Colvard v. Colvin

Filing 19

ORDER denying 11 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granting 13 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 6/14/2016. (Romine, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:15-CV-203-BO
JENNY CHRISTEN COLVARD,

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Plaintiff,

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V.

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ORDER

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CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.

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This matter is before the Court on parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings.
[DE 11, 13]. A hearing was held in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, on May 19,2016. For the
reasons detailed below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2010, plaintiff filed for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits, alleging an onset date of May 30, 2008, which was later amended to May 20, 2009. [Tr.
21]. On September 13, 2011, plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income. !d.
Plaintiffs claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. A video hearing was held
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on April 8, 2014. !d. The ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on April25, 2014. [Tr. 21-32]. The Appeals Council denied a request for review, and
the ALJ's decision became the final decision ofthe Commissioner, on July 16, 2015. [Tr. 1].
Plaintiff then sought review in this Court.
Plaintiff was 35 years old at her alleged onset date and has completed high school.
Plaintiff has a history of traumatic brain injury and depression. [Tr. 16].

DISCUSSION
When a social security claimant appeals a final decision of the Commissioner, the Court's
review is limited to the determination of whether, based on the entire administrative record, there
is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is defined as "evidence which a

reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Shively v. Heckler,
739 F.2d 987,989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1966)). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by such evidence, it must be affirmed. Smith
v. Chafer, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996).

To find a claimant disabled, an ALJ must conclude that the claimant satisfies each of five
steps. 20 C.P.R.§ 404.1520(a)(4). First, a claimant must not be able to work in a substantial
gainful activity. !d. Second, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment or
combination of impairments. !d. Third, a claimant's impairment( s) must be of sufficient duration
and must either meet or equal an impairment listed by the regulations. !d. Fourth, a claimant
must not have the residual functional capacity to meet the demands of claimant's past relevant
work. !d. Finally, the claimant must not be able to do any other work, given the claimant's
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. !d. The claimant bears the
burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful employment
since May 20, 2009. [Tr. 23]. Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiffs traumatic brain injury and
depression were severe impairments. !d. However, none ofplaintiffs impairments or
combination of impairments met or equaled a listing. [Tr. 24]. At step four, the ALJ found that

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plaintiff was capable of performing medium work with limitations for simple routine tasks and
no fast pace production requirements in a low stress job requiring only simple work related
decisions, few changes in the work setting, and only occasional interaction with large groups.
[Tr. 25]. Finally, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that claimant can perform. [Tr. 31]. A vocational expert testified that these
jobs would include employment as a furniture decal inspector, hand packer, and laundry checker.
[Tr. 31]. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled since May 20, 2009. !d.
Plaintiff now seeks review of the ALJ' s determination that she is not disabled.
On appeal, plaintiff argues ( 1) that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence; (2)
that the credibility decision is not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) that the Step 5
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. At hearing, plaintiffs counsel clarified
that if plaintiffs RFC argument failed then the remaining two arguments necessarily failed as
well. Accordingly, the Court will begin its review with the RFC determination.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff had an RFC of medium with
limitations. Residual functional capacity is the most a claimant can do despite his/her limitations.
20 CFR § 404.1545. It is determined by considering all relevant medical evidence and other
evidence and considers the claimant's ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other
requirements of work. !d. Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds, and if someone can do medium
work, he/she can also perform light and sedentary work. 20 CFR 404.1567. The Court finds that
there is substantial evidence to support the RFC in this case.
As a foundational matter, the Court notes that the ALJ did account for plaintiffs nonexertionallimitations in the RFC, finding that plaintiff was limited to simple routine tasks, no

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fast pace production requirements, a low stress job requiring only simple work-related decisions
and few changes in the work setting, and only occasional interaction with large groups. [Tr. 25].
The Court also notes that, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ did not just rely on
recent treatment notes. Indeed, the first doctor cited by the ALJ saw plaintiff on her amended
alleged onset date. [Tr. 25]. To the extent that plaintiff objects to the ALJ not giving as great
weight to the period of time in which plaintiff was not doing as well as she was at the beginning
and end of the period at issue, the ALJ addressed this exact issue and explained the decision to
do so by noting that "the record documents that the claimant's condition improved significantly
with medical management and therapy." [Tr. 29].
The Court also finds that the medical evidence supports the RFC. The ALJ rightly
afforded little weight to the medical records and opinions given, including those by Drs. Donna
Fleitas, when plaintiff was not effectively managing her condition with medicine and therapy, as
discussed supra. Even during this time, however, there were indicators which support the ALJ's
findings. For example, plaintiff reported to Dr. Fleitas in 2009 that, on a scale from 1-10 to
measure recovery from her brain injury, plaintiff stated that though she had some issues, she
considered herself a 10. Dr. Fleitas also noted that plaintiffhad an IQ of 101 and had completed
a four year degree since her injury. [Tr. 350]. The Court also notes that although Dr. Fleitas
found plaintiff incapable of full time work, she also recommended a re-evaluation of plaintiff's
medication regime which, further medical evidence indicates, was an effective means of
improving plaintiff's condition. There is no indication Dr. Fleitas has seen plaintiff since the
2009 evaluation. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the ALJ even heeded some of Dr.
Fleitas's opinions, such as addressing her concerns for plaintiff's group interactions by limiting
plaintiff to only occasional interactions with large groups in the RFC.

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The ALJ also rightly gave little weight to Dr. Angela Arnold, as it is apparently Dr.
Arnold's policy not to provide treatment notes, which makes it impossible to determine if her
conclusions were adequately supported by her own evidence.
The ALJ gave greater weight to plaintiffs treating psychiatrist, the consultative
examiner, and the State Agency medical consultants, as their opinions were supported by the
medical evidence and record as a whole. For example, the ALJ gave considerable weight to the
findings of Dr. Mur Aklini, whose opinion was consistent with his treatment notes and the
medical evidence. The Court notes that Dr. Aklini is the only provider who treated plaintiff over
an extended period of time and provided treatment notes. Dr. Alklini found that plaintiff had a
GAF score of70 in January 2012. [Tr. 449]. Two months later, plaintiff reported that she was
very happy with her medication regimen. [Tr. 442]. Later that year, plaintifftold Dr. Aklini she
would like to find a job. [Tr. 483]. On a mental health questionnaire administered in September
2012, plaintiff reported that any mental health problems she reported did not make it "difficult at
all" to do work, take care of things at home, or get along with other people. [Tr. 452]. At various
times plaintiff also reported to Dr. Aklini that she was going to the gym, going to yoga classes
(where she made friends), that she was volunteering at a pottery place, and that she was attending
church. [Tr. 474, 479]. As treatment progressed, plaintiff told Dr. Aklini she was not crying and
had been sleeping through the night. [Tr. 474]. The court notes that, to the extent plaintiff
reported negative psychological symptoms to Dr. Alkini they were often related to a troubled
romantic relationship, which has since ended. [Tr. 433, 437, 474]. As a result of treating plaintiff
over an extended period of time, Dr. Aklini found that plaintiff would be limited to unskilled
work in a low stress environment with limited interaction with the public. This was accounted for
in plaintiffs RFC.

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The ALJ also considered statements from plaintiffs mother, who addressed plaintiffs
shortcomings but ultimately concluded that plaintiff was capable of a simple, routine, repetitive
job that did not require being around people. [Tr. 300]. The ALJ afforded this opinion significant
weight and duly accommodated these concerns in the RFC as well.
For all the reasons discussed above, including plaintiffs activities of daily living, the
medical record, and opinion testimony, the Court finds that the RFC in this case is supported by
substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner is therefore affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 11]
is DENIED, and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 13] is GRANTED. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED, this__l__!f_ day of June, 2016.

ih~l..l.
:~.BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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