McCollum, et al. v. Robeson County, et al.
Filing
84
ORDER denying as moot 45 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and granting 74 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 5/27/2016. (Marsh, K)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:15-CV-451-BO
HENRY LEE MCCOLLUM and
GERALDINE BROWN RANSOM, on behalf of
and as legal guardian of LEON BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
V.
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ORDER
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ROBESON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on defendant Robeson County's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Plaintiffs' amended complaint includes a claim against Robeson County for
"Municipal Liability Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." [DE 70]. For the following reasons,
defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. [DE 74].
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Henry Lee McCollum and Leon Brown spent 30 years, 11 months, and 7 days
in prison after being wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of 11year Sabrina Buie. DNA testing conducted years after their convictions proved that they actually
innocent of raping and murdering Sabrina Buie. Both plaintiffs received pardons of innocence
from Governor Pat McCrory ofNorth Carolina.
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint in this action on August 31, 20 15. Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint on March 24, 2016, which seeks reliefpursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Robeson County, North Carolina, the Town of Red Springs, North Carolina, as well as several
law enforcement officers who were involved in the case. Defendant Robeson County now moves
to dismiss the claim against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANALYSIS
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency ofthe complaint. See Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). When acting on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the
court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff." My/an Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
A complaint must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Facial plausibility means that the facts
pled "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged"; mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory
statements do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Defendant claims that, because Robeson County has no control or supervisory power
over the operations of the Robeson County Sheriff or Sheriffs Department, it is not a proper
party to this action. "A county may only be held liable for acts for which the county has final
policymaking authority." Worrell v. Bedsole, 1997 WL 153830, *5 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 1997)
(internal quotation omitted). In North Carolina, the office of sheriff is a legal entity separate and
distinct from the board of county commissioners in part because it is elected by the people, not
hired by the county. See id. Furthermore, under North Carolina law, each sheriff"has the
exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his office." N.C. Gen. Stat. §
153A-103(1); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 162-24 (providing that a sheriffs authority may not be
delegated to another person or entity).
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Federal courts have dismissed numerous claims on this basis. Worrell v. Bedsole, 1997
WL 153830, *5-6 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 1997) ("Bledsoe's final policy-making authority over his
personnel decisions in the Sheriffs Department is his alone and is not attributable to Cumberland
County.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Parker v. Bladen County, 583 F.Supp.2d 736,
739--40 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2008) ("Thus, under North Carolina law, the sheriff, not the county
encompassing his jurisdiction, has final policymaking authority .. .");Jackson v. County of
Granville et al., No. 5:02-CV-899-80(3) (E.D.N.C. March 4, 2003) ("The Court finds that
Granville County has neither policymaking authority nor supervisory control over the employees
of the Granville County Sheriffs Department.); Merritt v. Beckham, No. 5:94-CV-462-80(3)
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 1995) ("Franklin County is not liable for the actions of the Sheriff or his
Deputy. These officers are acting under state law and are not in the control of the county.").
For all these reasons, the Court finds that Robeson County has neither policymaking
authority nor supervisory control over the employees of the Robeson County Sheriffs
Department. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims against Robeson County must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. [DE 74].
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' original complaint is DENIED AS MOOT. [DE 45].
SO ORDERED, this
a
day of May, 2016.
~EW,A~
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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