Tran v. Novo Nordisk Pharmaceutical

Filing 44

ORDER denying 38 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - Where defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, the court LIFTS the STAY of discovery. Further order on scheduling will follow, also with regard to the parties' joint report and plan. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 04/27/2015. (Baker, C.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:14-CV-254-FL

DINH Q. TRAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NOVO NORDISK PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

This matter comes now before the court upon defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. (DE 38). After careful review of the filings in support of and in opposition to said
motion, and the applicable law, the court must conclude that defendant is not entitled to judgment
on the pleadings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Briefly, plaintiff, now counseled, brought this employment discrimination action pro se.
Upon counsel’s entry, a second amended complaint was filed, clarifying his allegations. Defendant
denies any theory of liability, and asserts a counterclaim premised upon having entered into a
settlement with defendant, rendering this action baseless.
DISCUSSION
A.

Standard
In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, under Rule 12(c), the court applies “the

same standard” as for motions to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Edwards v. City of

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the
legal sufficiency of the complaint but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992).
A complaint states a claim if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Asking for plausible grounds . . . does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal [the] evidence” required to prove the claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Furthermore, the complaint need not set forth “detailed factual allegations,” but instead must
simply “plead sufficient facts to allow a court, drawing on ‘judicial experience and common sense,’
to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’”

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In
evaluating the complaint, “[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a
cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Id. at 255 (citations omitted).
B.

Analysis
Defendant relies on documentation not made a part of the complaint but, rather, various

attachments to defendant’s Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim (DE 33). The
court may consider such documents if “they are integral to the complaint and authentic.”

2

Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012)
These documents of or pertaining to a settlement are not integral to the complaint, and therefore may
not be considered without converting the instant motion to one for summary judgment. Even if the
court could consider them in regards to the motion now before it, there are contested issues arising
which militate against entry of judgment on the pleadings.
As explained below, without offering any comment as to the likelihood of plaintiff’s success
in the action, things are not so clear as defendant sees them in this case. The Mediated Settlement
Agreement ("MSA") entered into March 17, 2014, provides in part that the parties will enter into
a "standard Compromise Settlement Agreement ("CSA") which complies with N.C.G.S. 97-17."
This is the Agreement of Final Settlement and Release ("Clincher"), dated May 15, 2014, with
reference to any claim under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"), which
provides in part "that the parties agreed to pay the mediator's fees under a separate agreement."
Plaintiff failed and refused to execute the sweeping Confidential Settlement Agreement and
General Release ("Agreement and Release") later drafted by defendant, referred to in the Agreement
for Global Employment Release ("Agreement"), which Agreement was executed contemporaneous
with the MSA. He did not offer any counter-proposal but kept the consideration offered by
defendant “in exchange for this agreement,” entered into March 17, 2014, wherein plaintiff "agree[s]
to execute a mutually acceptable Release of All Claims to be prepared by Employer or Employer's
representative."
Plaintiff points to language issues which defendant would seek to dispute, bearing on his
knowledge and understanding. The court observes from attachment to plaintiff’s Answer to
Counterclaim, (DE 27), that an interpreter was utilized at a May 13, 2014, meeting at which, it

3

appears, the Agreement and Release was reviewed by plaintiff and his counsel. The Agreement and
Release refers to the same consideration, that is payment of the mediator’s fee, referred to in the
Agreement. Defendant characterizes the Agreement as a release of claims beyond the scope of the
MSA, including those pressed in this lawsuit, but on the strength of the argument offered here, this
is not so clear.
The word “Global” appears in the document’s title and it does read that the Agreement is an
“agree[ment] to execute a mutually acceptable Release of All Claims.” However, plaintiff disputes
the meaning of “All Claims,” urging it should be limited to claims under the Act. The terms of the
MSA, subject to approval by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, necessarily are limited to
claims and demands under the Act.
Where the issues raised are not susceptible to decision on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, for the reasons noted, defendant’s motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
Where defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, the court LIFTS the
STAY of discovery. Further order on scheduling will follow, also with regard to the parties’ joint
report and plan.
SO ORDERED, this the 27th day of April, 2015.

_____________________________
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge

4