Francis v. Fanning
Filing
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ORDER denying 22 Motion to Strike; granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by US District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 5/16/2018. (Stouch, L.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:16-CV-335-BO
GINA Y. FRANCIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARKT. ESPER,
Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Army,
Defendant.
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ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment and
motion to strike. The appropriate responses and replies have been filed, or the time for doing so
has expired, and the motions are ripe for ruling. A hearing on the matters was held before the
undersigned on April 18, 2018, at Raleigh, North Carolina.
For the reasons that follow,
defendant's motion to strike is denied and defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Gina Francis, initiated this action by filing a complaint in this Court on September
28, 2016, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; 29 U.S.C. §
621, et seq. Plaintiff, an African American female born in 1958, worked as the sole civilian
Veterinary Medical Officer at the Veterinary Treatment Facility at Camp Lejeune in Onslow
County, North Carolina from August 1, 2005, to June 9, 2011. For the rating periods of September
1, 2008, to August 31, 2009, and September 1, 2009, to August 31, 2010, plaintiff received
excellent or outstanding performance ratings. [DE 21-1]. On January 11, 2010, plaintiff was
counseled by Captain Angelina Gerardo (Gerardo), regarding record-keeping deficiencies. [DE
19-2 at 33]. 1 Plaintiff was counseled on May 12, 2010, by Captain Lavallee for inadvertent
breakage of a vial of narcotics. Id at 35.
Beginning in the summer of 2010, Captain Alberto Bonfiglio (Bonfiglio), a white male,
became plaintiffs first-line supervisor and Gerardo became Bonfiglio's supervisor. See id at 144;
162. On January 12, 2011, plaintiff was counseled by Bonfiglio regarding medical record-keeping,
and was counseled again on January 24, 2011, regarding her failure to implement procedures
discussed at her January 12th counseling. [DE 19-2 at 42-45].
Plaintiffs father was hospitalized from December 11 through December 16, 2010, after
which he was transferred to a nursing home. [DE 19-3 at 182]. On January 29, 2011, plaintiffs
father passed away. Id. On April 26, 2011, Gerardo provided to plaintiff a proposed letter of
separation signed by Bonfiglio. [DE 19-2 at 49-50]. Plaintiff responded in opposition to the
proposed separation. Id at 51-56. Plaintiff was separated from her employment with the Army
on June 9, 2011. Id at 64-65]. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges claims for race, sex, and age
discrimination as well hostile work environment.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court denies defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs response to the
motion for summary judgment for having been filed out of time. Striking is a drastic remedy that
is generally disfavored and not presently appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); Waste Mgmt.
Holdings v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001).
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no genuine issues of
material fact for trial and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
1 Citations
to defendant's appendix of exhibits [DE 19] refer to the appendix page numbers.
2
56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If that burden has been met,
the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute
to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, a trial court
views the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in
support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). "A dispute is genuine if a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.... and [a] fact is material if it
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Libertarian Party of Virginia v.
Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Speculative
or conclusory allegations will not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645,
649 (4th Cir. 2002).
Under Title VII, there are two avenues through which a plaintiff may avoid summary
judgment. First, a plaintiff may proceed under the mixed-motive :framework by presenting direct
or circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated the employer's adverse employment
decision. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
bane) (abrogated on other grounds by Univ. ofTex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013)).
Under the mixed-motive theory, a plaintiff need only demonstrate '"a stated purpose to
discriminate and/or indirect evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of
material fact."' Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 1999) (alteration
and quotation omitted).
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"The second method of averting summary judgment is to proceed under a 'pretext'
framework, under which the employee, after establishing a prima face case of discrimination,
demonstrates that the employer's proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse employment
action is actually a pretext for discrimination." Hill, 354 F.3d at 285 (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973)). To establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, plaintiff must show (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) who suffered
an adverse employment action; (3) that at the time of the adverse action she was performing at a
level that met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) the position remained open or was
filled by similarly qualified applicants outside plaintiff's protected class. Hill, 354 F.3d at 285.
"The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as this is always whether the employer is treating
'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (quoting Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1973)).
Plaintiff appears to proceed under the pretext framework. [DE 20]. Defendant concedes
that plaintiff satisfies the first and third elements of her prima facie case - that is, that plaintiff is
a member of a protected class or classes and that her termination was an adverse employment
action.
Defendant relies on plaintiffs record-keeping errors as evidence of both plaintiff's
unsatisfactory job performance and his legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
plaintiffs employment. In response to the summary judgment motion, plaintiff has submitted the
following evidence. Staff Sergeant Dawn Torrisi (Torrisi), the NCOIC 2 at the veterinary clinic,
testified that when she reviewed all charts for charting errors plaintiff appeared to have no more
mistakes than any of the military veterinarians. [DE 21-5] Torrisi Test. at 269, 273. Torrisi
2
This designation appears to refer to non-commissioned officer in charge.
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testified that she heard Bonfiglio refer to civilian staff as "his minions" and stated that that most
of her staff was offended by Bonfiglio's comments. Torrisi Test. at 273. Torrisi heard Bonfiglio
request to only see patient-animals with attractive owners on a regular basis. Torrisi Test. at 275.
Bonfiglio apparently made the same if not more mistakes in record-keeping as plaintiff but was
not counseled for those or other mistakes. Torrisi Test. at 280-81. Finally, as to plaintiffs
termination, Torrisi testified as follows:
A. [Torrisi] The termination letter, if you- I'm sure you've read it. It's ridiculous.
Q. Why is it ridiculous?
A. [Torrisi] She's a - she's a professional. And that entire letter focuses on her
ability to ... dot her Is and cross her Ts in a medical record. Given the 30 minutes
that she has to see appointments, I expect mistakes because that's a ridiculous
amount of time to have seen a patient if you have to do a full medical workup ... .
And the worst thing that happened was a couple of errors in the medical record .. .
I don't think he [Bonfiglio] wanted her there. I think he wanted somebody new that
he could make his little minion, literally.
Torrisi Test. at 300-301.
The clinic receptionist, Michelle Evans (Evans), testified that in early April 2011 Gerardo
informed staff that they would not have to deal with plaintiff much longer; Evans also had been
told that plaintiffs job had been offered to another veterinarian by the office manager just before
Easter and prior to plaintiffs termination in June. [DE 21-3] Evans Test. at 208. Evans testified
that Bonfiglio never asked that any of the military veterinarians' records be pulled for recordchecks, only that plaintiffs records be checked. Id. at 210. Evans testified that she saw many
mistakes in Bonfiglio's charting, and that plaintiff had not made many mistakes in her recordkeeping from March 18th to June 9th, just prior to her termination. Id. at 220.
Although defendant argues that it was Gerardo and not Bonfiglio who was responsible for
plaintiffs termination, Bonfiglio signed plaintiffs termination notice as the requesting officer and
Torrisi testified that Bonfiglio drafted and prepared plaintiffs termination papers while she and
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Bonfiglio were on temporary duty in Japan. Torrisi Test. at 278. Additionally, as to the final
element of plaintiffs prima facie case, the record reflects that, at least as of March 20, 2012, the
civilian veterinary position remained open or unfilled. [DE 21-4] Minerva Test. at 243. The same
testimony reveals that Bonfiglio attempted to fill plaintiffs position with his girlfriend but was
told he was not allowed to do so. Id.
While it is the perception of the decision-maker that is relevant to the determination of
whether a plaintiff is performing her job satisfactorily, Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,
80 F .3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996), the Court finds that the evidence proffered by plaintiff creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was treated less favorably because of her race,
gender, and/or age. Indeed, the McDonnell Douglas framework "was never intended to be rigid,
mechanized, or ritualistic." Furnco Const., 438 U.S. at 577.
Here, plaintiff has submitted
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment and to allow a jury to make a determination as
to whether she was performing her job satisfactorily and whether her employer's proffered basis
for her termination was mere pretext for discrimination. Summary judgment is therefore denied
as to plaintiffs claims for race, gender, and age discrimination.
Summary judgment in defendant's favor is, however, appropriate as to plaintiffs hostile
work environment claim. Before a party may file suit under Title VII, she is required to file a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The
scope of a discrimination lawsuit is limited to the scope of a plaintiffs discrimination charge as
investigated by the EEOC or appropriate deferral agency. Evans, 80 F.3d at 962-63. "If the claims
raised under Title VII exceed the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would naturally
have arisen from an investigation thereof, they are procedurally barred." Chacko v. Patuxent
Institution, 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005). While courts typically construe the administrative
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charges liberally, a claim in formal litigation will generally be barred if the EEOC charge alleges
discrimination on one basis, such as race, and the formal litigation claim alleges discrimination on
a separate basis, such as sex." Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd, 551F.3d297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, plaintiff alleged discrimination based on age, race/seniority, and gender in her formal
charge of discrimination. [DE 19-2 at 23-27]. Plaintiff has failed to present any substantive
argument that her hostile work environment claim is encompassed by her age, race, and gender
discrimination claims. See [DE 20]. Although the conduct forming the basis of plaintiffs hostile
work environment claim is the same as that forming the basis of her age, race, and sex
discrimination claims, compare Chacko (claims involved different conduct and different
evidence), plaintiffs allegations in her EEOC charge of inappropriate comments made generally
by Bonfiglio were insufficient to put defendant on notice of a hostile work environment claim.
See, e.g., Strothers v. City of Laurel, Md, 118 F. Supp. 3d 852, 864 (D. Md. 2015) (noting
comments, although objectionable, not directed at plaintiff cannot support a hostile work
environment claim).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to strike [DE 22] is DENIED and
defendant's motion for summary judgment [DE 16] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
SO ORDERED, this
_ik_ day of May, 2018.
v~LEIJ~
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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