Temple v. Astrue

Filing 31

ORDER DENYING 20 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and GRANTING 24 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 12/6/2013. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:12-CV-290-BO
MARGARET TEMPLE,
Plaintiff,
V.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. A hearing
was held before the undersigned on November 22, 2013, at Elizabeth City, North Carolina. For the
reasons discussed below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffbroughtthis action under42 U.S. C.§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the final
decision of the Commissioner denying her claim for disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB)
pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff protectively applied for DIB on August 19,
2008, alleging disability since December 30, 2004. 1 Her claims were denied initially and on
reconsideration. After conducting a hearing and considering the claim de novo, an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) found that plaintiffwas not disabled. The decision of the ALJ became the final
decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review.
Plaintiff then timely sought review of the Commissioner's decision in this Court.
DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, this Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is

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Plaintiff later amended her alleged onset date to March 31, 2005.

limited to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is supported by substantial evidence and
whether the Commissioner employed the correct legal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hays v.

Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence consists of more than a mere
scintilla of evidence, but may be less than a preponderance of evidence. Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389,401 (1971). The Court must not substitute its judgment for that ofthe
Commissioner if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hays, 907
F .2d at 1456.
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ uses a multi-step process. First, a
claimant must not be able to work in a substantial gainful activity. 20 C.P.R. § 404.1520.
Second, a claimant must have a severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. !d. Third, to be found disabled, without considering a
claimant's age, education, and work experience, a claimant's impairment must be of sufficient
duration and must either meet or equal an impairment listed by the regulations. !d. Fourth, in the
alternative, a claimant may be disabled if his or her impairment prevents the claimant from doing
past relevant work and, fifth, if the impairment prevents the claimant from doing other work. !d.
After finding at step one that plaintiff last met the insured status requirements on
December 31, 2006, and had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity between her alleged
onset date through her date last insured, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the following
severe impairments: fibromyalgia, degenerative joint disease of the left knee, and chronic fatigue.
The ALJ went on to find that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or equaled a listing at step three, and found that plaintiff had a residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform the full range of sedentary work Plaintiff was then found to be able
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to perform her past relevant work as a secretary, billing clerk, and receptionist. Accordingly, the
ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled.
Plaintiff contends first that the ALJ failed to properly assess her statement regarding the
date her disability began and failed to properly assess the statements of lay witnesses regarding
the date plaintiffs disability began. Plaintiff also contends it was error for the ALJ not to consult
a medical advisor to assist in determining plaintiffs onset date. The ALJ considered all of the
evidence relating to plaintiffs contention that she should be considered too limited to work prior
to her date last insured, December 31, 2006. Noting there to be "sparse" medical evidence from
her amended alleged onset date and her date last insured, the ALJ considered the statements by
plaintiffs husband and daughter-in-law regarding plaintiffs condition. SSR 83-20. The ALJ
afforded these lay statements little weight, however, as there was nothing in the medical record to
support their contention that plaintiff had bad days, felt bad, or needed assistance prior to her
date last insured. The medical record does reveal that in 2007 plaintiff began to complain of
fatigue, beginning one year earlier, with gradual onset, however. Tr. 416.
Nor was it error for the ALJ to fail to consult a medical advisor to determine plaintiffs
onset date. "[I]fthe evidence of onset is ambiguous, the ALJ must procure the assistance of a
medical advisor in order to render the informed judgment that [SSR 83-20] requires" in
determining the onset of a disabling impairment. Here, a medical advisor was not necessary as
plaintiff had not demonstrated that she had a condition or conditions that were determined to be
disabling. See Hall v. Astrue, 2:11cv24, 2012 WL 1313242 *4 (W.D.N.C. March 26, 2012)
(listing cases holding same).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ' s finding as to plaintiffs condition during the
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relevant time period, as does it support the ALJ's finding that plaintiff could perform sedentary
work. Even in the absence of a lengthy medical record detailing plaintiffs impairments, the ALJ
determined her subjective testimony to be credible enough to find that she could perform only
sedentary work - not medium work as had been found by the state agency physicians. Tr. 480;
487. Moreover, the ALJ did consider some medical evidence generated after plaintiffs date last
insured, Tr. 30-31, but clearly found that it was not "reflective of a possible earlier and
progressive degeneration." Moore v. Finch, 418 F.2d 1224, 1226 (4th Cir. 1969); see also Bird

v. Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337,341 (4th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs records related to
her knee pain reveal that following surgery her knee had greatly improved. Tr. 342. Though she
was diagnosed with fibryomyalgia in 2008, Tr. 403, as the ALJ noted, there was no medical
evidence in the record to support plaintiffs allegation that she had suffered from disabling
symptoms related to fibromyalgia or chronic fatigue since 2006.
As the ALJ employed the correct legal standard and substantial evidence supports his
findings, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE
20] is DENIED, defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 24] is GRANTED, and
the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED, this

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day of December, 2013.

TE
NCE W. BOYL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
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