Bartels et al v. Saber Healthcare Group, LLC et al

Filing 49

ORDER denying 31 Motion to Stay; granting 36 Motion to Remand. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 10/25/2016. This action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of Franklin County, North Carolina. (Stouch, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:16-CV-283-BO

JEANNE T. BARTELS, by and through
)
WILLIAM H. BARTLES, Attorney-in-fact,)
JOSEPH J. PFOHL, Executor of the Estate )
of BERNICE C. PFOHL, and CLAIRE M. )
MURPHY, by and through MICHELE
)
MULLEN, Attorney-in-fact, on behalf of )
themselves and all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.

)

SABER HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC,

)
)

~cl,

ORDER

)
Defendants.

)
)

This cause comes before the Court on plaintiffs' motion to appoint expert monitor,
defendant's motion to stay and compel arbitration, and plaintiffs' motion to remand. The
appropriate responses and replied have been filed and the matters are ripe for ruling. For the
reasons discussed below, this action is remanded to Franklin County Superior Court.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this action in Franklin County Superior Court as a putative class action
alleging claims arising from defendants' failure to comply with their contractual and statutory
obligations to provide assisted living services that meet the needs of the residents of defendants'
North Carolina Care Centers. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' North Carolina Care Centers
have failed and continue to fail to provide sufficient services to meet the basic needs of their

residents, including adequate bathing and timely provision of medication, and that defendants
consistently understaff the North Carolina Care Centers to the detriment of the residents and in
violation of North Carolina law. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as ofright adding an
additional named plaintiff, and plaintiffs allege claims for breach of contract and unfair trade
practices and seek injunctive relief.
While still proceeding in state court plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. A
hearing was held before a superior court judge who, at the hearing, orally granted plaintiffs'
motion but made entry of the injunction dependent on his issuance of a written order. [DE 38-2
at 60]. Prior to the written order being entered on May 31, 2016 [DE 34-1], defendants removed
the matter to this Court on the basis of its diversity jurisdiction as well as the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005. [DE 1]; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d); 1453.
This Court held a hearing on June 24, 2016, and following the hearing ordered that it
would consider the pending motions filed by the parties after they became ripe for ruling.
DISCUSSION
Because it concerns the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court considers first
plaintiffs motion to remand. Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1999). Removal
of a civil action from state court is only proper where the federal district courts would have
original jurisdiction, 28 U .S .C. § 1441, and it is the burden of the removing party to show that
jurisdiction lies in the federal court. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir.
2004) (en bane). Removal jurisdiction must be construed strictly in light of federalism concerns,
and if jurisdiction in the federal district court is determined to be doubtful, remand is required.

Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).

2

Plaintiffs contend that a valid forum selection clause precludes jurisdiction in this Court.
Each named plaintiff as alleged was a resident of Franklin Manor, a defendant facility in
Franklin County, North Carolina. 1 [DE 2-4]. Each plaintiff entered into a written contract with
defendants called an Assisted Living Residency Agreement. [DE 2-4 Ex. A]. This agreement
provides that it
shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of North Carolina, and the
county in which the Facility is located shall be the sole and exclusive venue for any
dispute between the parties, including, but not limited to, litigation ... that may be
brought, arise out of or in connection with or by reason of this Agreement.
Id

A forum selection clause is prima facie valid and should be enforced unless found to be
"unreasonable under the circumstances." MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10
(1972) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Neither party contests the validity or
reasonableness of the forum selection clause. Rather, the question for the Court is whether the
forum selection clause in plaintiffs' contracts with defendants results in a waiver of defendants'
right to remove plaintiffs' case to this Court. A further question presented by defendants is
whether, even if this may be so, the Class Action Fairness Act trumps the valid forum selection
clause. The Court addresses each question in tum.
Forum selection clauses may be mandatory or permissive. See Unista.ff, Inc. v.
Koosharem Corp., 667 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619 (E.D. Va. 2009). The clause at issue here provides

for the sole and exclusive venue, which the Court interprets to be a mandatory forum selection
clause. See id. "If the forum selection clause is mandatory, the Court must [then] determine
what, precisely, the clause mandates." Id.
1

Plaintiff Murphy is alleged to have been a resident of Franklin Manor from 7 April 2015
through 1January2016. She was then briefly a resident of defendants' facility Gabriel Manor
but returned to Franklin Manor on or about 22 April 2016 and was a resident at Franklin Manor
at the time of the filing of the amended complaint.

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This forum selection clause limits as the sole and exclusive venue "the county in which
the Facility is located." For these named plaintiffs, that is Franklin County, North Carolina.
Defendants argue that because Franklin County lies within this judicial district, jurisdiction is
proper in this Court under the plain terms of the forum selection clause. The parties agree that
there is no federal courthouse located in Franklin County.
"Federal courts are split as to whether a forum selection clause precludes venue in a
federal district court when the language of the clause ( 1) limits venue to a municipality or county
(2) in which a federal court does not physically sit." Rihani v. Team Exp. Distrib., LLC, 711 F.
Supp. 2d 557, 560 (D. Md. 2010) (listing cases). As the Rihani court explained, the Fourth
Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, but has in an unpublished opinion considered the
distinction between a geographic forum limitation, which would permit litigation in "either a
federal or state court within the specified geographic boundary," and limitations on sovereignty,
which requires an action "be filed in the courts of the state sovereign." Ferri Contracting Co. v.
Town ofMasontown, W. Virginia, No. 03-1303, 2003 WL 22244905, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 29,
2003).
Although Ferri Contracting has been applied to dictate that a forum selection clause
similar to that presented here did not preclude federal jurisdiction, Nahigian v. Juno-Loudoun,
LLC, 661 F. Supp. 2d 563, 568 (E.D. Va. 2009); see also Seventeen S., LLC v. D.R. Horton, Inc.,
No. 4:13-CV-03119-BHH, 2015 WL 337639, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2015), this Court is
persuaded by the reasoning of Rihani and other cases which have held that where a forum
selection clause limits venue to a geographic location which does not encompass a federal
district court, the right to remove to federal court has been waived. See Rihani, 711 F. Supp. 2d
at 561 (applying similar geographic limitation to court in a particular county and finding "no

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reason why a limitation of geography cannot also create a de facto limitation of sovereignty.");
see also Match Factors, Inc. v. Mickey B. Henson Enterprises, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-00062-FL,
2011WL1101363, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No.
4:10-CV-62-FL, 2011 WL 1081980 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2011) (adopting reasoning of Rihani to
find that geographic limitation could also impose sovereignty limitation). This reasoning is
further consistent with case law from other circuits. See, e.g., Yakin v. Tyler Hill Corp., 566 F.3d
72, 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (forum selection clause which provided for venue and trial "in Nassau
County, New York" excluded federal jurisdiction where no federal court was located in Nassau
County); Collin Cty. v. Siemens Bus. Servs., Inc., 250 F. App'x 45, 52 (5th Cir. 2007) (lack of
federal courthouse in county to which venue was limited renders the venue limitation clause a
waiver of right to remove); Redwood Hill Farm & Creamery, Inc. v. Barry-Wehmiller Design
Grp., Inc., No. 16-CV-03200-JST, 2016 WL 4710194, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2016) (federal
district court cannot be considered "in" a county in which the district court does not have
physical presence); see also Cosey v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm., 735 F.3d 161, 169 (4th Cir.
2013) (any ambiguities in contract construed against the drafting party).
In light of the foregoing persuasive authority, 2 the Court holds that the forum selection
clause at issue in this matter limits jurisdiction to the state courts in Franklin County, North
Carolina. Defendants next argue that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAP A) serves to trump the
2

The Court is not persuaded by defendants' argument that plaintiffs have waived the forum
selection clause by bringing claims not based expressly on the contract, see Se. Coastal Dev.
Fund, L.L.C. v. Commercial Real Estate Inc., No. 5:08-CV-15-F, 2009 WL 928543, at *11
(E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2009) (citing first, ninth, and third circuit cases holding that tort claims which
involve the same operative facts as breach of contract claim are governed by forum selection
clause), or by including defendants not technically parties to the contracts but which are as
plaintiffs allege closely related to or alter egos of the contracting party. See Hugel v. Corp. of
Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Belfiore v. Summit Fed. Credit Union, 452
F. Supp. 2d 629, 633 (D. Md. 2006) (listing cases holding same). Indeed, defendants state in
their Notice of Removal that defendant Saber HealthCare Holdings, LLC is the sole member of
each defendant LLC.

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forum selection clause to allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter. The Court
disagrees.
"CAP A gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in §

1332(d)(l), ifthe class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million." Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,
135 S. Ct. 547, 552 (2014). Although, as noted above, removal jurisdiction is generally strictly
construed, in light of Congress' intent to facilitate the adjudication of certain class action cases in
federal court, "no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA." Id. at 554. The
Court, however, is not aware of and defendants have not provided a case in which a court has
held that the lack of antiremoval presumption under CAFA is sufficient to trump a valid waiver
of the right to remove.
On the contrary, "courts have held that the CAFA, like other federal statutes subject to
the civil venue statutes, does not preempt a valid forum-selection clause." Mendoza v. Microsoft,

Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 533, 551 (W.D. Tex. 2014); see also Pizzeria v. Harbortouch, No. 13-CV0058 JAP, 2013 WL 4008914, at *3 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2013); Piechur v. Redbox Automated

Retail, LLC, No. 09-CV-984-JPG, 2010 WL 706047, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2010).
Accordingly, in the absence of any binding precedent to the contrary, the Court holds that CAFA
does not in this instance trump the valid forum selection clause between the parties. Remand of
this matter is therefore proper.
Finally, defendants ask that if this Court is inclined to remand this matter that it stay the
remand pending appeal, citing as a basis for the stay that "parallel state and federal proceedings
would prejudice the parties and waste judicial resources." [DE 46]. Plaintiffs have submitted in
support of their opposition to a stay a preliminary injunction order entered by Superior Court

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Judge Stephens which will purportedly take effect upon remand. [DE 47-1]. As it appears that
an injunction will become effective upon remand, and in the absence of any showing by
defendants of the applicable factors regarding a stay as well as the brevity of an appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1453, the Court finds that the balance of hardships weighs against entry of a stay. See

Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1970) ("party seeking a stay [in the district court]
must show (1) that he will likely prevail on the merits of the appeal, (2) that he will suffer
irreparable injury if the stay is denied, (3) that other parties will not be substantially harmed by
the stay, and (4) that the public interest will be served by granting the stay."). The request for a
stay is therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to remand [DE 36] is GRANTED. This
action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of Franklin County, North Carolina.
Plaintiffs' request for fees associated with their motion is denied. See Martin v. Franklin Capital

Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Defendants' request for stay ofremand is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this

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d- rJ day of October, 2016.

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