Sanchez-Rodriquez, et al. v. Jacksons Farming Company of Autryville, et al.

Filing 42

ORDER granting 37 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 1/27/2017. (Briggeman, N.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DMSION
No. 7:16-CV-28-D
CONSTANTINO SANCHEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
JOSE ALBERTO AGUILERA-HERNANDEZ,
ULISES EDGARDO CRUZ-GONZALEZ,
ES:MITH GONZALEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
VALENTIN ALVARADO-HERNANDEZ,
DANIEL RODRIGUEZ-GARCIA, and
ESDRAS SAIIT MENDIOLA-BORDES, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated persons,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

)

JACKSON'S FARMING COMPANY OF
AUTRYVILLE a/k/a JACKSON'S FARMING
COMPANY OF AUTRYVILLE,
WILLIAM BRENT JACKSON, and
WILLIAM RODNEY JACKSON,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

On January 18,2017, the parties filed a joint motion for class certification [D.E. 37]. As
explained below, the motion is granted.

I.
This lawsuit concerns collective and class action claims pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act("FLSA"),29U.S.C. §§ 20l,etseq., the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act(''NCWHA"),N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.1, et seq., and the North Carolina common law of contracts. Plaintiffs are
migrant agricultural workers who worked for defendants, a farm and its individual officers or
owners, pursuant to the H-2A guest worker program, in and around Sampson County, North
Carolina. The FLSA collective claim, along with the first NCWHA class claim, seeks payment of

back wages and liquidated damages based upon defendants' alleged failure to timely pay the class
members the named plaintiffs seek to represent weekly wages that were at least the minimum wage
rate required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). The second NCWHA class claim seeks back wages and
liquidated damages based upon the alleged failure of defendants to pay all wages when due at the
wage rate that was disclosed to all named plaintiffs, except Aguilera-Hernandez, and the class
members they seek to represent for all hours worked for those workweeks in which they performed
piece work for defendants. The third NCWHA class claim seeks back wages and liquidated damages
based upon the alleged failure to pay the named plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent for
travel time "all in a day's work." Finally, the "Contract Class" claim seeks back wages for the
alleged failure to pay the named plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent all wages due at the
adverse effect wage rate ("AEWR") or contract rate to which plaintiffs were entitled as a condition
of their employment. Defendants deny liability for all claims.
The parties have negotiated a settlement agreement in this action that includes class-wide
relief. For settlement purposes only, defendants consent to and join in the joint motion for class
certification pursuant to the settlement agreement reached between the parties, which is the result
of a compromise to resolve the disputes between them and does not constitute an admission of any
liability by any party.
The parties' settlement calls for the certification of a class, pursuant to Rule 23 ofthe Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The class is defined as follows:
All migrant or seasonal agricultural workers who performed temporary or seasonal
work in agriculture under the H-2A guest worker program for Jackson Farming
Company of Autryville, William Brent Jackson, or William Rodney Jackson at any
time during calendar years 2015 and through September 28, 2016.
Accordingly, pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties now seek to certify a class under the

2

NCWHA for underpaid wages and liquidated damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.22(a) and
95-25.22(a1) and Ru1e 23(b)(3).
II.

When a settlement is reached before Ru1e 23 certification, the law permits a class to be
certified solely for settlement purposes. Covarrubias v. Capt. Charlie's Seafood. Inc .. No. 2:1 0-CV10-F, 2011 WL 2690531, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Ju1y 6, 2011) (unpublished). The parties seeking class
certification still must meet the four prerequisites ofRu1e 23(a)(l )-(4) and then must establish that
they constitute a proper class ofat least one ofthe types described in Ru1e 23(b)(1 )-(3). Nonetheless,
courts need not inquire whether the class will be manageable at trial because settlement makes a trial
unnecessary. See Amchem Prods.. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
The court must make two initial findings before determining whether to certify a class action:
that a precisely defined class exists, and that the class representative is a member of the proposed
class. Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 576 (E.D.N.C. 1986); see E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys ..
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,403 (1977).
Here, the proposed class is defined as all migrant or seasonal agricu1tural workers who
performed temporary or seasonal work in agricu1ture under the H-2A guest worker program for
Jackson's Farming Company of Autryville, William Brent Jackson, or William Rodney Jackson at
any time during calendar years 2015 and through September 28, 2016, and is, therefore, sufficiently
precise. Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 576. Plaintiffs worked for defendants as temporary or seasonal
agricu1tural workers during the relevant time period. Therefore, they are members of the class they
seek to represent.
A trial court may certify a class under Ru1e 23 if it is satisfied that the prerequisites of Ru1e
23(a) have been satisfied. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
3

However, the trial court does not examine the merits of the underlying claims when it decides a
motion for class certification. See Eisen v. Carlisle & JacqueliD, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
Courts should "give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction, adopting a
standard of flexibility in application which will in the particular case best serve the ends of justice
for the affected parties and ... promote judicial efficiency." Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs.. Inc., 348
F .3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted) (omission in original); In re A.H. Robins. 880
F.2d 709,740 (4th Cir. 1989); see Kidwell v. Transportation Commc'ns Int'l Unio:!!, 946 F.2d283,
305 (4th Cir. 1991); Rodger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 160 F.R.D. 532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) mandates that the class be "so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable." There is no set number of members necessary for class
certification and the decision to certify or not certify a class must be based upon the particular facts
of each case. See Rodger, 160 F.R.D. at 535-37; Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 576-77.
The proposed class includes approximately 135 individuals who worked for defendants
during the relevant time period. Although there are a sufficient number of putative class members
to establish numerosity, the putative class members are geographically dispersed, lack sophistication,
and are non-English speaking migrant workers. These additional factors make joinder impracticable.
See. ~Gaxiolav. WilliamsSeafoodofArapahoe.Inc.. 776F. Supp.2d 117, 130(E.D.N.C.2011).
Thus, because the number of class members is sufficient and the circumstances do not make joinder
a practical alternative, the class meets the Rule 23(a)(1) standard for numerosity.
Under the "commonality" requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), at least one common question of
law or fact must exist among class members. See Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 577-78. It is not
necessary, however, that all of the questions oflaw or fact in a case be common to all putative class
members, but only that "a single common question ... exist[s]." Rodger, 160 F.R.D. at 537.

4

"Indeed, a single common question is sufficient to satisfy the rule." Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 577.
Here, the named plaintiffs and the other putative class members share common questions of
law or fact, including: (a) whether defendants failed to timely pay the class members weekly wages
that were at least the minimum wage rate required by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); (b) whether defendants
failed to pay all wages when due at the wage rate that was disclosed to all named plaintiffs, except
Aguilera-Hernandez, and the class members they seek to represent for all hours worked for those
workweeks in which they performed piece work for defendants; (c) whether defendants failed to pay
for travel time "all in a day's work"; and (d) whether defendants failed to pay all wages due at the
AEWR or contract rate to which plaintiffs were entitled as a condition of their employment.
Therefore, the commonality requirement is satisfied.
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class. Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 578. "The claim of a party is typical

if it arises from the same event or course of conduct which gives rise to the claims of other class
members and is based on the same legal theory."

Id.

"[T]he commonality and typicality

requirements tend to merge" in that "[b]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether under
particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named
plaintiff's claim[s] and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests ofthe class members will
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence." Falco!}, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13. The typicality
requirement does not require that all of the putative class members share identical claims. Rodger,
160 F.R.D. at 538. The prerequisites are only that plaintiffs' claims be common, and that class
representatives "not have an interest that is antagonistic to that of the class members." Id.
The facts alleged in the second amended complaint meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)(3)
with respect to the proposed class. [D.E. 33] 5-24 (,, 10-59). The named plaintiffs' claims and the

5

claims of the putative class members arise from the same alleged practices and course of conduct
by defendants. Id. 5-6(~~ 10--13), 9-24 (~~ 23-59). The named plaintiffs and the putative class
members were all employees of defendants and were all paid on a substantially similar basis when
they performed similar work. ld. 5-8 (~~ 10--20). Likewise, the claims of the named plaintiffs and
putative class members are based on the same legal theories. Id. 53-58 (mf 147-165). Therefore,
the claims ofthe proposed class representatives are ''typical" ofthe claims ofthe class members they
seek to represent and present common questions of law and fact. Id. 12-13 (mf 31-32), 18-19
(~~ 47-48),

21-22 (~~55-56), 39-40 (~~105-106).

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that ''the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests ofthe class." This is a two-part inquiry to determine: (1) whether the class representatives'
claims are sufficiently interrelated to and not antagonistic with the class claims, and (2) that legal
counsel is qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation. Rodger, 160 F .R.D.
at 539; Haywood, 109 F.R.D. at 578. These requirements are met.
The named plaintiffs share a common interest with class members in the litigation and
possess a personal financial stake in the outcome of this litigation. In addition, according to the
declaration of class counsel submitted with the joint memorandum filed in support of class
certification, they have consulted regularly with class counsel and personally participated in a lengthy
mediation to resolve these claims. Robert Willis, counsel for the named plaintiffs, is an experienced
counsel who regularly has been counsel in class action litigation, including class litigation involving
claims that are materially similar to those asserted in this case.
Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common issues of law or fact
predominate over individual issues and that the class action be the superior method of dealing with
the dispute. The factors used to make this determination are: "(A) the class members' interests in

6

individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation ofthe claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see Haywood, 109
F.R.D. at 580-84, 592-93.
The proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). See Rossini v. Ogilyy &
Mather. Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 598 (2d Cir. 1986). Based on the allegations in the second amended
complaint, certification ofthe class is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3). See [D.E. 33] 13-14 (, 35),
16-17 (, 43), 19-20 (,51), and 23-24 (,59). The legal and factual issues described in the second
amended complaint predominate over any individual issues oflaw and fact for any named plaintiff
or class member. Id.
Class treatment of the legal issues identified in this case would also be superior to other
procedures for handling the claims in question for numerous reasons. No member of the proposed
class has any necessary interest in individually controlling the prosecution of the claims at issue in
this litigation. "Additionally, because of the relatively small amount ofthe wage claims in this case,
no individual class member could have any reasonable financial capability to pursue this litigation
on an individual basis."

Gaxiol~

776 F. Supp. 2d at 131.

The court thoroughly discussed the applicable legal standard for evaluating the "similarly
situated" requirement under 29 U.S.C. §216(b) inJimenez-Orozco v. Baker Roofing Co., No. 5:05CV-34-FL, 2007 WL 4568972, at *6-7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2007) (unpublished). When those
standards are applied to this case, the named plaintiffs have met them. As noted, the named
plaintiffs' claims and the claims ofthe putative class members arise from the same alleged practices
and course of conduct by defendants during the relevant time period. The named plaintiffs and the

7

putative class members were all employees of defendants and were all paid on a substantially similar
basis when they performed similar work.

m.
In sum, the parties' joint motion for class certification [D.E. 37] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED. This 2.1 day of January 2017.

Chief United States District Judge

8