Simpson v. Colvin

Filing 24

ORDER granting 17 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and denying 19 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 4/29/2016. (Romine, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:15-CV-64-BO
DAVID GLENN SIMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner ofSocial Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. A
hearing was held on these matters before the undersigned on April 6, 2015, at Raleigh, North
Carolina. For the reasons discussed below, this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the
final decision of the Commissioner denying his claim for disability and disability insurance
benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. Plaintiff protectively filed his applications on December 29, 2011, alleging
disability beginning December 8, 2008.

After initial denials, a hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who issued an unfavorable ruling. The decision of the ALJ
became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs
request for review on February 3, 2015.
Commissioner's decision in this Court.

Plaintiff then timely sought review of the

DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), and 1383(c)(3), this Court's review
of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner employed the correct legal
standard.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

Substantial evidence is "such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
An individual is considered disabled if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than [twelve] months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further provides that an
individual "shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other line of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations issued by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential evaluation
process to be followed in a disability case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If a decision
regarding disability can be made at any step of the process, however, the inquiry ceases. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

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At step one, if the Social Security Administration determines that the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claim is denied. If not, then step two asks
whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If the claimant
has a severe impairment, it is compared at step three to those in the Listing of Impairments
("Listing") in 20 C.P.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

If the claimant's impairment meets or

medically equals a Listing, disability is conclusively presumed.

If not, at step four, the

claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) is assessed to determine if the claimant can
perform his past relevant work. If so, the claim is denied. If the claimant cannot perform past
relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant,
based on his age, education, work experience, and RFC, can perform other substantial gainful
work. If the claimant cannot perform other work, then he is found to be disabled. See 20 C.P.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4).
At step one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset date. Plaintiffs
epilepsy, mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, arthritis of both shoulders, and
diabetes were considered severe impairments at step two but were not found alone or in
combination to meet or equal a listing at step three. The ALJ concluded that plaintiff had the
RFC to perform medium work with additional exertionallimitations. The ALJ then found that
plaintiff was unable to return to his past relevant work, but that, considering plaintiffs age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. Thus, the ALJ determined that plaintiff
was not disabled from December 17, 2008, through the date of his decision.

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An ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence when assessing a claimant's RFC.
SSR 96-8p. The opinion of a treating physician must be given controlling weight if it is not
inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record and may be disregarded only if there is
persuasive contradictory evidence. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987);
Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1983). An ALJ must provide specific reasons for

the weight given to a treating physician's opinion. SSR 96-2p.
Here, the ALJ gave the opinion of Dr. White, plaintiffs treating physician, little weight.
Tr. 15. The ALJ explained that he found Dr. White's opinion that plaintiff could not perform
even sedentary work not to be supported by the evidence in the record. The ALJ further found
Dr. White's opinion to be inconsistent with the opinion of Dr. Ellis, a consultative examiner,
who found that plaintiff had no limitations in standing, walking, sitting, lifting, or carrying. Id;
Tr. 345.
In addition to opining that plaintiff could not perform even sedentary work, Dr. White
opined that plaintiff could never twist, stoop, or squat. Tr. 376. Dr. Gebrail, a consultative
examiner, also opined that plaintiff would have difficulty with heavy lifting, bending, twisting,
and pushing. Tr. 363. Both Dr. White and Dr. Gebrail's opinions were rendered after plaintiff
was involved in a car accident in 2011 in which he claims to have hurt his back, while Dr. Ellis'
opinion was rendered in 2010 prior to the accident. The ALJ' s reliance on Dr. Ellis' opinion in
light of the intervening accident is not supported by substantial evidence.
Further, the ALJ's RFC assessment fails to discuss plaintiffs bilateral shoulder arthritis,
which he found to be a severe impairment. Dr. White opined that plaintiff could reach overhead
for less than 10% of a workday, Tr. 376, and plaintiff testified that in the past his shoulder pain

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was so severe to have caused him to have trouble dressing.

Tr. 40.

Because limitations

associated with plaintiffs shoulder impairments could erode his ability to perform work, failure
to address such impairments in plaintiffs RFC determination was error.

See 20 C.F .R. §

404.1529( d)( 4 ); SSR 96-8p; Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F .3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 20 15) (declining to
adopt a per se function-by-function analysis rule but finding remand appropriate "where an ALJ
fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions"). Additionally, because the
ALJ failed to even mention plaintiffs shoulder arthritis, the Court cannot "create post-hoc
rationalizations to explain the Commissioner's treatment of evidence when that treatment is not
apparent from the Commissioner's decision itself." Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263
(lOth Cir. 2005).

Remand of this matter is therefore appropriate for the ALJ to consider

plaintiffs RFC in light of the foregoing findings.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 17] is GRANTED and
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 19] is DENIED. The decision of the ALJ
is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.

SO ORDERED, this

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day of April, 2016.

T RRENCE W. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT

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