessary to
[the] proceeding because of its relationship to the matter under consideration." Teamsters Local
Union No. 171, 173 F.3d at 917. If a "necessary" party has not been joined as required, the court
must order that the absent party be joined. See Owens-Illinois. Inc., 186 F .3d at 440. If the court
can do so, dismissal is not a proper remedy. Second, if the party is necessary to the proceeding but
joining it would deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must decide under Ru1e
19(b) ''whether the proceeding can continue in that party's absence"-in other words, whether the
"necessary" party is "indispensable" to the litigation. Teamsters Local Union No. 171, 173 F.3d at
917-18. If the court fmds that the litigation cannot proceed in the party's absence, the court must
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dismiss the case.

See,~.

Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d at 436-37.

As the moving party, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has
failed to join a necessary party. See Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 92
(4th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, the defendant must "show that the person who was not joined is needed
for a just adjudication." ld. (quotation omitted).
Eutaw has not met its burden under Rule 12(b)(7). Blue alleges that she encountered various
barriers to access in Eutaw Village's parking lot and common areas, see Compl.

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4-5, 10, and

seeks an injunction ordering Eutaw ''to alter Eutaw Village ... to make [its] facilities readily
accessible and usable" or to close Eutaw Village until it removes the alleged barriers to access.
Compl.

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16. Blue does not seek injunctive relief against Robertson's. To the extent that Blue

mentions certain barriers to access located in space controlled by Robertson's, the court treats those
allegations as mere surplusage. If Blue wishes to allege violations of the ADA against Robertson's
or any other Eutaw Village tenant, she would have to seek to amend her complaint and name those
tenants as defendants. Thus, the court denies Eutaw's motion to dismiss.
II.
In sum, the court DENIES Eutaw's motion to dismiss [D.E. 11].
SO ORDERED. This _L day of August 2014.

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J
S C.DEVER III
Chief United States District Judge

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