Martin v. Bimbo Food Bakeries Distribution, Inc.
Filing
66
ORDER denying 51 Motion to Consolidate Cases. Signed by Senior Judge W. Earl Britt on 5/20/2015. (Marsh, K)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
JOHN T. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIMBO FOODS BAKERIES
DISTRIBUTION, LLC.; f/k/a
GEORGE WESTON BAKERIES
DISTRIBUTION, INC.,
NO. 5:14-CV-17-BR
Defendant;
RICHARD RAMSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BIMBO FOODS BAKERIES
DISTRITUBION, LLC; f/k/a
GEORGE WESTON BAKERIES
DISTRIBUTION, INC.,
NO. 5:14-CV-26-BR
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court on John T. Martin’s (“Martin”) and Richard Ramsey’s
(“Ramsey”) motions to consolidate. (No. 5:14-CV-17-BR, DE # 51; No. 5:14-CV-26-BR, DE #
47). Defendant Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, Inc., f/k/a George Weston Bakeries
Distribution, Inc.’s (“defendant” or “BFBD”) filed a response in both cases. (No. 5:14-CV-17BR, DE # 58; No. 5:14-CV-26-BR, DE # 52). This matter is ripe for disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
On 8 January 2014, Martin filed a complaint in state court asserting several claims related
to the termination of his Distribution Agreement with BFBD. (No. 5:14-CV-17-BR, DE # 1-1.)
The following day, BFBD removed the action to this court. (Id. at DE # 1.) On 5 February
2015, Martin filed a second suit in state court related to BFBD’s actions subsequent to the
termination of the Agreement, which BFBD timely removed to this court. Martin v. Bimbo
Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, No. 5:15-CV-96-BR (E.D.N.C. 2015). By order dated 24
April 2015, the court consolidated Martin’s two cases. (No. 5:14-CV-17-BR, DE # 56.)
On 21 January 2014, Ramsey filed a complaint in state court alleging claims arising out
of BFBD’s termination of his Distribution Agreement. (No. 5:14-CV-26-BR, DE # 1-1.) BFBD
removed the action to this court on the same day. (Id. at DE # 1.) On 2 December 2014,
Ramsey filed a second suit in state court related to BFBD’s actions subsequent to the termination
of the Agreement, which BFBD removed to this court on 7 January 2015. Ramsey v. Bimbo
Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, No. 5:15-CV-6-BR (E.D.N.C. 2015). By order dated 10
April 2015, the court consolidated Ramsey’s two cases. (No. 5:14-CV-26-BR, DE # 50.)
Now, Martin and Ramsey (collectively “plaintiffs”) request that this court consolidate
their remaining actions against BFBD. (DE # 52, at 18.) 1
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to consolidate separate
actions before the court if they “involve a common question of law or fact.” 2 The court has
broad discretion with regard to consolidation. See A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v.
1
Plaintiffs and defendant filed identical briefs in both cases. For the sake of efficiency, the court will cite only to
the briefs filed in Martin, No. 5:14-CV-17-BR.
2
Plaintiffs base their motions for consolidation on Rules 18, 19, and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(DE # 52, at 15.) However, Rule 42(a) is the proper rule under which to analyze plaintiffs’ motions. See Molever v.
Levenson, 539 F.2d 996, 1003 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying Rule 42(a) to analyze whether the district court properly
consolidated three cases).
2
Tidewater Const. Co., 559 F.2d 928, 933 (4th Cir. 1977) (“District courts have broad discretion
under F.R.Civ.P. 42(a) to consolidate causes pending in the same district.”). In exercising its
discretion, the court must consider:
whether the specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion [are] overborne by
the risk of inconsistent adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the
burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple
lawsuits, the length of time required to conclude multiple suits as against a single
one, and the relative expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-trial
alternatives.
Arnold v. Eastern Air Line, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982).
In broad terms, plaintiffs’ cases possess similarities. In addition to naming the same
defendant, the same Distribution Agreement governed both of their relationships with BFBD.
Further, both plaintiffs argue that BFBD terminated their respective Agreements for participating
in a group of distributors that opposed new BFBD pricing policies. (Memo., DE # 52, at 17.)
Lastly, both have breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices claims remaining
against BFBD. However, the similarities end there. The facts and circumstances surrounding
BFBD’s purported reasons for each termination are vastly different, complicated, and factintensive. BFBD contends that it terminated Martin’s Agreement for engaging in “flushing,” an
alleged fraudulent practice that amounts to a “non-curable breach” under the Agreement.
BFBD’s witnesses will present the jury with a detailed explanation of this practice, which is
factually complicated. As BFBD notes, “[n]one of this is relevant in any way to the facts in Mr.
Ramsey’s case.” (Resp., DE # 58, at 4.) BFBD maintains that it terminated Ramsey’s
Agreement after he was banned from a Harris Teeter store, which it alleges constitutes a “curable
breach” under the Agreement. Witnesses called to testify regarding Ramsey’s dealings with the
Harris Teeter store, which are central to his case, have no bearing on Martin’s case.
Additionally, regarding plaintiffs’ claims surrounding BFBD’s operation and sale of their routes,
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the court agrees with BFBD that "[i]n both cases, the Sales Areas, outlets serviced, customers,
initial cost, value, sales price, and costs of operation of each business are entirely different and
unrelated," (id). Further, there is no risk of inconsistent adjudications because there is no legal or
factual determination that would dictate the outcome of both cases. Lastly, plaintiffs,
represented by the same counsel, filed their initial cases separately over one year ago, and had
ample time to request consolidation before such a late stage in litigation.
In light of the significant factual differences regarding the termination of plaintiffs’
respective Agreements and defendant’s operation and sale of plaintiffs’ routes, the court
concludes that any judicial efficiency gained by consolidation would be minimal and outweighed
by the risk of possible jury confusion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motions to consolidate are DENIED.
This 20 May 2015.
__________________________________
W. Earl Britt
Senior U.S. District Judge
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