Campbell v. Speedway LLC et al

Filing 21

ORDER granting defendant Yelverton's 10 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 5/18/2018. Copy sent to Tommy Campbell via US Mail to 145 Sawmill Drive, Four Oaks, NC 27524. (Stouch, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:18-CV-64-BO

TOMMY CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
V.

SPEEDWAY, LLC and NICK YELVERTON,
Defendants.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant Yelverton's motion to dismiss [DE 10].The
matter is ripe for ruling. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Tommy Campbell, proceedirigpro se, brought Title VII claims against his
employer and his supervisor on February 16, 2018. He alleges both race discrimination and
retaliation claims. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a); 3(a). Defendant Yelverton has moved to dismiss
the claims against him.
A motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). It should be granted
when, after accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, no set of facts would
establish plaintiff to relief. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
Civil rights complaints, especially those filed by pro se plaintiffs, should be read generously. Id.
Defendant Yelverton has moved to dismiss on the grounds that Title VII does not provide
for individual liability. This is true. Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th
Cir. 1998). Supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations. Id.
Plaintiff has sued defendant Yelverton in his individual capacity for violating Title VII.

Accordingly, defendant Yelverton cannot be held liable and his motion to dismiss must be
granted.
Defendant Yelverton's motion to dismiss [DE 10] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this

a

day of May, 2018.

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TRRENCEW:BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE