The United States of America v. Hill et al

Filing 30

ORDER denying 25 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; denying 26 Motion to Rescind Entry of Default Order Pursuant to Rule 60; denying 28 Motion to Amend/Correct, alter, or vacate this court's order. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 4/6/2018. Sent to Larry Darnell Hill, Jr. at Lexington - F.M.C.P.O. Box 14500 Lexington, KY 40512 via US Mail. (Briggeman, N.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DMSION
No. 5:17-CV-366-D

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
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v.
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LARRY DARNELL HILL, JR.,
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HILLBOY's ENTERTAINMENT,
)
a/k/a LARRY HILL- HILLBOY'S
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ENTERTAINMENT, d/b/a
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HILL'S TAX SERVICE, and
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CRYSTAL DENISE DICKENS,
)
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Defendants. )
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ORDER

On February 5, 2018, Larry Darnell Hill, Jr. ("Hill") filed a motion for appointment of

counsel [D.E. 25]. On February 8, 2018, Hill filed amotion requesting the court to rescind the entry
of default entered against defendant Crystal Denise Dickens ("Dickens") and to appoint Dickens
counsel [D.E. 26]. On February 15, 2018, Hill filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate this court's
order denying Hill's motions concerning the discovery plan [D.E. 28]. The government did not
respond to the motions.
No constitutional right to counsel exists in civil cases absent "exceptional circumstances." Whisenant v.

Y~

739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated in part on other

grounds~

Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989); see Cookv. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779,780 (4th Cir.
1975). The existence of exceptional circumstances depends upon ''the type and complexity of the
case, and the abilities of the individuals bringing it." Whisenant 739 F .2d at 163 (quotation
omitted). The claims are straightforward, and the government presented them clearly. This case

does not present exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, Hill's motion for the appointment of
counsel [D.E. 25] is denied.
As for Hill's motion to rescind the entry of default and to appoint Dickens counsel [D.E.

26], on January 26, 2018, the clerk entered default against Dickens [D.E. 23]. The court has not
entered default against Hill. An individual has the right to conduct a case pro se in federal coUrt.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel ...."). However, the right to conduct one's own case does not
give one a right to litigate on behalf of another. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). "The reasoning behind this rule is two-fold: it protects the rights of
those before the court and jealously guards the judiciary's authority to govern those who practice
in its courtrooms." Myers v. Loudoun cty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). Thus, the motion to rescind entry of default order and to appoint Dickens counsel [D.E.
26] is denied.
Finally, Hill's motion to alter, amend, or vacate this court's order denying Hill's motions
concerning the discovery plan [D.E. 28] is baseless and is denied.
In sum, Hill's motions for appointment ofcounsel [D.E. 25], requesting the court to rescind

the entry of default entered against Dickens [D.E. 26], and to alter, amend, or vacate this court's
order [D.E. 28] are DENIED.
SO ORDERED. This ___La day of Apri12018.

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