Frierson v. The Shaw University

Filing 60

ORDER - The court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment 32 . Defendant may file a motion for costs in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's local rules. The clerk shall close the case. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 5/19/2023. (Mann, Stephanie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DMSION
No. S:21-CV-45-D

KENNETH FRIERSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
THE SHAW UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

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ORDER

On February 1, 2021, Kenneth Frierson ("Frierson" or ''plaintiff'') filed a complaint against

The Shaw University ("Shaw'' or "defendant'') alleging wrongful employment termination under
Title IX of the Education Amendment Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) ("Title IX'') [D.E. 1]. On
July 20, 2021, Frierson filed an amended complaint [D.E. 11]. On August 29, 2022, Shaw moved
for summary judgment [D.E. 26] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 27], exhibits [D.E. 28],
and a statement ofmaterial facts [D.E. 29]. On August 30, 2022, Shaw filed an amended motion for
summary judgment [D.E. 32]. On September 21, 2022, Frierson responded [D.E. 36] and filed an
opposing statement of material facts [D.E. 37]. On October S, 2022 Shaw replied [D.E. 42]. The
same <lay, Shaw responded to Frierson's opposing statement of material facts [D.E. 43]. As
explained below, the court grants Shaw's motion for summary judgment.
I.

This action stems from an internal Title IX investigation at Shaw into a student's allegation
of sexual harassment against Frierson. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 11] ft 4--14; see also Def. SMF [D.E.
29] ft 3--4, 17-19, 23-39; Pl. SMF [D.E. 37] ft 1, S. Shaw is a private university that receives

federal funding. See Def. SMF ,r 4; Pl. SMF ,r 1. Frierson was the Director of Student Retention at
Shaw University, an at-will employment position. See Def. SMF ft 17-19; Pl. SMF ,r 1. Frierson
worked in an office with other employees, as well as student interns. See Def. SMF ,r 20; Pl. SMF

,r 1.

When Shaw hired Frierson in August 2017, Frierson signed an acknowledgment that he

reviewed and understood the Employee Handbook and that he acknowledged and agreed to abide
by Shaw's policies prohibiting harassment. See Def. SMF ,r 21; Pl. SMF ,r 1. Shaw's harassment
policies and employee guides included a student relationship policy and an inappropriate
conduct/behavior policy. See Def. SMF ft 5-16; Pl. SMF ,r 1.
In August 2017, Frierson (then age 29 and unmarried) began working at Shaw as Director

of Student Retention. See Frierson Dep. [D.E. 38-1] 13, SO. A female student intern worked in the
same office suite as Frierson. Id. at 50--S 1. The female student was not enrolled in any ofthe classes
that Frierson taught. See id. at 51-52. She did not report to Frierson as an intern but sometimes
worked on issues concerning student retention. See id. at 56--58. Frierson communicated with the
student in person, via email, on the telephone, and via text. See id. at 59. In mid-December 2017,
when the student intern left for winter break, Frierson texted the student intern to see if she had left
for Los Angeles yet and later texted her to see if'she arrived safely. See id. at 75-76. She did not
respond. See id. On January 15, 2018, at 10:50 p.m., Frierson texted the student intern and asked,
"Are you responding to me now? Okay." Id. at 76. She did not respond. At 11 :28 p.m., Frierson
texted the student intern and wrote, "No? Cool." Id. At 11 :30 p.m., the student responded via text,
"LMAOOO." Id. at 77. To which Frierson asked if something was funny, and then he wrote, "See
howyouplay." Id. Thestudentinternthenwrote, "Sir, whatdoyouwant." Id. Friersonresponded,
"Call me." According to Frierson, he wanted to speak with the student intern about an event with
students for MLK Day. Id.
2

On January 31, 2018, Frierson learned from Lee Wood ("Wood"), Shaw's Title IX
coordinator, that a student intern. who worked in the same office as Frierson had filed a sexual
harassment complaint against him. See Def. SMF ff 24-25, 27, 34; Pl. SMF ff 3-5, 9; Am. Compl.

,r

10; cf. [D.E. 38-2] 88-95 (emails concerning the complaint of a female student to Shaw

admjnjstrator Rishard Wedderburn about Frierson's behavior on January 29, 2018, where Frierson
called the student to his office at approximately 5: 15 p.m. to express his feelings for the student).
Wood identified the student, asked questions about Frierson and the student's relationship, notified
Frierson that Shaw (through Wood) would investigate the alleged sexual harassment, and told
Frierson to remain off campus during the investigation. See Def. SMF ff 34; Pl. SMF ,r 9; Am.
Compl. ff 10-11.
Shaw's investigation into the student's sexual harassment complaint against Frierson
consisted of the student completing an intake form, the student meeting with Wood to review her
complaint and to be interviewed, Wood interviewing the student's roommate, and Wood
interviewing Frierson. See Def. SMF ff 28-35; Pl. SMF ff 5-9. During Frierson's interview,
Wood did not tell Frierson the student's specific allegations beyond stating that a female student
stated that Frierson was "bothering her." See Def. SMF ,r 34; Pl. SMF ,r 9; Am. Compl.

,r 10;

Frierson Deel. [D.E. 41] ,r 5. Frierson denied having any physical contact with the student, but did
admit speaking with her in person, on the phone, and via text messages. See [D.E. 36] 4.
As part ofthe investigation, Wood collected evidence, including text messages that Frierson

sent to the student and to the student's roommate. See [D.E. 28-4]. The student alleged that Frierson
harassed her on multiple occasions, indicated that he wanted to have a relationship with her, and that
Frierson used sexual innuendo. See Def. SMF ff 25, 30, 32; see also [D.E. 28-4]. The student also
alleged that Frierson called her between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. just to talk, texted her after work

3

hours, and once touched her without her consent in his office. See [D.E. 28-4] 3, 14. The text
messages included some sent on a Sunday evening telling the student to "stop playing with me" and
to ''tell [her roommate] to come to class." Id. at 14. The student's allegations were supported by her
call logs, screen shots of her text messages, and an interview of her roommate, a friend whom the
student repeatedly told about Frierson' s alleged harassment. See id. at 2-18. The student was not
one ofFrierson' s students, did not report to Frierson, was a senior, was doing well academically, and
was not at risk for leaving Shaw early. See Def. SMF ft 23-24; Pl. SMF ,r 3. Frierson had no
professional need to contact the student because she was not his student and she did not report to
him. See Def. SMF ft 23-24; Pl. SMF ,r 3.
On February 1, 2018, Wood completed the Title IX investigation and prepared a detailed
report. See [D.E. 28-4] 1-18. Wood forwarded the report to Dr. Pamela Denning (Shaw's Associate
Vice President ofAcademic Affairs) and Dr. Renata Dusenbury (Shaw's Vice President ofAcademic
Affairs). See Def. SMF ft 17, 35; [D.E. 34-1] 2. On that same day, Dr. Dusenbury forwarded the
report to Shaw's President, Dr. Paulette R. Dillard, for her review and decision. See Def. SMF ,r 36.
Dr. Dusenbury and Dr. Denning recommended terminating Frierson's employment. See id. Dr.
Dillard received the recommendation, authorized terminating Frierson's employment, andauthorizm
giving Frierson the option to resign in lieu of termination. Id.

On February 1, 2018, around 5:00 p.m., Wood notified Frierson that Shaw had completed
I

itsinvestigationintothestudent'sallegations. See Def. SMFft35-36; Pl. SMF,r 10. OnFebruary
2, 2018, Frierson met with Wood and Dr. Denning, Frierson's supervisor. See Def. SMF ,r 37; Pl.
SMF ,r 10. Wood and Dr. Denning notified Frierson that the investigation concluded with a
recommendation that Shaw terminate Frierson's employment. See Def. SMF ft 37-39; Pl. SMF ,r
10. Wood and Dr. Denning presented Frierson with a resignation letter, which he refused to sign.
4

See Def. SMF ff 37-39; Pl. SMF 110. Therefore, Shaw terminated Frierson's employment See
Def. SMF ff 37-39; Pl. SMF 110.
On July 31, 2018, Frierson filed a complaint under Title IX with the Office for Civil Rights
("OCR") in the United States Department ofEducation. See Def. SMF 140; Pl. SMF 1 11; On July
30, 2019, the OCR investigation found that Shaw failed to comply with Title IX by failing to provide
Frierson with specific notice of the allegations against ~ failing to give Frierson a reasonable
opportunity to respond to the allegations, and failing to give Frierson an opportunity to confront or
question the student or respond to the student's specific allegations against him. See Def. SMF 1
41; Pl. SMF 111.
On July 25, 2019, in response to the OCR investigation, Shaw entered into an OCR

Resolution Agreement and agreed to appoint an impartial investigator to reinvestigate the student's
allegations. See Def. SMF 142; Pl. SMF 111. On October 12, 2019, as part of the reinvestigation,
Shaw emailed Frierson and asked him for an interview. See [D.E. 34-1] 23. On October 16, 2019,
Frierson declined to be interviewed, and he did not otherwise provide any additional information
during the investigation. Id. On October 18 and 19, 2019, Shaw again contacted Frierson about its
interview request, but Frierson did not respond. Id. at 23 n.1.
On January 17, 2020, the OCR issued its Monitoring Closure Letter to Shaw. See Def. SMF

143; Pl. SMF 1 11. In the letter, the OCR noted that Shaw agreed to comply with the Resolution
Agreement by appointing an impartial investigator to reinvestigate the student's allegations. See
[D.E. 34-1] 22-24; Def. SMF 143; Pl. SMF 1 11. The OCR letter also noted Frierson's failure to
participate in the reinvestigation. See [D.E. 34-1] 23; see also Def. SMF 143; Pl.SMF111. The
reinvestigation did not alter the conclusions of the first investigation, and the OCR found that Shaw
fulfilled its requirements under the OCR Resolution Agreement. See [D.E. 34-1] 23.

s

II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record as a whole, no genuine
issue ofmaterial fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment initially must demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact or the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case. See Celotex Cor,p. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,325 (1986). Once the moving party has
met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, see ·
Anderso~ 477 U.S. at 248-49, but "m.ust come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Blee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cor,p.• 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986) (cleaned up). A trial court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Anderso~ 477 U.S. at 249. In making
this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most•favorable to the nonmoving party. See Harris, 550 U.S. at 378.
A genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists ifthere is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderso~ 477 U.S. at 249. "The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position [is]
insufficient ...." Id. at 252; see Beale v. Hardy. 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The
nonmoving party, however, cannot create a genuine issue ofmaterial fact through mere speculation
or the building ofone inference upon another."). Only factual disputes that affect the .outcome under
substantive law properly preclude summary judgment. See Anderso~ 477 U.S. at 248.
Title IX prohibits discrimination "on the basis of sex" by institutions, including colleges or
universities, receiving federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 168l(a), 1687; Jackson v.
6

Binnjngham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,695
n.17 (1979); Peltierv. Charter Day Sch., Inc., 37 F.4th 104, 127 (4th Cu-. 2022)(en bane). Title IX
"is enforceable through an implied private right of action." Sheppard v. Visitors ofVa. State Univ.,
993 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2021); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703.
To state a ·claim under Title IX, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a federally-funded
institution discriminated against him on the basis of sex. See Shcmparg, 993 F.3d at 235; Doe v.
Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 667-68 (7th Crr. 2019). As part of a plaintiff's claim, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that plaintiff's sex was the "but-for'' cause ofthe discrimination. See Sheppard, 993
F.3d at 236 (collecting cases). In attempting to raise a plausible inference that a college
discriminated on the basis of sex, a plaintiff may pursue an "erroneous outcome" theory or a
"selective enforcement" theory. See She_parg, 993 F.3d at 235-36; Yusufv. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d
709, 715 (2d Cu-. 1994). Under the erroneous outcome theory, a plaintiffmust allege and prove that
he ''was innocent and wrongly found to have committed an offense" and that there is a causal
connection between the flawed outcome and sex bias. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 725. Under the selective
enforcement theory, a plaintiff must allege and prove ''that, regardless of the [plaintiff's] guilt or
innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected by
the [plaintiff's sex]." Id.
Evidence of "clear procedural irregularities" can support a plausible inference that a college
discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. See, e.g.• Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d
580, 586--88 (6th Cir. 2020). But merely identifying mistakes or imperfections in an investigation
does not suffice to raise a plausible inference of sex discrimination. See, e.g.• Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291-92 (1998); Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675,688 (11th Crr.
2022). Moreover, evidence that a university credits an alleged victim's statements and supporting
7

evidence during a Title IX investigation does not constitute sex-based bias or sex discrimination.
See, e.g.• Rossleyv. Drake Univ., 342 F. Supp. 3d904, 927 (S.D. Iowa2018), aff'g, 979 F.3d 1184
(8th Cir. 2020); Doe v. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1079 (D. Colo. 2017); Doe
v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 990-92 (D. Minn. 2017); Sahm v. Miami Univ., 110
F. Supp. 3d 774, 778-80 (S.D. Ohio 2015); Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573,
579 (E.D. Va. 1996). Furthermore, a reviewing court in an action alleging a Title IX violation does
not "step into the shoes of the university's decision-makers and evaluate the weight and credibility
ofthe evidence" that a university ''found demonstrated [a person] was responsible for misconduct."
Rossley. 342 F. Supp. 3d at 927; see Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 648--49 (1999); Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 989--90; Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97
F. Supp. 3<1448,461 (S.D.N.Y.2015);Doev. Univ. ofthe S., 687F. Supp. 2d 744,755 (E.D. Tenn.
2009).
In his amended complaint, Frierson contends that after the student alleged that he sexually
harassed her~ Shaw conducted a flawed investigation into the student's allegations, treated him
differently during the investigation because ofhis sex, and terminated his employment based on his
sex. See Am. Comp!. ft 21-26. Shaw responds that it impartially investigated the student's claims
and agreed to reinvestigate the claims with an impartial investigator in accordance with the OCR
Resolution Agreement. Frierson, however, declined to provide any additional information to the
person appointed to do the reinvestigation, and Shaw permissibly maintained its decision to
terminate Frierson's employment. See [D.E. 27] 2-5.
Although the parties dispute whether Frierson provided information, such as text messages
and supporting witnesses, during Shaw's initial investigation, Frierson does not object to paragraph

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43 in Shaw's statement ofmaterial facts. See [D.E. 37] ft 1-11. Paragraph43 of Shaw's statement
of material facts states:
On January 17, 2020, OCR issued its Monitoring Closure Letter to Shaw. In that

letter, OCR noted that Shaw, pursuant to the Resolution Agreement, agreed to reopen
and complete a prompt and equitable investigation of the complaint filed by the
Student against Frierson, including a designating an impartial investigator to
re-interview Frierson and review any additional information provided by him. OCR
further noted that, in response to Shaw's requests for an interview, Frierson stated he
did not want to participate in an interview by Shaw and he did not otherwise provide
any additional information to be considered in 'the investigation.
Def. SMF ft 43; Pl. SMF ,I 11. Therefore, although Frierson disputes whether Shaw initially asked
, Frierson for witnesses or to provide other information to support his position during the initial
investigation, Frierson does not dispute four key facts about the reinvestigation. First, Shaw
appointed an impartial investigator to reinvestigate the student's sexual harassment complaint against
him. Second, as a part of the reinvestigation, the impartial investigator asked Frierson for an
interview and additional information to support Frierson's position during the reinvestigation. See
Def. SMF ,I 43; Pl. SMF ,I 11. Third, Frierson declined to provide any information to the impartial
investigator during the reinvestigation. See Def. SMF ,I 43; Pl. SMF ,I 11. Accordingly, Shaw did
not change its decision to terminate Frierson's employment.
Even if there is a genuine dispute concerning whether Shaw originally asked Frierson for
witnesses and whether Shaw conducted the initial investigation properly, Frierson has failed to create
a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Frierson's sex was the but-for cause of his
employment termination or Shaw's decision not to changethatemploymentdecisionafter appointing
an impartial person to reinvestigate the student's sexual harassment complaint. See Def. SMF ft
40-41; Pl. SMF ,I 11; see also Am. Compl. ,I 33; [D.E. 36] 6. As for Frierson's argument about
systemic procedural errors, the OCR did find that Shaw failed to comply with Title IX during its

9

initial investigation. See Def. SMF ff 40-41; Pl. SMF ,r 11. Nonetheless, the imperfections in
Shaw's initial investigation do not suffice to raise a genuine issue of material fact about sex
discrimination concerning the original decision to terminate Frierson' s employment or the decision
to decline to change it after the reinvestigation. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92 (holding that a
school's failure to follow a Title IX regulation "d[id] not itselfconstitute 'discrimination' under Title
IX''). Tellingly, Shaw appointed an impartial investigator to reinvestigate the student's complaint,

but Frierson chose not to participate in that reinvestigation. See Def. SMF ,r 43; Pl. SMF ,r 11.
In opposition to the conclusion that Shaw did not violate Title IX in terminating Frierson's

employment, Frierson cites two cases for the proposition that procedural irregularities can provide
a plausible inference of sex discrimination. See Doe v. Univ. ofArk.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858 (8th
Cir. 2020); Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019). In University of Arkansas. Fayetteville, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a male student
plaintiffplausibly alleged that the university panel that reversed a Title IX coordinator's finding that
the male student did not sexually assault a female student was under outside pressure to change the
result due to media scrutiny, a student body movement, and anArkansas legislative investigation into
how the university allegedly mishandled several sexual assault allegations. See Univ. of Ark.Fayetteville, 974 F.3d at 860-66. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit held that the male student plaintiff
plausibly alleged that even though the university panel found the male student responsible for sexual
assault, the university panel did not expel him, which was the typical sanction for such a finding.
Thus, this failure to expel the male student plausibly indicated that the university panel found the
male student guilty of violating university policy to appease those providing outside pressure but
deviated from the typical sanction because the evidence did not support the finding of a sexual
assault. See id. at 865-66. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
10

dismiss the male student plaintiff's Title IX claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See id. at 869.

As for Purdue University. close to the time that Purdue disciplined a male student for
allegedly sexually assaulting a female student with whom he was in a consensual sexual relationship,
a Purdue official involved in the investigation ofthe male student posted an article to Facebook titled
"Alcohol isn't the cause of campus sexual assault. Men are.'' Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 669--70.
Moreover, two members ofthe Purdue panel investigating the male student also "candidly stated that
they had not read the investigative report. The one who apparently had read it asked [the male
student] accusatory questions that assumed his guilt." Id at 658. On this record, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the male student plaintiff's Title IX claim under
Rule 12(b)(6). See id. at 667-70.
In contrast to these two cases, this court is reviewing this matter at summary judgment.
Mor~over, Frierson has presented no evidence of systemic procedural bias. During the ~tial
investigation and reinvestigation, Shaw relied on credible allegatj.ons ofthe student supported by text
messages, call logs, and another witness. See Def. SMF

ff

25, 30, 32; see also [D.E. 28-4].

Furthermore, Frierson has not presented evidence that Shaw favors females over males when
conducting Title IX investigations or that Shaw faced any outside pressure in making its decisions
in this case. The only argument Frierson makes for sex-based bias against him in the initial
investigation was the decision of Shaw administrators to credit the female student's version ofevents
over Frierson's version. See [D.E. 36] 6. However, crediting a victim's statements, backed by
additional evidence such as text messages and a corroborating witness, does not evince
discrimination on the basis of sex. See, ~ Rossley, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 928; Univ. of Colo.,

11

Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1079; Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 991; Sahm, l 10 F. Supp.
3d at 778; Haley, 948 F. Supp. at 579.
As for specific individual sex bias, Frierson alleges that Wood, the male Title IX coordinator

who originally investigated the allegations, was biased against men. See Am. Compl. ff 34-35;
-

[D.E. 36] 4-5, 9--10. In support, Frierson cites an interaction where Wood did not make Frierson
pay for parking at a Shaw athletic event after noticing that Frierson was with his girlfriend. See
[D.E. 36] 10. Frierson also cites a comment that Wood made during the February 2, 2018 meeting
stating that Frierson's caring nature was seen as predatory. See id. at 5, 10. Frierson also cites as
evidence of specific individual sex bias that Frierson was the only male in an office with eight
1

women, but his supervisor once did not allow him to hire a more qualified male applicant. See id.
at 10.
Even viewing the cited evidence in the light most favorable to Frierson, no rational jury could
rely on the cited evidence to plausibly infer that Shaw (through Wood, Dr. Denning, Dr. Dusenbury,
and Dr. Dillard) conducted the initial investigation, terminated Frierson's employment, conducted
the reinvestigation, or persisted in the qriginal termination decision because ofFrierson's sex. The
cited evidence simply does not support Frierson' s claim that discrimination on the basis ofFrierson' s
sex was the but-for cause of how Shaw conducted the initial investigation or reinvestigation or why
Shaw terminated Frierson's employment and declined to· change that decision.
As for Frierson's erroneous outcome argument, Frierson does not present evidence that

permits a plausible inference that he was innocent and wrongly found to have acted inconsistently
with Shaw's employment policies and that there is a causal connection between the alleged
erroneous outcome and Frierson's sex. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Frierson, no evidence suggests that Shaw wrongfully terminated Frierson's employment. Although
12

Frierson states that his relationship with the student was not overtly sexual, that he never touched
the student, and that he had no romantic or physical relationship with the student, a physical,
romantic, or sexual relationship was not necessary under Shaw's employment policies for Shaw to
terminate Frierson's employment. The undisputed evidence showed that Frierson gave the student
intern his phone number so that she could text him about personal and professional topics, called her

periodically in the evening to see how she was doing, and repeatedly texted her during her winter
break. See Def. Sl\,IF ft 25, 30, 32; see also [D.E. 28-4]. Frierson's conduct raised concerns with
Shaw's administration, including potential Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA")
violations, the power differential between Frierson and the student intern, and Frierson' s extremely
poorjudgmentincomm.unicatingwith the student as he did. See [D.E. 28-3] 10-14; [D.E. 28-4] 8;
[D.E. 29-S] ft S-6; [D.E. 29-8] ft 7, 10-11. Furthermore, Frierson was an at-will employee. See
Def. Sl\,IF ft 17-19; Pl. Sl\,IF ,r 1. Therefore, the evidence presented shows that Shaw had reasons
that were not based on Frierson's sex to terminate his employment. Even viewing the record in the
light most favorable to Frierson, Frierson has not presented sufficient evidence of sex discrimination.
See, e.g., She_parg, 993 F.3d at 236.

m.
Jnsum, the court GRANTS defendant's motion for summaryjudgment [D.E. 32]. Defendant
may file a motion for costs in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's
local rules. The clerk shall close the case.
SO ORDERED. This _.lj_ day of May, 2023.

JSC.DEVERID
United States District Judge
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