Brown v. Berryhill
Filing
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ORDER granting 22 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and denying 17 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Chief Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 12/2/2018. (Stouch, L.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:17-CV-248-BO
DERIUM XA VION BROWN,
Plaintiff,
V.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-l!lotions for judgment on the pleadings
[DE 17, 22]. The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. A hearing on this
matter was held in Raleigh, North Carolina on November 16, 2018. For the reasons discussed
below, plaintiffs motion [DE 17] is DENIED and defendant's motion [DE 22] is GRANTED. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of the
final decision of the Commissioner denying his claim for supplemental security income (SSI)
pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed his SSI application on March 18,
2014, alleging disability due to mental health problems, bipolar disorder, asthma, depression, and
shortness of breath. [Tr. 19, 192-99, 212]. Plaintiffs application was denied both initially and
upon reconsideration, in July 2014 and October 2014, respectively. [Tr. 114-22, 126-35].
At plaintiffs request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on
October 27, 2014, at which plaintiff and his attorney appeared. [Tr. 37-59]. The ALJ issued a
decision in March 2017; finding that plaintiff was not disabled. [Tr. 16-36.]. In May 2017, the
Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review. [Tr. 1-5].
In December 2017, plaintiff filed the complaint at issue, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). [DE 1]. Plaintiff and
defendant then filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings which have been fully briefed
and are ripe for disposition. [DE 17, 22].
DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), this Court's review of
the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the decision, as a whole, is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner employed the correct legal
standard. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Johnson v.
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Courts should not make their own credibility determinations or substitute their own judgments for
the judgments of the ALJs. Radfordv. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013).
An individual is considered disabled if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than [twelve] months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further provides that an
individual "shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other line of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
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Regulations issued by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential evaluation process
to be followed in a disability case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). In making a
disability determination, the ALJ engages in a sequential five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520; see Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653. At step one, if the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity, the claim is denied. At step two, the claim is denied if the claimant
does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting him or
her from performing basic work activities. At step three, the claimant's impairment is compared
to those in the Listing oflmpairments (Listing). See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. If the
impairment is included in the Listing or is equivalent to a listed impairment, disability is
conclusively presumed. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment,
then the analysis proceeds to step four, where the claimant's residual functional capacity is
assessed to determine whether plaintiff can perform his past work despite his impairments. If the
claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the analysis moves on to step five: establishing
whether the claimant, based on his age, work experience, and residual functional capacity can
perform other substantial gainful work. The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four
steps of this inquiry, but shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200,
1203 (4th Cir. 1995). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the
burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
If a decision regarding disability can be made at any step of the process, then the inquiry ceases.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). In this case, the ALJ's inquiry ended at step five
when she concluded that plaintiff was able to perform work that existed in significant numbers in
the national economy. [Tr. 29-30]. In other words, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
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Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to properly weigh the opinions of
plaintiffs treating physicians and (2) failing to find that plaintiff had an acceptable reason for
refusing to comply with medical treatment. But a careful review of the record and the ALJ's
decision shows that the decision was properly supported by substantial evidence and that remand
would not be appropriate.
I. Treating Source Opinions
In deciding whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must always consider the medical
opinions in the case record together with the rest of the relevant evide11ce received. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(a)(2)(b), 416.927(a)(2)(b). 1A medical opinion is a statement "from physicians and
psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and
prognosis, what [she] can still do despite impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restrictions."
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). Treating source opinions are entitled to controlling weight if they are
"well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and [are]
not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). An ALJ's determination "as to the weight to be assigned to a
medical opinion generally will not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged
up 'specious inconsistencies,' ... or has failed to give a sufficient reason for the weight afforded
a particular opinion." Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App'x 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2015). Factors that ALJs
consider in determining how much weight to afford a medical opinion include (1) the examining
1
In January 2017, the Social Security Administration published final rules titled "Revisions to
Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence." 82 Fed. Reg. 5844; see also 82 Fed. Reg.
15132 (March 27, 2017) (amending and correcting the final rules published at 82 Fed. Reg.
5844). Because these final rules did not become effective until after the ALJ's decision, they do
not apply in this case, and the citations in this order are to the rules in effect at the time of the
ALJ' s decision.
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relationship, (2) the treatment relationship, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4) the consistency
of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the physician's specialization, and (6) other relevant
factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ' s assessment of the medical opinions. Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Ms. Hickman and Dr. Silver. [DE 18, p.
10-11]. As to Ms. Hickman's opinion, the ALJ discussed at length her reasons for assigning it
limited weight. [Tr. 28]. The "treating physician rule" requires controlling weight to be given to a
well-supported treating source as to the nature and severity of a claimant's impairmen~. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(c). This rule remains in effect in this case as plaintiff filed her claim prior to March 24,
2017. Brown v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec., 873 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2017). However, "some issues are
not medical issues regarding the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s) but are
administrative findings that are dispositive of a case,'' including whether an individual is disabled
under the Social Security Act and whether an individual's residual functional capacity prevents
him or her from performing certain jobs. See Social Security Ruling 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at
*2 (S.S.A. 1996). Rather, "the final responsibility for deciding issues such as these is reserved to
the Commissioner." Id. The record reflects that the ALJ discounted Ms. Hickman's opinion as to
these issues and to the extent that it conflicted with the objective findings of other medical reports
in the record. [Tr. 28, 326, 400, 403, 409, 429, 432, 479, 513]. As to Dr. Silver, the ALJ gave
sufficient reasons for affording the opinion little weight, including that it was inconsistent with the
record evidence. [Tr. 27]. Overall, substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ's
assessments of the treating source opinions and there was no reversible error.
II. Medical Compliance
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To be eligible for SSI disability benefits, a claimant must follow prescribed treatment if it
is expected to restore the claimant's ability to work, unless the claimant has an acceptable reason
for non-compliance. 20 C.F.R. § 416.930. The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing
unjustified non-compliance by substantial evidence. Preston v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 988, 990 (4th
Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff argues that his non-compliance "was not deliberate, but instead the result of his
severe mental impairments." [DE 18, p. 12]. But the record does not support this excuse. Plaintiff
testified before the ALJ that he was currently compliant with his medication and that the treatment
was helping. [Tr. 45, 49]. In support of his position, plaintiff points only to a supplemental medical
source statement submitted by Ms. Hickman which was not before the ALJ. [Tr. 15, 16-36]. No
other medical opinion suggests that plaintiffs mental impairments prevented him from complying
with his treatment. Plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. Substantial evidence exists in the record
to support the ALJ's determination that plaintiffs non-compliance was unjustified and contributed
to his difficulties.
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CONCLUSION
Having conducted a full review of the record and decision in this matter, the Court finds
that the decision as a whole is supported by substantial evidence and that the correct legal standard
was applied. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 17] is DENIED
and defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [DE 22] is GRANTED. The decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to close the file.
SO ORDERED, this
d-
day of December, 2018.
T RRENCE W. BOYLE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT UDGE
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