Davis et al v. Ratledge et al

Filing 52

ORDER granting 28 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 3/5/2025. (Pro se party has consented to receiving electronic service of all motions, notices, orders, and documents in civil cases in the Eastern District of North Carolina.) (Collins, S)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
NO. 5:24-CV-00440-FL
MICHAEL SCOTT DAVIS and STETSON
MANSFIELD WEBSTER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BRIAN RATLEDGE, JENNIFER
BEDFORD, JULIE BELL, and DAMION
MCCULLERS, in their official and
individual capacities,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

This matter is before the court upon defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) (DE 28). Plaintiffs responded in opposition to
defendants’ motion, and the issues raised are ripe for ruling.1 For the following reasons, the motion
is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Michael Scott Davis (“Davis”) and Stetson Manfield Webster (“Webster”)
commenced this action July 30, 2024, with complaint against defendants Brian Ratledge
(“Ratledge”), Jennifer Bedford (“Bedford”), Julie Bell (“Bell”), and Damion McCullers
(“McCullers”), district court judges in North Carolina’s 10th Judicial District. Proceeding pro se,

1

On February 25, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered its mandate regarding
its opinion and judgment dismissing that part of plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal of the court’s October 28, 2024, order
denying plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file supplemental complaint, and affirming that part of the court’s October 28,
2024, order denying plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief. The only motion thus before the court is the instant
motion to dismiss.

plaintiffs seek review of actions taken by defendants during each of plaintiffs’ respective domestic
child custody and child support cases.
Plaintiffs’ original complaint, which seeks to state claims premised upon false
imprisonment against defendants Ratledge, Bell, and McCullers is followed on the docket by a
myriad of state court papers on behalf of plaintiff Davis, (DE 1-2 through DE 1-29), and plaintiff
Webster, (DE 1-30 through DE 1-58). Another complaint was taken in and filed by the clerk July
30, 2024, indexed as an “attachment” to the aforementioned complaint, (DE 1-1), stating claims
for violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights against defendants subject of the false imprisonment claims
together with defendant Bedford. Memorandum of law in support of complaint for violation of
civil rights also was separately filed and indexed by the clerk following filing of the first complaint.
(DE 1-59).
Two more titled complaints follow separately on the docket in this case, filed August 20,
2024. One parallels or amends the complaint for false imprisonment, (DE 7) (“Suppl. Compl.”),
and the other states amended claims for violation of civil rights, (DE 8) (“Am. Compl.”).2
Amended memorandum of law in support of amended complaint for violation of civil rights rounds
out the August 20, 2024, filings by plaintiffs. (DE 9).
Plaintiffs filed motion for leave to file additional supplemental complaint September 18,
2024, and emergency motion for declaratory relief October 11, 2024. Following expedited
briefing, the court denied both motions in order entered October 28, 2024. Specifically, the court
determined plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief was barred by the Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine,

2

The court considers the facts alleged in each of the aforementioned filings (DE 1, 1-1, 7, and 8) as comprising
plaintiffs’ operative complaint (hereinafter, referenced collectively as the “complaint”).
3

D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

2

and their request to supplement was futile. See Davis v. Ratledge, No. 5:24-cv-440-FL, 2024 WL
4594236 at *2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2024). Plaintiffs filed notice of interlocutory appeal of the
court’s October 28, 2024, order November 8, 2024. In unpublished opinion entered January 28,
2025, the Fourth Circuit dismissed that part of plaintiffs’ appeal which sought review of this court’s
denial of leave to file additional supplemental complaint and affirmed this court’s denial of
declaratory relief. Davis v. Ratledge, No. 24-2135, 2025 WL 314112 at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025).
In the meantime, after extension of time, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim October
21, 2024. After extension of time, plaintiffs responded in opposition December 11, 2024.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although not a model of clarity, the facts alleged in the complaint may be summarized as
follows.
A.

Plaintiff Davis
Plaintiff Davis alleges multiple due process violations by defendants Ratledge and Bedford

in their handling of his underlying domestic case against his ex-wife. Specifically, Davis alleges
defendant Ratledge violated Davis’s right to due process through: delays of two and four years in
hearing motions (Am. Compl. (DE 8) at 5), depriving Davis of the opportunity to fully and fairly
present his arguments on at least one of those motions (id. at 7), misclassifying certain of Davis’s
income (id. at 10), making decisions based on unsubstantiated claims (id. at 11), refusing to review
certain evidence (id. at 13), failing to address sanctionable behavior (id. at 15), ignoring and
denying certain of Davis’s motions (id. at 18), and finding Davis in civil contempt and mandating
his arrest without supporting evidence (id. at 20-21). Davis alleges defendant Bedford violated his

3

due process rights by finding Davis in willful contempt based on inadequate and contradicted
evidence. (Id. at 22-23).
Plaintiff Davis also alleges defendant Ratledge “unlawfully restrained Plaintiff Davis
against his will by ordering his arrest and incarceration without proper legal justification.” (Supp.
Compl. (DE 7) at 3).
B.

Plaintiff Webster
Plaintiff Webster alleges multiple due process violations by defendants McCullers,

Bedford, and Bell.
Specifically, plaintiff Webster alleges that defendant McCullers failed to finalize pending
orders, relied on unverified testimony, and refused to hear Webster’s motion to reconsider before
ordering his arrest for civil contempt (Am. Compl. (DE 8) at 27-28). Webster alleges that
defendant Bedford obstructed Webster’s access to the courts by continuing hearing on his motion
to show cause. (Id. at 37). Webster also alleges that Defendant Bell barred Webster from accessing
evidence and failed to provide him with a status update (id. at 29), failed to respond to motions
and delayed issuing orders (id.), revised a custody order despite contradictory evidence (id. at 31),
admitted into evidence a document without authentication (id. at 33), failed to provide explanation
for a financial determination (id. at 34), delayed hearing beyond the state court’s guidelines (id.),
relied on selective and outdated case history in issuing a gatekeeper order (id. at 36), and delayed
entry of a protective order (id.).
Additionally, plaintiff Webster alleges defendants Bell and McCullers “unlawfully
restrained Plaintiff Webster against his will by ordering his arrest and incarceration without proper
legal justification.” (Suppl. Compl. (DE 7) at 3)

4

COURT’S DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion4 challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff

bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction is appropriate when challenged by the
defendant. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Adams v.
Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).5 Such a motion may either 1) assert the complaint fails
to state facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction may be based, or 2) attack the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from the complaint. Bain, 697 F.2d at 1219. Where a
defendant raises a “facial challenge[ ] to standing that do[es] not dispute the jurisdictional facts
alleged in the complaint,” the court accepts “the facts of the complaint as true as [the court] would
in context of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.” Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 287 (4th Cir. 2018).
B.

Analysis
Defendants argue this court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court agrees.
“Congress has vested only the [United States] Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review
state court decisions.” Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir. 2006); see 28 U.S.C. §
1257. In accordance with that limitation, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal district
courts “from exercising what would be, in substance, appellate jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.” Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2020). The “doctrine bars lower federal
courts from considering not only issues raised and decided in the state courts, but also issues that

4

Because, as explained more fully herein, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, it
does not reach additional grounds raised by defendants under Rule 12(b)(2) or 12(b)(6) based upon abstention,
immunities, and failure to state a claim. Therefore, the court sets forth only the standard of review under Rule 12(b)(1).
5

In case citations in this order, internal quotations and citations are omitted, unless otherwise specified.

5

are inextricably intertwined with the issues that were before the state court.” Washington v.
Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005).
An issue is “inextricably intertwined” with those that were before the state court if “success
on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). Additionally, a “claim seeking
redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself – even if the basis of the claim was
not asserted to the state court – asks the federal district court to conduct an appellate review of the
state-court decision.” Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006).
Therefore, when a plaintiff “seeks redress in the federal district court for the injury caused by the
state-court decision, his federal claim is, by definition, ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the statecourt decision, and is therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the federal district court.” Id. A
plaintiff “may not escape the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman by merely refashioning his
attack on the state court judgments as a § 1983 claim.” Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122
F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997). Rather, “litigants who feel a state proceeding has violated their
constitutional rights must appeal that decision through their state courts and thence to the Supreme
Court.” Id. at 203 n.11 (quoting Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Though previously “broadly interpreted,” the Supreme Court of the United States has
clarified that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “goes no further than necessary to effectuate Congress’
allocation of subject matter jurisdiction between the district courts and the Supreme Court.” Thana
v. Bd. of License Comm’rs, 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting narrowing of the doctrine
following the decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)).
In applying the doctrine, the district court “assesses only whether the process for appealing a state
court judgment to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) has been sidetracked by an action

6

filed in a district court specifically to review that state court judgment.” Thana, 827 F.3d at 320.
Thus, it is “confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 319.
Bearing its limited application in mind, the court is compelled to conclude that plaintiffs’
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Although plaintiffs repeatedly assert that they
do not seek “to review or alter any state court judgments or factual findings,” (see DE 8 at 9, 11,
13, 15, 20, 22, 24, 28, 31, 36, 38), they request this court to “[d]eclare that the actions of the trial
court violated Plaintiff Davis’s and Plaintiff Webster’s due process rights,” and “[a]ward . . .
compensatory damages for the actual losses incurred as a result of the due process violations,” (id.
at 42). Thus, plaintiffs “seek[] redress in the federal district court for the injury cause by the statecourt decision[s].” Davani, 434 F.3d at 719. Even if those injuries are Constitutional in nature,
and even if plaintiffs do not expressly seek reversal of state court decisions, their claims are “by
definition, ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state-court decision[s], and [are] therefore outside
of the jurisdiction” of this court. Id. at 719.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, for the proposition that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “does not extend to claims addressing systemic violations or raising independent
constitutional or procedural issues,” (DE 46 at 7), is misplaced. In Exxon, the court held that
where state and federal matters are proceeding in parallel, “Rooker-Feldman is not triggered
simply by the entry of judgment in state court.” Exxon, 544 U.S. 280 at 292. That is not the issue
here.
It is true that “[i]f a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies
a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is

7

jurisdiction.” Id. at 293 (emphasis added). But as explained above, plaintiffs’ claims here are
“inextricably intertwined with the state-court decisions,” and thus are not independent. Davani,
434 F.3d at 719. “Exxon teaches . . . that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser
in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the
state court’s decision itself.” Id. at 713. This is precisely what happened here, and the RookerFeldman doctrine therefore bars this court’s jurisdiction in this matter.
Because this court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is granted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE 28) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’
claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The clerk
is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this the 5th day of March, 2025.

__________________________________
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge

8