Fuller v. Holt et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 28 Motion for Leave to File a Supplement to the Motion to Dismiss GRANTING 31 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response Request for an Enlargement of Time to Amend the Complaint (Pla intiff's Amended Complaint due by 8/24/2018) DENYING 34 Motion Request for Fundamental Principles to Apply; DENYING 37 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan on 8/3/2018. (A copy of this order was sent via US mail to Napier Sandford Fuller, 2201 Lynnwood Drive, Wilmington, NC 28403.) (Collins, S.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NO. 7:18-CV-00059-FL
NAPIER SANDFORD FULLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
REBECCA W. HOLT, in her official
capacity as employee of the North
Carolina Office of the Courts, RICHARD
A. BADDOUR, in his official capacity as
employee of the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts,
JAMES C. STANDFORD, in his official
capacity as employee of the North
Carolina Administrative Office of the
Courts, JAMES T. BRYAN, III, in his
official capacity as employee of the North
Carolina Administrative Office of the
Courts, SAMANTHA HYATT CABE, in
her official capacity as employee of the
North Carolina Administrative Office of
the Courts, and CATHERINE C.
STEVENS, in her official capacity as
employee of the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts,
Defendants.
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ORDER
This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, (DE 37), in
which plaintiff seeks from the court entry of text order recommending continuation of his pending
criminal prosecution in Orange County Superior Court, State v. Fuller, 2017 CRS 050340, set to
commence August 6, 2018.
To obtain preliminary injunction, plaintiff must demonstrate “he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
In this case, plaintiff has not made the requisite showing of a likelihood of success on the
merits, given jurisdictional bars to injunctive relief under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The Younger doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from interfering with pending state criminal
proceedings. Id. Younger abstention is appropriate where there is “(1) an ongoing state judicial
proceeding, instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2) implicates
important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the
plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.” Nivens v.
Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 2003). “[A] federal court may disregard Younger's mandate
only where (1) there is a showing of bad faith or harassment by state officials responsible for the
prosecution; (2) the state law to be applied in the criminal proceeding is flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions; or (3) other extraordinary circumstances exist that
present a threat of immediate and irreparable injury.” Id.
Here, plaintiff’s request for relief falls within Younger. First, there is a pending state
criminal proceeding. See State v. Fuller, 2017 CRS 050340. Second, “North Carolina has a very
important, substantial, and vital interest in preventing violations of its criminal laws.” Nivens v.
Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 2003). Finally, plaintiff's “pending state prosecution provides
the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam
v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 904 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, to the extent
plaintiff’s motion seeks advisory order from the court, the court lacks the power to grant such relief.
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See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has neither the power to
render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the
case before them.”). Accordingly, the court must deny plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
Also pending before the court are defendants’ motion for leave to file supplemental
memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss (DE 28), plaintiff’s motion for extension of time
and leave to file amended complaint (DE 31), and plaintiff’s “Request for Fundamental Principles
to Apply.” (DE 34).
For good cause shown, the court allows defendants’ motion. Next, to the extent plaintiff
seeks extension of time to file response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, for good cause shown, the
court allows plaintiff’s motion and accepts plaintiff’s late response filed on July 23, 2018. With
respect to that portion of plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file amended complaint, where plaintiff
filed motion within with time allowed by the federal rules, the court also grants that request.
See Fed. R. Civil P. 15(a) (1)(B) (allowing party to amend pleading once as a matter of course
within 21 days after service of responsive pleading, if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required).
Lastly, plaintiff requests entry of text order “urging restraint upon the volume of legal
submissions,” and requiring that the court only consider those “exhibits that directly relate to the
legal issue before the court.” (DE 34, ¶ 11). To the extent plaintiff seeks entry of a text order
urging the court to apply “fundamental legal principles,” the court denies plaintiff’s motion. The
court construes plaintiff’s motion more reasonably as a supplemental response in opposition to
defendants’ motion to dismiss and will consider it as such in resolving that motion.
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. (DE
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37).
In addition, the court ALLOWS defendants’ motion for leave to file supplemental
memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. (DE 28). Defendants are DIRECTED to file
supplement to their motion to dismiss within 7 days entry of this order. Plaintiff shall have 14 days
thereafter to file any response thereto.
The court also ALLOWS plaintiff’s motion for extension of time and leave to file amended
complaint. (DE 31). Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file any amended complaint within 21 days entry
of this order. Lastly, the court DENIES plaintiff’s request at DE 34.
SO ORDERED, this the 3rd day of August, 2018.
_____________________________
LOUISE W. FLANAGAN
United States District Judge
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