Rhodes et al v. Ingram et al

Filing 123

ORDER denying 93 Motion with respect to trifurcation and denying without prejudice with respect to the use of special interrogatories. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert B. Jones, Jr. on 7/10/2016. (Grady, B.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT FO NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DNISION
No. 7:13-CV-192-RJ
DAVID RHODES,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

~

TIMOTHY CLEMMONS, TINA
EDWARDS and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER
TIMOTHY CLEMMONS,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,

v.
DAVID RHODES,
Counterclaim Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This cause comes before the court on Defendants' motion to trifurcate trial and to use special
interrogatories to resolve factual issues bearing on the applicability of qualified immunity. [DE-93].
Plaintiff has responded to the motion [DE-116], and the issues raised are ripe for decision. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is denied with respect to trifurcation and is denied
without prejudice with respect to the use of special interrogatories.
I. BACKGROUND

On August 25, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' and
Counterclaim Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

[DE-69].

The remaining claims

proceeding to trial before the undersigned 1 are Plaintiffs claim for excessive force and unreasonable
search in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Clemmons
and Edwards in their individual capacities, and Clemmons' counterclaim against Rhodes for
defamation. Defendants Clemmons and Edwards have asserted a defense of qualified immunity and
seek to trifurcate the trial in this matter and use special interrogatories to resolve factual disputes
bearing on their assertion of qualified immunity. Trial is currently set for July 18, 2016.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Trifurcate Trial
Defendants request that the court separate the issues of immunity, liability, and damages at
trial. [DE-93] at 2. Defendants argue that because the qualified immunity question must be resolved
at "the earliest possible stage oflitigation," it should be resolved first, before any other issues are
tried. See Cloaninger ex rel. Estate ofCloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court, for convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize, to separate issues to be presented at trial. "[T]he granting
of separate trials is within the sound discretion of the trial judge." Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49, 51
(4thCir.1953);see Thomasv. Babb,No. 5:10-CV-52-B0,2015 WL 1275393, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Mar.
19, 2015) (unpublished); Scarbro v. New Hanover Cnty., No. 7:03-CV -244-FL, 2011 WL 2550969,
at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2011) (unpublished). "Bifurcation is the exception; not the rule," L-3
Commc 'ns Corp. v. OS! Sys., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), and the burden is on
the party requesting separate trials to convince a court to allow them. F & G Scrolling Mouse, L. L. C.

1

After the issue of summary judgment was decided the parties consented to have a magistrate judge conduct all
further proceedings in this case. [DE-75].

2

v. IBM Corp., 190 F.R.D. 385, 387 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Scarbro, 2011 WL 2550969, at *1.
The court, in its discretion, is unpersuaded that trifurcation of the issues in this matter would
serve to expedite, economize, or avoid prejudice. It appears that if the issues are separated as urged
by Defendants, some evidence related to liability and/or damages would necessarily need to be
presented during other phases of the trial, resulting in overlapping evidence and potential confusion
of the jurors. While the question of whether Defendants are entitled to immunity under the facts
found by the jury is a question of law reserved for the court, Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553,
559 (4th Cir. 2005), such requirement in no way compels the need for bi- or trifurcation ofthe issues.

See Thomas, 2015 WL 1275393, at *1; Scarbro, 2011 WL 2550969, at *2. Indeed, proceeding in
the manner suggested by Defendants, with three trial phases, each consisting of separate issues and
findings by the jury and/or the court, would seem in this instance to create a scenario ripe for
confusion and resulting prejudice to either Defendants or Plaintiff, or both.
Defendants have simply not satisfied their burden to show that separation of the issues will
promote greater convenience and economy in this matter and will not result in undue prejudice to
any party. The court therefore in its discretion denies Defendants' request.

B. Use of Special Interrogatories
Defendants seek to use special interrogatories to resolve factual issues bearing on
Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity. Plaintiff objects to the use of special interrogatories
on the grounds that they are not required, their use would unnecessarily complicate and confuse the
jury, and the jury's decision on liability would necessarily subsume their responses to the
interrogatories. In any event, Plaintiff argues the interrogatories as proposed by Defendants misstate
the law and are premature. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks to reserve his ability to propose his own

3

special interrogatories should the court allow them to be submitted to the jury.
The court agrees that the motion to use special interrogatories is premature, as there may be
additional factual disputes that arise or anticipated factual disputes that do not arise at trial. See
Thomas, 2015 WL 1275393, at *2. Accordingly, the court denies Defendants' motion without
prejudice, and it will consider a request to use special interrogatories again at the appropriate time
during the trial.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion [DE-93] is DENIED with respect to
trifurcation and is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to the use of special
interrogatories.
So ordered, the lOth day of July 2016.

Robert B. Jo es, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

4