Wriglesworth v. Fanning

Filing 14

ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 6/28/2017. (Briggeman, N.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DMSION
No. 5:16-CV-686-D

SONIA I. WRIGLESWpRTH,
Plaintiff,

v.
ERIC FANNING, Secretary, U.S.
Department of the Army,
Defendants.

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ORDER

On July 20, 2016, Sonia I. Wriglesworth ("Wriglesworth" or "plaintiff') filed a pro se
employment discrimination complaint in this court against Eric Fanning, the Secretary ofthe Army
("Fanning" or "defendant") [D.E. 1]. On October 14,2016, Wriglesworthamendedhercomplaint
[D.E. 7]. On December 12, 2016, Fanning moved to dismiss Wriglesworth' s complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim [D.E. 10] and filed a memorandum in support
[D.E. 11]. On January 5, 2017, Wriglesworth responded in opposition [D.E. 13]. As explained
below, the court grants Fanning's motion to dismiss.
I.
Wriglesworth is a former employee of the Department of the Army, Army Reserve (''the
Army"). Compl. [D.E. 1], 5. On April 28, 2015, Wriglesworth filed an Equal Employment
Opportunity complaint (''the fourth EEO complaint") against the Army, claiming that procedural
irregularities in the Army's investigation and processing ofher EEO complaints were reprisals for
three previous EEO complaints. Id., 6; [D.E. 1-1]. On May 11, 2015, the Army dismissed the
fourth EEO complaint. Compl., 7; [D.E. 1-2]. On June 15, 2015, Wriglesworth appealed the
Army's dismissal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Compl., 8;

[D.E. 1-3].
On July 27, 2015, Wrig1esworth filed another EEO complaint with the Army (''the fifthEEO
complaint"), claiming reprisal for the three EEO complaints mentioned in the fourth EEO complaint
as well as the fourth EEO complaint itself. Am. Compl. [D.E. 7] ~ 6; [D.E. 7-1]. On August 11,
2015, the Army dismissed the fifth EEO complaint. Am. Compl. ~ 7; [D.E. 7-2]. On September
11, 2015, Wriglesworth appealed the Army's dismissal of the fifth EEO complaint to the EEOC.

Am Compl. ~ 8; [D.E. 7-3].
On November 3, 2015, the EEOC affirmed the Army's dismissal of the fourth EEO
complaint. Compl. ~ 11; [D.E.1-6]. OnDecember7, 2015, Wriglesworthrequested that the EEOC
reconsider. Compl. ~ 12; [D.E.1-7]. OnMarch9,2016, theEEOClaffirmedtheArmy'sdismissal
of the fifth EEO complaint. Am Compl. ~ 11; [D.E. 7-6]. On April13, 2016, Wriglesworth
requested that the EEOC reconsider. Am Compl. ~ 12; [D.E. 7-7]. On April20, 2016, the EEOC
denied reconsideration of the fourth EEO complaint. Compl. ~ 14; [D.E. 1-9]. On July 13,2016,
the EEOC denied reconsideration of the fifth EEO complaint. Am Compl. ~ 14; [D.E. 7-9].
On July 20, 2016, Wriglesworth filed a complaint against Fanning [D.E. 1], which she
amended on October"14, 2016 [D.E. 7]. Her complaint does not mention any causes of action,
although it mentions both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.
(''the Rehabilitation Act").
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests a complaint's legal and factual sufficiency.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80, 684 (2009); Bell Atl. Com. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 554--63 (2007); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F .3d 298, 302 (4thCir. 2008). To withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a pleading "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

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to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the
facts and reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party]." Massey v.
I

Ojanii:t, 759 F.3d 343, 347, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of
Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013). A court need not accept as true a complaint's
legal conclusions, "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Giarratano,
521 F.3dat302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556U.S. at678-79. Rather, a plaintiff's allegations
must "nudge[] [her] claims," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of"mere possibility"
into "plausib[ility]." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. "[N]aked assertions of wrongdoing," devoid of
"factual enhancement," cannot "cross the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief." Francis, 588 F .3d at 193 (quotations omitted). A plaintiff armed with nothing more than
"labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," cannot
proceed ~to the litigation process. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Francis, 588 F.3d at 193.
A legally sufficient complaint must meet the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2}, a complaint
must contain "a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) exists to ensure that defendants have adequate notice of the
nature of the claims against them.

See,~.

Francis, 588 F.3d at 192.

The standard used to evaluate the sufficiency of a pleading is flexible, "and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted).
EricksoD, however, does not ''undermine [the] requirement that a pleading contain 'more than labels
and conclusions."' Giarratano, 521 F.3dat304n.5 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at555); see Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 677-83; Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Ap_peals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), affd, 566
U.S. 30 (2012); Nemet Chevrolet Ltd., 591 F.3d at 255-56; Francis, 588 F.3d at 193. Although a
court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, it "cannot ignore a clear failure to allege
facts" that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing. LP, 867 F. Supp.
2d 766, 776(E.D.N.C. 2011); see Giarratano, 521 F.3dat304n.5. "The 'specialjudicialsolicitude'
with which a district court should view ... pro se complaints does not transform the court into an
advocate. Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed."
Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Every party-pro se or
otherwise-must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Baldwin C1y. Welcome Ctr. v. Bro:wn, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (per curiam).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials
"attached or incorporated into the complaint." E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus .. Inc.,
637 F.3d 435,448 (2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263,268 (4th
Cir. 2005). A court also may take judicial notice of public records without converting the motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201(d); Tellabs. Inc. v.
Mak:or Issues & Rights. Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt C1y. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d
176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
Viewed together, Wriglesworth's complaint and amended complaint do not state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Wriglesworth apparently brings her claim under 42 U.S.C. §
·2000e-16(c), which allows an employee who has filed an EEO complaint "if aggrieved by the final
disposition of his complaint ... [to] file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title,
in which civil action the head ofthe department ... shall be the defendant." But Wriglesworth does
not allege any facts beyond the procedural history of her EEO complaints, and "that the EEOC

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erred by affmning the [Army's] final decision of dismissal and by denying reconsideration."
Compl. ~ 15; Am. Compl. ~ 15. Even ifWriglesworth could bring a claim against the Army based
on the EEOC's alleged errors, she has offered no evidence beyond the conclusory allegation that
the EEOC erred.
"Title VII does not provide an implied cause of action peimitting a plaintiff to challenge
procedural deficiencies in an agency's handling of an EEO complaint. . . . [W]hen there have been
procedural irregularities in [a federal employer's] handling of an employee's EEO complaint, the
employee does not have a right under Title Vll to file a separate procedural claim, but must seek
redress for the alleged discrimination by filing a substantive claim to be adjudicated de novo in the
district court." Nielsen v. Hagel, 666 F. App'x 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (citations
omitted); seeJordanv. Summers,205 F.3d337, 342 (7thCir. 2000). IfTitle VII does not implicitly
authorize a suit against a federal employer for its own mishandling of an EEO complaint, then Title
Vll does not implicitly authorize a suit against a federal employer for the EEOC's acts in
mishandling an employee's complaint. Thus, the court holds that a federal employee may not sue
her employer under Title VII based on the EEOC's alleged mishandling of her EEOC complaint.
To the extent Wriglesworth has attempted to bring a retali~tion claim under Title VII, she
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To establish a retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must prove that (1) she engaged in a protected activity under Title VII, (2) her employer
took action against her that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse, and (3) her
employer took the adverse action because of the protected activity~ See Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,67-70 (2006); DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d409, 416 (4th
Cir. 2015); Boyer-Libero v. Fontainbleau Com., 786 F.3d 264,281 (4th Cir. 2015) (en bane); Balas
v. Huntington Ingalls Indus .. Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2013). The second prong requires
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wrongful action by the employer. In her complaint, Wriglesworth does not allege any wrongful acts
by her employer, the Army. Rather, Wriglesworth alleges that the "EEOC erred by affirming the
[Army's] final decision of dismissal and by denying reconsideration." Compl.

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15 (emphasis

added). Therefore, she has failed to state a claim.
Even if the court construes Wriglesworth's request for "a trial de novo by jury in Federal
District court on all issues in my discrimination complaint[s]," Compl. ~ 16; Am. Compl. ~ 16, as
an attempt to incorporate by reference the merits of the two EEO complaints mentioned in
Wriglesworth's complaint and amended complaint, Wriglesworth still has not stated a claim. In
the EEO complaints Wriglesworth cites in her complaint and amended complaint, Wriglesworth
alleged only procedmal irregularities regarding previous EEO complaints and sought reinstatement
ofpreviousEEOcomplaints. [D.E.1-1] 3-9; [D.E. 7-1] 3-10. Wriglesworthcannotmaintainan.
action under Title VII for such procedmal complaints. See, ~'Nielsen, 666 F. App'x at 232.
To the extent Wriglesworth' s complaint and amended complaint make fleeting references
to the Rehabilitation Act, she has not alleged any claim under the Rehabilitation Act. See, ~'
Hooven-Lewis v. Calder~ 249 F.3d 259,266--68 (4th Cir. 2001); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Thus, she
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

n.
In sum, Fanning's motion to dismiss [D.E. 10] is GRANTED, and the complaint and
amended complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED. This .1.B_ day of June 2016.

Chief United States District Judge

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