Mondragon et al v. Scott Farms, Inc. et al
Filing
212
ORDER APPROVING CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23(b)(3) granting 208 Corrected Joint MOTION to Certify Class Under Rule 23(b)(3) Case Caption Corrected. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 11/18/2019. (Collins, S.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
CASE NO.: 5:17-cv-356-FL
RICARDO MONDRAGON, EUSTORGIO
ESPINOBARROS FELICIANO,
JUAN CONTRERAS, CUTBERTO ORTIZ
HERNÁNDEZ, ALEJANDRO JIMENEZ
GONZALEZ, RENATO ROMERO
ACUÑA, JOSÉ TAPIA, ANASTACIO
LOPEZ SOLIS, and ABDON QUIRASCO
SIXTECO, on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT FARMS, INC., ALICE H. SCOTT,
LINWOOD H. SCOTT, JR., LINWOOD H.
SCOTT III, DEWEY R. SCOTT, JFT
HARVESTING INC., JUAN F. TORRES
OASIS HARVESTING, INC.,
and RAMIRO B. TORRES
Defendants.
_________________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER APPROVING CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 23(b)(3)
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ joint motion for class action
certification. Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on May 15, 2018
alleging claims for relief under four legal theories.
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Espinobarros Feliciano,
Contreras, Romero Acuna and Quirasco Sixteco (collectively “FLSA plaintiffs”)
assert an FLSA collective action seeking payment of back wages and liquidated
1
damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) based upon the defendants’ alleged failure to
pay FLSA plaintiffs and the members of the collective action that they sought to
represent the overtime rate required by § 207(a) of the FLSA. [DE 58 at ¶¶16669, 179-81].
Plaintiffs also alleged two (2) separate class actions under the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”), and an additional class action claim
under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act (“AWPA”).
[DE 58 at ¶¶ 146-51, 152-57, 158-63, 170-172, 173-75, 176-78].
First, all
plaintiffs sought to bring a NCWHA class action seeking back wages and
liquidated damages based upon the alleged failure of the Defendants to pay
the named Plaintiffs and members of the class the Adverse Effect Wage Rate
(“AEWR”) in violation of North Carolina General Statute § 95-25.1, et seq. [DE
58, ¶¶ 152-57, 173-75]. Second, Plaintiffs Espinobarros Feliciano, Contreras,
Romero Acuña and Quirasco Sixteco sought to bring a NCWHA class action for
back wages and liquidated damages based upon the alleged failure to the
defendants to pay promised wages for those workweeks when the plaintiffs
worked in excess of 40 hours when that work include in part of the unloading,
packing and/or processing of sweet potatoes that were produced by persons or
entities other than the Defendants pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1, et
seq. [DE 58, ¶¶ 158-63, 176-77]
The AWPA class action asserted by all Plaintiffs seeks statutory or
actual damages based upon the Defendants’ alleged violation of a series of
AWPA statutory rights, including, but not limited to providing false and
2
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
misleading information, failing to comply with the working arrangements and
failing to pay members of the class wages when due. [DE 58 at ¶¶ 146-51, 17072].
Defendants denied the claims against them and asserted various
affirmative defenses. [DE 123].
The Plaintiffs and Defendants have negotiated a settlement agreement in
this action which includes relief on a class wide basis for the Plaintiffs’ claims
under the AWPA and NCWHA for Defendants’ alleged failure to pay the AEWR,
and relief for a collective action of similarly situated employees for Plaintiffs’
overtime claims under the FLSA.
For settlement purposes only, Defendants
consent to and join in the Joint Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
(“Joint Motion”) pursuant to the Settlement Agreement reached between the
parties, which is the result of compromise to resolve the disputes between them
and does not constitute an admission of any liability to any party. [DE 208].
Accordingly, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the parties now seek
to certify two classes. First, the parties move the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23, to certify a class represented by all Plaintiffs defined as
follows:
All non-H-2A migrant and seasonal agricultural
workers (as the terms “migrant agricultural worker”
and “seasonal agricultural worker” are defined in 29
U.S.C. §§ 1802(8) and 1802(10) and 29 C.F.R. §§
500.20(p) and 500.20(r)) who were employed by one or
more of the Defendants to perform any job task listed
in the H-2A clearance order or any job task actually
performed by any H-2A worker at Scott Farms from
September 15, 2014 through August 14, 2019.
3
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
This class will be referred to as the AWPA Class.
Second, the parties move the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, to certify a class represented by all Plaintiffs defined as follows:
All non-H-2A farmworkers who were employed by one
or more of the Defendants when, during the time
period covered by an H-2A clearance order for work to
be performed at Scott Farms, they performed any job
task listed in the H-2A clearance order or any job task
actually performed by any H-2A worker at Scott Farms
from July 17, 2015 to August 14, 2019.
This class will be referred to as the NCWHA #1 Class.
I.
CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION
When a settlement is reached prior to Rule 23 certification, the law permits
a class to be certified solely for the purposes of settlement. Covarrubias v. Capt.
Charlie’s Seafood, Inc., 2011 WL 2690531 (E.D.N.C., July 06, 2011), at *2. There is
a strong judicial policy in favor of settlement. See Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.
2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). The parties seeking class certification must still meet
the four prerequisites of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) through (4) and
then must establish that they constitute a proper class of at least one of the types
delineated in Rules 23(b)(1) through (3). However, in those cases, courts do not need
to inquire whether the class will be manageable at trial because the settlement
makes a trial unnecessary. Anchem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
As detailed below, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and the information
submitted in support of the Joint Motion are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and establish that the Class Plaintiffs seek to represent also qualify under
Rule 23(b)(3).
4
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
A.
Named Plaintiffs are Members of and have Precisely Defined the
Class They Seeks to Represent.
The court must make two initial determinations before determining whether
to certify a class action: that a precisely defined class exists, Haywood v. Barnes, 109
F.R.D. 568, 576 (E.D.N.C. 1986), and that the class representative is a member of
the proposed.
The first class is a class represented by all Plaintiffs defined as follows:
all non-H-2A migrant and seasonal agricultural
workers (as the terms “migrant agricultural worker”
and “seasonal agricultural worker” are defined in 29
U.S.C. §§ 1802(8) and 1802(10) and 29 C.F.R. §§
500.20(p) and 500.20(r)) who, during the time period
covered by an H-2A clearance order for work to be
performed at Scott Farms, were employed by one or
more of the Defendants to perform any job task listed
in the H-2A clearance order or any job task actually
performed by any H-2A worker at Scott Farms from
September 15, 2014 through August 14, 2019.
This class will be referred to as the AWPA Class. Each Plaintiff claims that he
worked for Defendants as a “seasonal agricultural worker” during the relevant time
period. Plaintiffs also alleged that each of them worked in positions constituting
“corresponding employment” with H-2A workers during the period in question.
Therefore, they are all members of the AWPA Class that they seek to represent.
The NCWHA Class #1 is represented by all Plaintiffs defined as follows:
All non H-2A farmworkers who were employed by one
or more of the Defendants when, during the time
period covered by an H-2A clearance order for work to
be performed at Scott Farms, they performed any job
task listed in the H-2A clearance order or any job task
actually performed by any H-2A worker at Scott Farms
from July 17, 2015 to August 14, 2019.
The Plaintiffs are non H-2A farmworkers employed by Scott Farms Inc. and
5
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
allege that they performed work in “corresponding employment” to H-2A workers
during the relevant time period. Thus, again, they are members of the NCWHA
Class #1 they seek to represent.
For the reasons stated above, each of the classes are sufficiently precise and
Plaintiffs are members of these classes. Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 576.
B.
The Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality and Adequacy
Requirements of Rule 23(a) are Satisfied with regard to the Classes.
A class action under Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., “may only be certified if the trial
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied.” General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161
(1982) (“Falcon”). Thus, “Falcon requires the trial court to engage in an extensive
factual analysis at the certification stage in order to satisfy itself that the
requirements of Rule 23 have been met.” Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 575. However, the
trial court does not examine the merits of the underlying claims when it decides a
motion for class certification. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78
(1974); see also Covarrubias., 2011 W 2690531, *3.
Courts should “give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction,
adopting a standard of flexibility in application which will in the particular case best
serve the ends of justice for the affected parties and . . . promote judicial efficiency.”
Gunnells v. Health Plan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing In re
A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 709, 740) (4th Cir. 1989), cert. den., Anderson v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989)), cert. den., Healthplan Services, Inc. v. Gunnells,
542 U.S. 915
(2004); see also Kidwell v. Transportation Communications
International Union, 946 F.2d 283, 305 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. den., 503 U.S. 1005
6
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
(1992) (“[t]rend is to give Rule 23 a liberal construction.”); Rodger v. Electronic Data
Systems Corp, 160 F.R.D. 532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
1. The AWPA and NCWHA Classes are sufficiently numerous and
joinder is impracticable.
The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., mandates that
the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” There is no
set number of members necessary for class certification and the decision to certify or
not certify a class must be based upon the particular facts of each case. See Haywood,
109 F.R.D. at 576-77 (courts have "certified classes composed of as few as eighteen…
and twenty-five members") (citations omitted).
The proposed AWPA settlement class includes 122 people who worked for
Defendants.
The proposed NCWHA #1 settlement class includes 189 people.
Although there are a sufficient number of putative class members to establish
numerosity, this Court’s analysis should not be limited to numbers alone. See
Rodger, 160 F.R.D. at 536-537. Here, the presumption of numerosity should also
stand because joinder of all members of the class is all but impossible. Where, as
in this case, class members are geographically dispersed, lack sophistication, and are
non-English speaking migrant workers, courts have found that such additional
factors make joinder impracticable. See Gaxiola v. Williams Seafood of Arapahoe,
Inc., 776 F.Supp.2d 117, 130 (EDNC 2011); Covarrubias, 2011 WL 2690531 at 4;
Rodriguez v. Berrybrook Farms, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1009, 1013-1014 (W.D. Mich.
1987); Leyva v. Buley, 125 F.R.D. 512, 515 (E.D. Wash. 1989).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that the named Plaintiffs and members of
the AWPA Class and NCWHA Classes are “economically disadvantaged, making
7
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
individual suits difficult to pursue.” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir.
1993). Because the number of class members is sufficient and the circumstances do
not make joinder a practical alternative, the class meets the Rule 23(a)(1) standard
for numerosity.
2. There are common questions of law and fact.
Under the "commonality" requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., at least
one common question of law or fact must exist among class members. See Haywood,
109 F.R.D. at 577-78. It is not necessary, however, that all of the questions of law or
fact in a case be common to all putative class members, but only that “a single
common question . . . exist.” Rodger, 160 F.R.D. at 537. “Indeed, a single common
question is sufficient to satisfy the rule.” Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 577. In Hernandez
Garcia, the named Plaintiffs were crab workers who had claims related to payment
for housing and knives that were not shared by dock workers. However, the Court
found there were common issues of law and fact between the Plaintiffs and the dock
workers related to payment of visa and transportation costs such that commonality
existed. See Hernandez Garcia Order at 5; see also, Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 577
(holding that “class certification will not be defeated solely because there are some
factual variations among the members’ grievances”).
Here, named Plaintiffs and the other putative class members were all paid on
an hourly basis and share common questions of law or fact for each of the respective
classes.
For the AWPA class, the common questions of law or fact include whether the
Defendants provided false information to the class members about the availability
of H-2A positions and how much class members were owed for that work and
8
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
whether Defendants paid class members less than the AEWR while employing H2A workers;.” [DE 58, ¶ 148].
For the NCWHA Class #1 class, the common questions of law or fact are
whether Defendants are joint employers of H-2A workers and the class members,
whether class members performed the same authorized or unauthorized task as H2A workers, and whether Defendants failed to pay class members a promised rate
while they employed H-2A workers. [DE 58, ¶ 154].
Therefore, the commonality requirement is satisfied.
3. The named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Class.
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defense of the class. Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 578. “The
claim of a party is typical if it arises from the same event or course of conduct which
gives rise to the claims of other class members and is based on the same legal theory.”
Id. “[T]he requirements of commonality and typicality tend to merge” in that “[b]oth
serve as guideposts for determining whether under particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claims
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n. 13.
The typicality requirement does not require that all of the putative class members
share identical claims. Rodger, 160 F.R.D. at 538 (“A court may determine that the
typicality requirement is satisfied even when the plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of
the class members are not identical”). The prerequisite is only that Plaintiffs’ claims
be common, and “class representatives must not have an interest that is antagonistic
9
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
to that of the class members.” Id.
The allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) with respect to each of the Classes. The named
Plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of the respective Class members arise from the same
practices and course of conduct by Defendants.
The named Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed AWPA Class and
proposed NCWHA Class #1 were all employees of Defendants and all allegedly
performed work in “corresponding employment” during the relevant time period.
The claims of the named Plaintiffs and proposed Class members are based on
the same legal theory. Therefore, the named Plaintiffs have established that the
claims under the AWPA and the NCWHA are "typical" of the claims of the Classes
each seeks to represent.
4. The Named Plaintiffs are Adequate Representatives of the Class.
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” This is a two-part inquiry to determine:
(1) whether the class representatives’ claims are sufficiently interrelated to and not
antagonistic with the class’ claims and (2) that legal counsel is qualified, experienced
and generally able to conduct the litigation. Rodger, 160 F.R.D. at 539; see also
Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 578. Each of the named Plaintiffs meets these requirements
with respect to the proposed AWPA Class and the NCWHA Classes.
Each of the named Plaintiffs meets the first requirement by demonstrating
their consistent involvement in the litigation. Id. at 578-79. Here, as in Haywood,
the named Plaintiffs have a common interest with class members in the litigation,
10
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
possess a personal financial stake in the outcome, consulted regularly with Class
Counsel, were involved with the discovery responses by responding to written
discovery and, additionally, three named plaintiffs were deposed, and five of the
named Plaintiffs participated in person in a lengthy mediation to resolve these
claims, while the other named Plaintiffs were available by phone. Id.; Declaration
of Carol L. Brooke in Support of Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Collective
Action and Class Action Settlement, (“Brooke Decl.”) [DE 202-3], ¶¶ 12-14. The
named Plaintiffs each understood their obligation as class representative in the
event that the Court certified this as a class action with respect to AWPA claims
and/or the NCWHA claims. See Brooke Decl., ¶¶ 13-14.
In addition, under the arrangement between named Plaintiffs and counsel,
all expenses incident to class certification can be advanced to the named Plaintiffs
by counsel for the Plaintiffs, with the named Plaintiffs remaining ultimately liable
for such costs in the event that the Court rejects either the Settlement Agreement or
Plaintiffs request and motion that the expenses involved in providing notice to the
class be paid for by the Defendants. Brooke Decl., ¶ 9; Declaration of Robert J. Willis
in Support of Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Collective Action and Class
Action Settlement (“Willis Decl.”) [DE 202-4], ¶¶ 2-3; see Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at
580 (approving such a cost advance arrangement).
Lastly, Robert Willis, Carol Brooke, and Clermont Ripley, counsel for the
named Plaintiffs, are experienced counsel who have previously been counsel in class
action litigation, including class litigation involving identical claims as asserted in
the instant case. Brooke Decl., ¶ 6; Willis Decl., ¶¶ 6-10. See also Covarrubias. 2011
11
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
WL 2690531 at *7.
C.
The Class Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common issues of law or
fact predominate over individual issues and that the class action be the superior
method of dealing with the dispute. The factors used to make this determination are:
“(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.” Rule 23(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. See also Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 58084, and 592-93.
The proposed class satisfies the requirements of (b)(3) for the reasons already
stated above in the memorandum of law submitted in support of the Motion, [DE
206], as to Rule 23(a). See Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 at 598 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that satisfaction of Rule 23(a) “goes a long way toward satisfying
the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of commonality”). Based on the allegations in the
Complaint, certification of the AWPA Class and the NCWHA Class #1 is appropriate
under Rule 23(b)(3). The legal and factual issues described in paragraphs 146-51,
152-57, 158-63, of the Third Amended Complaint predominate over any individual
issues of law and fact for any Plaintiff class member.
Class treatment of the legal issues identified in this case would also be
superior to other procedures for the handling of the claims in question for a
12
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
number of reasons. No member of the AWPA Class or the NCWHA Classes has
any necessary interest in individually controlling the prosecution of the claims at
issue in this litigation. “Additionally, because of the relatively small amount of the
wage claims in this case, no individual class member could have any reasonable
financial capability to pursue this litigation on an individual basis.” See Gaxiola
2011 WL 806792 at 12; Hernandez Garcia Order at 6.
In addition, no other litigation concerning this matter and filed by any of
the parties involved in the present action is currently pending. Plaintiffs’ and
Defendants’ counsel are not aware of any other litigation pending against
Defendants besides this action.
Furthermore, this Court has a substantial
interest in the resolution of the issues raised in this litigation occurring in one
forum. Because Plaintiff and members of the AWPA Class and the NCWHA
Classes were all employed by the same corporate employer, Scott Farms, Inc., that
maintained payroll records and employee data for the entire time period covered
by the classes, the management of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) in this matter
should not present any difficulties.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the parties Joint Motion for Certification of
Settlement Classes is GRANTED.
18th
November
This the ____ day of __________________, 2019.
____________________________________
The Honorable Louise W. Flanagan
U.S. District Judge
13
4814-0653-1498, v. 1
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?