Andrews v. Colvin

Filing 26

ORDER granting 18 Motion for Judgment; denying 20 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 2/13/2017. (Stouch, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:15-CV-226-BO
TIMOTHY SHANE ANDREWS,
Plaintiff,
V.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner ofSocial Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. A
hearing was held on these matters before the undersigned on January 12, 2017, at Elizabeth City,
North Carolina. For the reasons discussed below, this matter is remanded to the Commissioner
for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the
final decision of the Commissioner denying his claim for disability and disability insurance
benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB on
March 7, 2012, alleging disability since February 20, 2010. After initial denials, a hearing via
videoconference was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who issued an unfavorable
ruling.

The decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner when the

Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review. Plaintiff then timely sought review of the
Commissioner's decision in this Court.

DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 1383(c)(3), this Court's review of
the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner employed the correct legal
standard. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

Substantial evidence is "such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
An individual is considered disabled if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than [twelve] months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further provides that an
individual "shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other line of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations issued by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential evaluation
process to be followed in a disability case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The
claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If a decision
regarding disability can be made at any step of the process the inquiry ceases. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404. l 520(a)(4), 4 l 6.920(a)(4).

At step one, if the Social Security Administration determines that the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claim is denied. If not, then step two asks
whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If the claimant
has a severe impairment, it is compared at step three to those in the Listing of Impairments
("Listing") in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant's impairment meets or
medically equals a Listing, disability is conclusively presumed.

If not, at step four, the

claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) is assessed to determine if the claimant can
perform his past relevant work. If so, the claim is denied. If the claimant cannot perform past
relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant,
based on his age, education, work experience, and RFC, can perform other substantial gainful
work. If the claimant cannot perform other work, then he is found to be disabled. See 20 C.F .R.
§ 416.920(a)(4).

At step one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff met the insured status requirements and
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date.

Plaintiffs

degenerative disc disease and depression were considered severe impairments at step two but
were not found alone or in combination to meet or equal a Listing at step three. The ALJ then
concluded that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with
only frequent but not constant handling and fingering with the right hand and a limitation to
work requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out no more than simple instructions.
The ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a pipe installer and
general manager, but found that, considering plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and
RFC, there were jobs which existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff

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could perform. Thus, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled as of the date of his
decision, May 22, 2014.
An ALJ makes an RFC assessment based on all of the relevant medical and other

evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). An RFC should reflect the most that a claimant can do,
despite the claimant's limitations. Id. An RFC finding should also reflect the claimant's ability
to perform sustained work-related activities in a work setting on regular and continuing basis,
meaning eight-hours per day, five days per week. SSR 96-8p; Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559,
562 (4th Cir. 2006). Finally, an RFC "assessment must include a narrative discussion describing
how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory
findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations)." SSR 96-8p.
Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ' s finding that plaintiff could perform light
work with minimal limitations. In March 2011, Dr. Grubb noted that plaintiff had limited range
of motion in his neck and only about 60% strength in his right hand as compared to his left. Tr.
322. Plaintiff is right-handed. Id. In July 2014, Dr. Grubb noted that plaintiff had right arm
pain where he had extensive surgery and could not have an MRI performed in that area due to
multiple plates. Tr. 417. Dr. Eskander, a consultative examining physician with the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, noted in May 2012 that plaintiff reported
that his right arm is very weak after two broken bones and that an EMG over twenty years ago
revealed nerve damage. Tr. 349.
The ALJ gave Dr. Grubb's statements that plaintiff is disabled little weight, Tr. 22, but
the ALJ failed to either consider fully or explain his rejection of the remainder of Dr. Grubb's
opinions and findings regarding plaintiff's ability to perform work, specifically his limitations

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related to his right hand. While the ALJ' s RFC limited plaintiff to frequent but not constant
handling and fingering, the ALJ failed to explain why Dr. Grubb's additional limitations on
twisting/turning, gripping, and repetitive movements were not included in his RFC. Tr. 383.
Further, although the ALJ relied on plaintiff's self-reported rug shampooing and engagement in
extra work around the house as evidence that Dr. Grubb's opinions were not supported by the
record, Tr. 22, the Court notes that while engagement in regular activities can indeed serve as
evidence of what a claimant is capable of doing, the question to be decided in every application
for disability insurance benefits case is what work can the claimant perform for eight hours a
day, five days a week. Dr. Grubb, plaintiff's treating physician, consistently documents that
plaintiff experiences low back, neck, and arm pain, and the ALJ' s dismissal of his opinions
whole cloth was error in this case. See SSR 96-2p (even if a treating physician's opinion is not
entitled to controlling weight, it still may be entitled to great weight).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 18] is
GRANTED and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 20] is DENIED. The
decision of the ALJ is REMANDED to the Commissioner to consider again whether an RFC of
light work with mild limitations is supported in this case.

SO ORDERED, this

/..J

day of February, 2017.

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11,._JJ
; RRENCE W. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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