Fuhr v. Colvin

Filing 35

ORDER DENYING 26 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and GRANTING 28 Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 1/26/2015. (Fisher, M.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:14-CV-52-BO
JOHN FUHR,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings. [DE 26, 28]. A hearing was held in Elizabeth City, North Carolina on January 13,
2015. For the reasons detailed below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) for review of the
Commissioner's decision denying his claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. Mr. Fuhr filed his claim on June
10,2009, alleging an onset date of March 30,2009. [Tr. 122-25, 615]. His claim was denied
initially and upon reconsideration. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), at which plaintiff appeared, and the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision on May 6,
2011. (Tr. 624]. The Appeals Council denied Mr. Fuhr's request for review, and plaintiffthen
filed a civil action which resulted in a remand to the Commissioner for further fact-finding. [Tr.
597-603]. The Appeals Council subsequently remanded Mr. Fuhr's case back to an ALJ, who
held a new hearing on May 17, 2013. On June 7, 2013, the ALJ rendered another unfavorable
decision. [Tr. 64]. The Appeals Council denied review and the ALJ's decision became the final
decision of the Commissioner. Mr. Fuhr then sought review in this Court.

DISCUSSION
When a social security claimant appeals a final decision of the Commissioner, the Court's
review is limited to the determination of whether, based on the entire administrative record, there
is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971). Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence which a
reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Shively v. Heckler,
739 F.2d 987,989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966)). Ifthe Commissioner's decision is supported by such evidence, it must be affirmed. Smith

v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635,638 (4th Cir. 1996).
In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ uses a multi-step process. First, a
claimant must not be able to work in a substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Second, a claimant must have a severe impairment that significantly limits his or her physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. !d. To be found disabled, without considering a
claimant's age, education, and work experience, a claimant's impairment must be of sufficient
duration and must either meet or equal an impairment listed by the regulations. !d. In the
alternative, a claimant may be disabled if his or her impairment prevents the claimant from doing
past relevant work or if the impairment prevents the claimant from doing other work. !d. The
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
After finding that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date, the ALJ determined that Mr. Fuhr's
degenerative disc disease, shoulder impingement, and obesity qualified as severe impairments at
step two. [Tr. 552]. The ALJ then found that Mr. Fuhr did not have an impairment or

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combination of impairments that met or equaled a listing and had a residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform a reduced range of sedentary work. [Tr. 555-56]. Specifically, the ALJ found
that Mr. Fuhr could not climb, crawl, or be exposed to industrial hazards, could only reach
overhead with his right arm occasionally, and had to be permitted to sit or stand at will. [Tr.
556]. The ALJ then determined that plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a
mechanic, auto parts worker, or delivery driver, but that jobs existed in the national economy in
significant numbers that plaintiff would be able to perform. [Tr. 562-63]. According, the ALJ
found that Mr. Fuhr was not disabled as of the date of the opinion. [Tr. 564 ].
A reviewing court should uphold an ALJ's decision "even if we disagree with it,
provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence." Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635,
63 8 (4th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff was capable
of full-time work. The ALJ's finding that Mr. Fuhr was capable of full-time work as long as he
was provided the opportunity to sit or stand at will is supported by substantial evidence. [Tr.
559]. In concluding that plaintiff could work full-time, the ALJ relied on the treating source
opinions. The ALJ gave Dr. Miller's opinion "significant weight" and limited Mr. Fuhr to
sedentary work as recommended by Mr. Gonzalez. [Tr. 560, 497]. The only part of the treating
source opinions that the ALJ disagreed with was that plaintiff continue with part-time work. It is
important to note that none of the treating sources stated that that Mr. Fuhr was incapable of fulltime work-their view that he was capable of doing part-time work is not necessarily consistent
with the maximum exertionary level at which he was capable of working. Moreover, the
statements by treating sources Dr. Miller and Mr. Gonzalez date from 2009, four years before the
ALJ' s decision. Later records demonstrate that Mr. Fuhr' s pain was under control, and he
reported doing well, working, hard, and doing heavy lifting after their reports. [Tr. 799]. For

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example, in December 2012, Dr. Gootman said that Mr. Fuhr's pain was controlled and he was
doing well on medication. [Tr. 776]. Lastly, the ability to work is an issue reserved to the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 414.1527(d)(3); see also Morgan v. Barnhart, 142 Fed. App'x 716,
722 (4th Cir. 2005) ("the ALJ is under no obligation to give a treating physician's legal
conclusions any heightened evidentiary value") (emphasis in original). In sum, the ALJ had a
sound basis for not agreeing with the view that Mr. Fuhr should be limited to part-time work and
his decision not to include a part-time limitation is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiffs argument about his ability to perform other jobs in the economy likewise
focuses on whether he can work full-time. As discussed supra, the lack of a limitation to parttime work is supported by substantial evidence, therefore Mr. Fuhr's argument about his ability
to perform other jobs in the economy fails.
Mr. Fuhr also argues that the ALJ should have considered his personality disorder, PTSD,
and depressive disorder severe impairments. Plaintifftestified that he does not use medication for
depression or PTSD. [Tr. 553-54] He also stated that he was able to do heavy lifting at work
despite these conditions. [Tr. 799]. Moreover, his psychiatrist stated that the depressive disorder
was in a chemotherapeutic remission. [Tr. 411]. The ALJ spent a significant amount oftime
assessing Mr. Fuhr's mental impairments in terms of the four functional areas set out in the
disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders and concluded that Mr. Fuhr's mental
impairments cause no more than mild limitations within the functional areas laid out in section
12.00C of the Listing oflmpairments, 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Supbt. P, App'x 1. Mr. Fuhr is able to
perform most daily living activities independently, alleged no difficulty getting along with coworkers or the public, demonstrated the ability to retain and follow instructions, and has not had

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any episodes of decompensation. [Tr. 554-55]. The ALJ's determination that these impairments
caused no more than mild limitations is supported by substantial evidence.
Mr. Fuhr's arguments that his military service and history of treatment for pain should
have been considered by the ALJ in making a credibility finding likewise fail. The record
demonstrates that the ALJ was aware of plaintiffs history of pain treatment, his military service,
his VA treatment, and his VA rating. [Tr. 553, 562]. The ALJ, at minimum, partially credited
Mr. Fuhr's testimony by modifying the RFC to allow him to sit or stand at will [TR. 559].
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in assessing plaintiffs credibility.
The ALJ carefully considered all of the evidence in the record in making the
determination that Mr. Fuhr is not disabled. Substantial evidence clearly supports the ALJ's
findings, and as such, it is proper to affirm the ALJ's determination that plaintiff is not disabled
and is not entitled to benefits.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 26]
is DENIED, and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 28] is GRANTED. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED, this

d"

day of January, 2015.

RRENCE W. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDO

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