McGuffin v. Social Security Administration

Filing 20

ORDER granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 7/17/2017. (Briggeman, N.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:16-CV-843-D

CLARENCE ANDREW MCGUFFIN,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v.
)
)
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER

On October 7, 2016, Clarence McGuffin ("McGuffin" or "plaintiff') filed suit under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking an order requiring the Social Security
Administration (''the SSA" or "defendant") to produce records concerning productivity data of the
SSA's decision writers [D.E. 1]. On December 22,2016, the SSA moved to dismiss McGuffin's
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, for summary judgment [D.E. 10]
and filed a supporting memorandum [D.E. 11], a statement of material facts [D.E. 12], and an
appendix [D.E. 15]. On January 27, 2017, McGuffin responded in opposition [D.E. 18]. On
February 10, 2017, the SSA replied [D.E. 19]. As explained below, the court grants the SSA's
motion for summary judgment.
I.
On July 15, 2016, McGuffin submitted an electronic Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request for records concerning the productivity of the SSA' s decision writers. Compl. [D.E. 1] , 9.
He requested two items in particular:
i.

The [Office of Disability Adjudication and Review's Case Processing and
Management System ("CPMS")] data used to measure Decision Writer
productivity in all141 hearing offices for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009 as
identified in the SSA [Office of the Inspector General's ("OIG")] Audit
Report A-02-09-19068 from November 2010, . "Office of Disability

Adjudication and Review Decision-Writing Process"; and
ii.

The monthly Decision Writer Productivity reports that measure individual
and office Decision Writer productivity for Region IV (Atlanta) hearing
offices from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2015[.]

'

Id., 11; [D.E. 1-2]. According to McGuffin, "release of the infortnation is essential to ascertain
whether the testimony and statements of witnesses in those legal matters are truthful or can be
substantiated as untruthful." Compl., 7.
On August 3, 2016, the SSA informed McGuffin that it was contacting its components to
fulfill McGuffin's request. Compl., 14-15; [D.E. 1-8] 4-5. The next day, an SSA FOIA officer
told McGuffin the SSA had sent McGuffin's request to the SSA' s Office of Disability Adjudication
and Review ("ODAR''). Compl. , 16. On August 11 and August 12, 2016, McGuffin again
contacted the SSA about his request but received no response. ld., 17. On October 6, 2016, SSA
notified McGuffin that it was fulfilling his request but was awaiting a response from yet another
component from which it had requested responsive documents . .Id., 18; [D.E. 1-8] 5-6. Not
satisfied, McGuffin filed suit the following day to compel production of the requested documents.
See Compl., 1; [D.E. 1-8] 7.
After McGuffin filed suit, the SSA responded to his FOIA request with two releases. The
SSA's interim release on November 7, 2016, responded in full to McGuffin's first request by
releasing all responsive records that the SSA had located. Zimmerman Decl. [D.E. 15-2] , 6; Def.' s
App. [D.E. 15-4]. The interim release also partially responded to McGuffin's second request by
releasing productivity reports that measured decision-writer productivity on a per-office level.
Zimmerman Decl., 6; Def.'s App. [D.E. 15-4]. The SSA told McGuffin it would soon respond to
the other halfofMcGuffin' s second request, which sought productivity reports ofindividual decision
writers. Def.'s App. [D.E. 15-4]. On November 23,2016, the SSA released that information, but
withheld identifying information about SSA employees. Zimmerman Decl., 7; Def.'s App. [D.E.
15-3]. For each report, the withheld data included: (1) the employee's name, (2) the employee's

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available hours to write decisions, (3) the percentage of time worked on decision writing out of the
employee's total duty hours, and (4) the learning curve that applies to the employee. Zimmerman
Decl., 8.
The SSA withheld this information under FOIA's Exemption 6, which protects from
disclosure "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see Zimmerman Decl.
, 8; Def.'s App. [D.E. 15-3]. The SSA concluded that these four data fields fell within Exemption
6 because they could directly identify employees or lead to their identification. Zimmerman Decl.
, 8(c); Def.'s Stmt. Material Facts [D.E. 12] ,, 24--25. Specifically, the employees' names could
directly identify employees, the available hours and percentage of time spent on decision writing
"could lead to identification of individuals whose hours were different than the majority of writers
for a given month and location," and the learning-curve information could lead to identification of
individuals "by showing who was on the learning curve (i.e., which employees were trainees in a
given month)." Zimmerman Decl., 8(c). The SSA released all other fields on the reports. ld.
After the second of its two releases, the SSA moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction or, alternatively, for summary judgment. See [D.E. 10]. The SSA seeks summary
judgment because the SSA "has conducted a reasonable and adequate search for records and
produced all responsive documents that are not exempt from release under FOIA." [D.E. 11] 2.
McGuffin does not contest the adequacy of the SSA' s search but argues that the SSA has not shown
that the redacted materials fall within Exemption 6. [D.E. 18] 4. Thus, McGuffin contends that ''the
only unanswered FOIA question in this case is the 'Exemption 6' redactions." Id.
II.

Courts typically resolve FOIA cases on summary judgment. See Turnerv. United States, 736
F.3d 274,282 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates
''that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to

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judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment must
initially show an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact or the absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Com. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986r If a moving party
meets its burden, the nonmoving party must "come forward with specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cotp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986) (quotation and emphasis omitted). A genuine issue for trial exists if there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support ofthe plaintiff's position [is] insufficient ...." ld. at 252; see Beale v. Hardy, 769 F .2d 213,
214 (4th Cir. 1985) (''The nonmoving party, however, cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another."). Only factual disputes that
might affect the outcome under substantive law preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. In reviewing the factual record, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draws reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushi:m, 475 U.S. at
587-88.

m.
FOIA requires agencies, upon receiving a sufficiently specific and reasonable request for
records, to "make the records promptly available." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A); see Am. Mgmt. Servs ..
LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 703 F.3d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 2013). FOIA, however, allows agencies to
withhold records falling within one of nine exemptions. Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 352
(1982); Am. Mgmt. Servs .• LLC, 703 F.3d at 728; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The nine exemptions
"reflect a wide array of concerns, and are designed to safeguard various public interests against the
, harms that would arise from overbroad disclosure." Am. Mgmt. Servs .. LLC, 703 F.3d at 728-29
(quotations omitted); see FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982). "The government has the
burden of demonstrating that a requested document falls under an exemption, which it can satisfy

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by describing the withheld material with reasonable specificity and explaining how it falls under one
ofthe enumerated exemptions." Am. Mgmt. Servs.. LLC, 703 F .3d at 729 (alteration and quotations
omitted). The court determines de novo whether an exemption applies. See U.S. Dep't of Justice
v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom ofPress, 489 U.S. 749,755 & n.6 (1989); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
Exemption 6 protects from disclosure "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(6). Exemption 6 permits the withholding of information when two requirements are met.
First, the requested information must be contained in personnel, medical, or similar files. Second,
the information must constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See U. S. Dep't
ofStatev. WashingtonPostCo.,456U.S. 595, 601--02&n.4(1982); Corev. U.S. PostalServ., 730
F.2d 946, 947-48 (4th Cir. 1984).

A.
As for the first requirement, the information withheld is contained in "similar files." "The
Supreme Court has directed that the phrase 'similar files' has a 'broad, rather than a narrow,
meaning,' and expressly rejected the contention that such files must contain 'highly personal' or
'intimate' information to fall within the exemption." Judicial Watch. Inc. v. United States, 84 F.
App'x 335, 338 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (quoting Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. at 598).
Congress did not intend Exemption 6 to cover only "a narrow class of files containing only a discrete
kind of personal information." Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. at 602. Instead, Congress intended
that Exemption 6 "cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as
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applying to that individual." ld. (quotation omitted). Thus, ''under Supreme Court precedent
Exemption 6 extends to ' [a]ll information which applies to a particular individual ... regardless of
the type of file in which it is contained."' Judicial Watch. Inc., 84 F. App'x at 338 (emphasis
omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health &
HumanServs., 690F.2d252,260 (D.C. Cir.1982)); see WashingtonPostCo.,456U.S. at601 &602

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n.3; Core, 730 F.2d at 948 ("Because this information pertains to particular individuals, it clearly
falls within the 'similar files' definition of Washington Post, 456 U.S. at 602."). The productivity
reports of individual decision writers from which the information was redacted contain the names
of individual employees as well as information about their personal on-the-job productivity. The
reports comfortably fit the definition of"similar files."

B.
In determining whether a privacy invasion is "clearly unwarranted," courts must balance the
asserted privacy interests against ''the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing
analysis-the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency's
performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to."
U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (alteration and
quotations omitted). Here, the balance favors withholding the redacted information.
Exemption 6 protects the privacy of federal employees' names. See Solers. Inc. v. Internal
Revenue Serv., 827 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 2016); Judicial Watch. Inc., 84 F. App'x at 339; cf.
Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464--65 (4th Cir. 2000). "[T]he public interest in the names of
government employees alone [is] negligible absent a compelling allegation of agency corruption or
illegality." Judicial Watch. Inc., 84 F. App'x at 339 (quotations omitted); see Solers. Inc., 827 F.3d
at 333; cf. Neely, 208 F.3d at 464. McGuffin has not made a compelling allegation of agency
corruption or illegality, and therefore the SSA's decision writers' privacy interest in their names
outweighs the public interest in disclosure, and the SSA permissibly redacted this information under
Exemption 6.
The disclosure of the employee's available hours to write decisions, the percentage of time
worked on decision writing out of the employee's total duty hours, and the learning curve that
applies to the employee implicates privacy interests as well. A person can use the redacted
information to identify the employee the information corresponds to, and the information reflects

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how one employee may be performing over other employees. See Def.'s Stmt. Material Facts~~
24-25, 28. Federal employees "have a substantial interest in the nondisclosure of their identities."
Solers. Inc., 827 F.3d at 333 (quotation omitted). Exemption 6's protects "individuals from the
injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information."
Core, 730 F.2d at 947; see Ripskis v. Dep't ofHous. & Urban Dev., 746 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam). Thus, federal employees have a "substantial" privacy interest in employee evaluations,
because "disclosure of even favorable information may well embarrass an individual or incite
jealousy in his or her co-workers." Ripskis, 746 F.2d at 3; see Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S.
Dep'tofCommerce, 962 F.2d 1055, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Stem v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84,91 (D.C. Cir.
1984); cf. Core, 730 F.2d at 948-49. The privacy interest in job-performance evaluations "also
reflects the employee's more general interest in the nondisclosure of diverse bits and pieces of
information, both positive and negative, that the government, acting as an employer, has obtained
and kept in the employee's personnel file." Stem, 737 F.2d at 91. Performance appraisals are
exempt by regulation from information that must generally be made publically available. See 5
C.F.R. § 293.311(a)(6). Because the redacted information can lead to identifying SSA employees'
identities and link them with productivity information likely to lead to injury, embarrassment, or
jealousy, the employees have a privacy interest in the redacted information.
Having concluded that the requested information implicates legitimate privacy interests, ''the
burden shifts to the requester to (1) show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a
significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake, and (2) show
the information is likely to advance that interest." Casa De Md .• Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 409 F. App'x 697, 700 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quotation omitted); see
Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). McGuffin argues that two
aspects of the public interest support disclosure.

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First, McGuffin argues that releasing the redacted information serves the public interest by
"determin[ing] how individual writers perform over time to determine ifDefendant treated Plaintiff
disparately." [D.E. 18] 9-10. Although McGuffin frames this inquiry as serving the public interest,
the inquiry is personal to McGuffin given McGuffm' s statement that he ''requested this information
for use in a legal proceeding" to determine whether witnesses were lying. Compl. ~ 7. Although
McGuffin may have a personal interest in knowing whether the SSA discriminated against him, his
personal interest in the requested information does not implicate a public interest. Instead, whether
disclosure is clearly unwarranted "must turn on the nature of the requested document and its
relationship to the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act to open agency action to tp.e
light of public scrutiny, rather than on the particular purpose for which the document is being
requested." Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 772; see Neely, 208 F.3d at 464.
Moreover, Congress did not intend FOIA ''to supplement or displace rules of discovery." John Doe
Agency v. John Doe Com., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989); see Cooper Cameron Com. v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 280 F.3d 539, 547-48 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding no
public interest in the fact that documents sought under FOIA would impeach testimony in a civil
suit).
Even construing McGuffin's claimed interest as one belonging to the public rather tb,an him
personally, his contention fails. In analyzing Exemption 7(c), which exempts the disclosure of law
enforcement records that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," the Supreme Court has held that where
the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted
negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester
must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. Rather, the
requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person
that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.
Favisb, 541 U.S. at 174. Courts have applied the same standard to Exemption 6. See Casa De Md..
Inc., 409 F. App'x at 700; Goldstein v. Treaswy Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., 172 F. Supp. 3d

8

221, 232-33 & n.3 (D.D.C. 2016); Samahon v. FBI, 40 F. Supp. 3d 498, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2014);
Bloomer v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 870 F. Supp. 2d 358, 367 (D. Vt. 2012). McGuffin, the
requester, has not met this burden.
Second, McGuffm has not met his burden of articulating how the release of the redacted
information would otherwise "shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties" or "let
citizens know what their government is up to." Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 497
(alteration and quotations omitted). In his FOIA request, McGuffin "asserted no public interest in
SSA's release of individual-level performance information." Zimmerman Decl. ~ 8(b); see [D.E.
1-2]. Moreover, McGuffin's assertion that ''there is a public interest in the information that Plaintiff
seeks" because "Congress has shown an interest" in the SSA's backlog of pending claims, Compl.
~ 22,

does not suffice. Although that interest may well be a public one, McGuffin has cited nothing

suggesting how the information redacted from the individual-level productivity reports ''would
produce any relevant information that is not set forth in the documents that have already been
produced." U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1991). For example, McGuffin does
not show how the individual-level productivity reports further this interest in a way office-level
reports do not. Having failed to show that the requested information is likely to further the public
interest asserted, McGuffin has not carried his burden. See Favisb, 541 U.S. at 172; Case De Md..
Inc., 409 F. App'x at 700.
Balancing the SSA decision writers' privacy interests in their names and personal
productivity information against the lack of an articulated public interest that disclosure would
advance, the privacy interests prevail.

See Ray, 502 U.S. at 179 ("Mere speculation about

hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably significant invasion of privacy.").
Disclosing the redacted information would "constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

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IV.
In sum, the SSA properly withheld the redacted information under FOIA's Exemption 6.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the SSA's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 10]. The clerk
shall close the case.
SO ORDERED. This f l day of July 2017.·

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