Southwood v. The Credit Card Solution et al

Filing 57

ORDER denying without prejudice 56 Motion: RESPONSE to Order regarding 54 Order on Motion to Certify Class, and Motion to Set Jury Trial. Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file a motion for default judgment on or before March 1, 2015. Counsel is reminded to read the order in its entirety for detailed information. Signed by Senior Judge James C. Fox on 1/26/2015. (Edwards, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHARON SOUTHWOOD, for herself,
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

v.
THE CREDIT CARD SOLUTION, et. al,
Defendants.

CHRIS TAYLOR, for himself
and all others similarly situated, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
LEE W. BETTIS, Jr., Esq. et al.
Defendants,

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No. 7:09-CV-81-F

No. 7:09-CV-183-F

In an order filed on March 27, 2014, the court directed Plaintiff to enter default against
Defendant Philip M. Manger; (2) ordered that cases 7:09-CV-81-F and 7:09-CV-183-F be
consolidated; and (3) denied the Plaintiffs' motions to certify the class without prejudice to renew
within 60 days, or file another appropriate motion.
Plaintiffs timely complied [DE-56], indicating they are not renewing their motions to certify
class, but instead "request that jury trial be set as to their individual cases, to be jointly tried at the
next available civil session." Pl.'s Resp. to Order on Class Certification and Mot. to Set Jury Trial
[DE-56]. The Named Plaintiffs recognize that all remaining defendants are in default, see id., but

contend that "a jury trial will in any event be necessary to determine punitive damages" for the
claims of conversion, violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, and fraud. Id at 2.
Given that default has been entered as to all the remaining defendants, rather than setting this
matter for trial, the court discerns that the most efficient manner to resolve the litigation is for the
individual Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment. This is especially so because it is not
apparent from the motion which individual Plaintiffs are still pursuing this litigation. Resp. to Order
[DE-56] at 1. To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that the default judgment should address only
liability, and leave the determination of damages to the jury, Plaintiffs should support such a request
with persuasive authority and specific reasons why a jury trial is preferable to the court determining
damages, whether on the basis of affidavits or an evidentiary hearing. Many courts have determined
that a jury trial is not required or unnecessary in the context of default judgment. See, e.g., Benz v.

Skiba, Skiba & Glomski, 164 F.R.D. 115 (D. Me. 1995) (finding, after plaintiff objected to district
court removing case from jury trial calendar where all defendants had defaulted, that plaintiff was
not entitled statutorily or constitutionally to a jury trial on damages); Swoope v. Gary Community

School Corp., No. 2:10-CV-423-RL, 2011 WL 6826410, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 28, 2011). The
default judgment motion(s) must address which plaintiff is moving for default judgment, and on
which claims that individual plaintiff is moving.
To the extent that Plaintiffs move to set this matter for jury trial, the motion [DE-56] is
DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file a motion for default judgment on or
before March 1, 2015.

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SO ORDERED. This the

J..'

day of January, 2015.

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enior United States District Judge

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