EVANS et al v. DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA, CITY OF et al
Filing
33
BRIEF in Support of 32 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants DNA SECURITY, INC., RICHARD CLARK filed by DNA SECURITY, INC., RICHARD CLARK. (KING, ROBERT)
EVANS et al v. DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA, CITY OF et al
Doc. 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA DAVID F. EVANS; COLLIN FINNERTY; and READE SELIGMANN, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA; MICHAEL B. NIFONG; MARK GOTTLIEB; BENJAMIN HIMAN; DAVID ADDISON; LINWOOD WILSON; PATRICK BAKER; STEVEN CHALMERS; BEVERLY COUNCIL; RONALD HODGE; JEFF LAMB; MICHAEL RIPBERGER; LEE RUSS; DNA SECURITY, INC.; RICHARD CLARK; and BRIAN MEEHAN, Defendants. ____________________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFEDANTS DNA SECURITY, INC. AND RICHARD CLARK Defendants DNA Security, Inc., and Richard Clark, through counsel and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Local Rule 7.2, respectfully submit this Brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss.
NATURE OF THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT
Case No. 1:07-CV739
This action arises out of the case styled State vs. Finnerty, Evans, & Seligmann ("the Criminal Action"), in which each of the current Plaintiffs was named as a criminal
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defendant relating to an alleged sexual assault. The Criminal Action was eventually dismissed, and the lead prosecutor, Defendant Michael Nifong ("Nifong"), was disbarred. Plaintiffs contend that the governmental Defendants -- members of the Durham County District Attorney's office, members of the Durham County Police Department, the Durham City Manager, and the City of Durham ("the Non-DSI Defendants") -engaged in various acts of misconduct in bringing and maintaining the Criminal Action, including witness intimidation, fabrication of evidence, withholding of evidence, and misrepresentations to opposing counsel and the court. Assuming -- as the Court must at this stage -- that Plaintiffs' allegations have some merit, it is perhaps not surprising that Plaintiffs have brought suit against some or all of the Non-DSI Defendants. What is surprising, and highly unusual, is that Plaintiffs also have brought suit against an expert witness for the State (Brian Meehan or "Meehan")1, the DNA laboratory that performed work for the State (DNA Security, Inc. or "DSI"), and the President of the DNA laboratory (Richard Clark or "Clark") (collectively, "the DSI Defendants"). Such a step is extraordinary for several reasons, including (as discussed below) the fact that expert witnesses are absolutely immune from suit and that none of the DSI Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs. What is even more startling about Plaintiffs' claims is that Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the DSI Defendants: (1) fabricated evidence; (2) destroyed evidence;
1
During the relevant events, Meehan was the Laboratory Director of DNA Security, Inc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.)
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(3) made any false statements to the criminal defendants2; or (4) made any false statements to any court. To the contrary, Plaintiffs admit that: 1. DSI accurately conducted testing that established that no DNA evidence existed to support the claims of the alleged rape victim (Crystal Mangum or "Mangum") against Plaintiffs (Am. Comp. ¶¶ 61, 206). 2. DSI accurately conducted testing that contradicted Mangum's claim that she had not had sexual intercourse with anyone other than the Plaintiffs in the days leading up to the alleged rape (id. ¶¶ 59, 77). 3. DSI and Meehan reported all of the results of the DNA testing to Nifong and the police (id. ¶¶ 207, 224). 4. Meehan prepared a written report, as directed by Nifong, regarding any matches between the rape kit samples and the DNA samples provided by the lacrosse players (id. ¶¶ 230, 232). 5. DSI produced to Nifong, who then produced to the criminal defendants, all of the underlying, raw data from the DNA sampling (id. ¶ 302). 6. Meehan truthfully testified in court about how the DNA testing and reporting occurred (id. ¶ 307).
2
At some points in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs loosely refer to the May 12 Report as "false and misleading." (Id. ¶ 226.) However, Plaintiffs never point to any statements in the report that they contend were not true. Instead, Plaintiffs apparently contend that the report was "false" because it did not contain every opinion formed by DSI. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 232 (report "intentionally omitted the DNA results that matched or were consistent with . . . multiple unidentified men").)
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Ultimately, Plaintiffs' allegations as to the DSI Defendants come down to this: Even though the criminal defendants were given both a report and all of the raw data generated by DSI, and even though the DNA testing performed by DSI was accurate and exonerated Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs do not like the way that the report was written (because it did not include information about DNA from males other than the lacrosse players), and Plaintiffs object to the fact that the DNA raw data was voluminous and difficult for the criminal defense attorneys to understand (although the defense attorneys did understand the data after some effort (id. ¶ 303)). Contorting those facts -- taken at face value at this stage of the proceedings -- into a lawsuit against the DSI Defendants is inappropriate. For the multiple reasons discussed below, the claims against DSI and Clark should be dismissed.
FACTS3
The Amended Complaint in this action contains 567 paragraphs, the great majority of which do not relate to the DSI Defendants. Other parties will undoubtedly review those facts in their respective briefs. Therefore, DSI and Clark will limit their discussion to those facts that relate to the claims against the DSI Defendants.4
3
DSI and Clark sharply disagree with many of the allegations in the Amended Complaint. For the purposes of the present Motion, however, Plaintiffs' allegations are taken at face value.
4
Meehan is represented by separate counsel. Because the DSI Defendants are frequently lumped together in the Amended Complaint, however, much of the discussion in this Memorandum necessarily relates to, and applies to, Meehan as well as DSI and Clark.
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A. Retention of DSI.
Early in the criminal investigation involving Plaintiffs,
initial DNA testing requested by Nifong and performed by the State Bureau of Investigation "found no evidence that Mangum was assaulted or any evidence that would otherwise corroborate her claims." (Am. Comp. ¶ 76.) Nifong directed that another lab be located to perform additional, more sensitive testing (id. ¶ 199), and his office ultimately located and retained DSI. (Id. ¶ 203.) Meehan was the Laboratory Director for DSI, and Clark was DSI's President. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.) B. Work performed by DSI. The rape kit evidence as well as DNA samples obtained from the lacrosse players were transferred to DSI on April 6, 2006. (Id. ¶ 203.) Plaintiffs allege that the work subsequently performed by DSI: (1) found no DNA from Plaintiffs in any of the rape kit samples, thereby directly contradicting Mangum's allegations (id. ¶¶ 61, 2065); and (2) found DNA from other males in the rape kit samples, thereby contradicting Mangum's claim that she had not had sex with anyone other than Plaintiffs in the days leading up to the alleged rape (id. ¶¶ 59, 77). Plaintiffs further allege that, as DSI performed the analysis, a total of three meetings occurred between Nifong, police officers, Meehan, and Clark to discuss the status and results of DSI's work and that in those meetings, Meehan provided complete and correct information to Nifong and the police as to DSI's findings. (Id. ¶¶ 207, 224,
5
The header on page 61 of the Amended Complaint reads: "DSI's Testing Excludes All of the Duke Lacrosse Players from the Rape Kit Items with 100% Certainty."
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230.) Those findings included the fact that there were no matches to any of the lacrosse players, but that DNA had been found from other males.6 (Id.) On May 12, 2006, as directed by Nifong¸ Meehan provided Nifong with a written report ("the May 12 Report") of DSI's findings on the issue of whether any matches were found between the rape kit samples (i.e., the samples from Mangum) and the "reference" samples (the 46 lacrosse players and Mangum's boyfriend). Per Nifong's directions, the report did not discuss the DNA from any "non-reference" samples (i.e., persons other than the lacrosse players and Mangum's boyfriend). (Id. ¶¶ 230-32.) The fact that the May 12 Report did not refer to any non-reference sample matches is one of Plaintiffs' two complaints against the DSI Defendants in this matter: The May 12 Report only reported on a DNA result if it matched or was consistent with one of the individuals who had provided a reference sample for testing purposes -- e.g., Mangum's boyfriend and the Duke lacrosse players. The May 12 Report intentionally omitted the DNA results that matched or were consistent with the multiple unidentified men who had not provided any reference specimens for comparison. (Id. ¶ 232.) Thus, Plaintiffs complain that, while the DSI Defendants provided Nifong and the police with a complete verbal report, the written report did not contain all of DSI's conclusions. Plaintiffs allege that Nifong later misrepresented to defense counsel and the court that the written report contained all of DSI's conclusions. (Id. ¶¶ 277, 278.)
6
"No later than April 10, 2006, Defendants had in their possession an oral report from Meehan that DSI's testing had revealed the existence of DNA from multiple unidentified males on Mangum's rape kit items, and excluded with 100% certainty all of the Duke lacrosse players, including the Plaintiffs, as contributors of the DNA found on those items." (Id. ¶ 275; see also id. ¶¶ 207, 224, 296.)
6
There is no allegation that the DSI Defendants had any involvement with these misrepresentations. Plaintiffs Finnerty and Seligmann were indicted by a Durham grand jury on April 17, 2006 -- after Meehan accurately reported to Nifong the results of tests completed to that date (id. ¶¶ 206-07) and several weeks before DSI issued its May 12 Report summarizing the results of its DNA analysis (id. ¶¶ 212-13). Plaintiffs do not allege that DSI, Clark, or Meehan testified or otherwise presented evidence that was considered by the grand jury in its decision to indict Finnerty and Seligmann.7 Plaintiff Evans was indicted on May 15, 2006, three days after the release of the May 12 Report, but again, Plaintiffs make no claim that the DSI Defendants presented evidence to the grand jury. (Id. ¶¶ 238-41.) Subsequent to the indictments, criminal defense counsel requested, and received, the underlying raw data from DSI's work. (Id. ¶ 302.) Plaintiffs make no allegation that the DSI Defendants altered, withheld, or fabricated any of that data. The raw data consisted of 1,844 pages of material that, as the name indicates, was raw, basic documentation generated as part of DSI's work. The fact that the underlying data was not presented in a form that was simple to understand is Plaintiffs' second complaint against the DSI Defendants: Even when Defendants finally disclosed the exculpatory facts [i.e., the presence of DNA from unidentified males], they did not do so in a recognizable form, but rather, attempted to bury the exculpatory results as
7
In contrast, Plaintiffs do allege that other Defendants testified before the grand jury. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 215.)
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unsummarized raw data scattered across nearly 2000 pages of documents in a willful attempt to obfuscate the results from Plaintiffs and the court, to obstruct justice, and to cover up their own wrongdoing. (Id. ¶ 276.) Plaintiffs concede that they received exactly what they asked for -- the complete files of DSI. (Id. ¶ 298.) Plaintiffs concede, moreover, that their non-scientist, criminal defense attorneys were able to understand the raw data and thereby determine that Nifong had made misrepresentations concerning the May 12 Report. (Id. ¶ 303.)
C. Collapse of State's case. After criminal defense counsel determined that Nifong
had made misrepresentations concerning DSI's report, a hearing was conducted on December 15, 2006. At that hearing, Meehan testified truthfully in all respects and explained exactly what the May 12 Report did, and did not, include. (Id. ¶ 307.) Meehan further testified that he would have prepared a report setting forth the results of all of DSI's tests and examinations if he had been asked to do so by Nifong or other representatives of the State of North Carolina at any time after May 12, 2006. (Id. ¶ 307(f).) The revelation that Nifong had made misrepresentations to the court and opposing counsel about the May 12 Report set in motion the ethics charges that led to Nifong's recusal, the transfer of the case to the Attorney General's office, and the eventual declaration of Plaintiffs' innocence. (Id. ¶¶ 297, 316-19.) D. Summary. Thus, according to the Amended Complaint: 1. DSI was hired to test the rape kit and compare it to the lacrosse players' samples (id. ¶¶ 202, 204);
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2. DSI performed this work accurately and confirmed that no matches existed (id. ¶¶ 61, 206); 3. DSI determined that other DNA was present (id. ¶¶ 77, 207); 4. DSI informed Nifong about all of its conclusions (id. ¶¶ 207, 224); 5. At Nifong's request, Meehan prepared a written report that set forth the data showing no matches between the rape kit samples and any lacrosse players (id. ¶ 232); 6. Nifong misrepresented that May 12 Report reflected all of DSI's conclusions and data (id. ¶¶ 277, 278); 7. When asked, DSI turned over all of the raw data to Plaintiffs (id. ¶ 302); 8. Plaintiffs used the raw data to determine that Nifong had made misrepresentations (id. ¶ 303); 9. 10. This conclusion was confirmed by Meehan's testimony (id. ¶ 307); and The discovery of Nifong's misrepresentations led to the collapse of the
criminal prosecution (id. ¶¶ 316-19). These are the facts upon which Plaintiffs have sued the DSI Defendants for violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights, as well as malicious prosecution, obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. Finally, it must be noted that Plaintiffs have sued Clark, and grouped him generically together with various parties, yet there is no allegation that Clark himself did anything wrong. Plaintiffs allege that Clark was the President of DSI (id. ¶ 31), and that Clark attended the three meetings with Nifong at which the results of the testing were
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discussed (id. ¶¶ 207, 223, 229). Plaintiffs do not allege that Clark performed any of the DNA testing, that he prepared the May 12 Report, or that he played any role in preparing, compiling, or producing any of the raw data. So, while DSI and Meehan have been sued for accurately performing DNA testing, accurately reporting their conclusions to Nifong and the police, preparing a report as requested by Nifong, and giving Nifong the raw data, Plaintiffs allege that Clark simply attended meetings with Nifong and the police. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Should Plaintiffs' claims be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)? 2. Should Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)? ARGUMENT A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is intended to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). Such a motion should be granted when the complaint fails to allege all of the elements of a cause of action or facts sufficient to support such elements. Bass v. E.I Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.).
Dismissal also is "appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense." Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996).
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To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). A plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss bears the burden of alleging "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. The Court should construe the factual allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, but need not accept as true "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkt., Inc. v. J.D. Assoc. L.P., 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"). I. ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE MEEHAN WAS AN EXPERT WITNESS WITH ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY A. The DSI Defendants Enjoy Absolute Immunity from All of Plaintiffs' Claims Arising from Their Role in the Criminal Proceeding
Under long-established precedent, the DSI Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from all of Plaintiffs' claims, which arise from Meehan's conduct (as the laboratory director for DSI) as an expert witness for the State in the Criminal Action. A witness in a criminal proceeding -- whether a private citizen or a public official -- has absolute immunity from subsequent damages claims based on the witness's testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983); Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 1996); Burke v. Miller, 580 F.2d 108, 109 (4th Cir. 1978) (followed in Briscoe). Absolute witness immunity has a lengthy history in the English and American courts,
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going back to the sixteenth century. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330-31; Burke, 580 F.2d at 109 ("That . . . inviolable immunity is accorded witnesses is attested by a plethora of precedent."). Because the cases recognizing witness immunity from federal claims are descended from centuries-old common law cases, it is not surprising that the same immunity principle bars North Carolina state law claims against witnesses. See Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 721, 122 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1961) (per curiam); Odinkemelu v. Williams, No. 1:00CV750, 2001 WL 34013620, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2001), aff'd, 20 Fed. Appx. 136 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying North Carolina law). Plaintiffs' claims do not arise from Meehan's testimony at trial (because the charges against Plaintiffs were dismissed before a trial occurred). Instead, their claims relate to the only role that Meehan played in the Criminal Action: preparing and
reporting on the expert conclusions formed in performing the DNA analysis. Absolute witness immunity encompasses not just activity at trial but also actions preliminary to trial and, indeed, prior to the initiation of a prosecution. A witness has broad immunity for actions taken "in preparation for providing expert witness testimony in the `due course of a judicial proceeding.'" Sharp v. Miller, 121 N.C. App. 616, 617, 468 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1996) (quoting Williams v. Congdon, 43 N.C. App. 53, 55, 257 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1979)); see also Woodward v. Weiss, 932 F. Supp. 723, 727 (D.S.C. 1996) (absolute witness privilege applied to any "preliminary step to a judicial proceeding which bore a reasonable relation to litigation"). The justice system's interest in ascertaining the complete truth of matters in dispute necessitates such a broad grant of
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immunity to potential witnesses not only for their trial testimony, but also for their participation in pretrial analysis: The truth-seeking function of the court demands evidence. Yet evidence does not present itself to the court. It must be located, organized, and understood by the attorneys before it can be presented to the court. This process of discovering, organizing, and understanding evidence is a vital part of the judicial process. It is perhaps more essential to the court's truthseeking function than the actual trial for without it there would be no grist for the mill. Collins v. Walden, 613 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 402 (11th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision). Consequently, expert witnesses are absolutely immune from claims based on "their actions in preparing the report to guide expert testimony" as well as their analysis performed prior to drafting the expert report. Sharp, 121 N.C. App. at 618, 468 S.E.2d at 801; see Harden v. Green, 27 Fed. Appx. 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (expert entitled to "absolute . . . witness immunity for their conduct in completing competency exams and furnishing written reports"); Woodward, 932 F. Supp. at 727-28 (expert witness absolutely immune from claims related to pre-litigation report provided to insurer); Williams, 43 N.C. App. at 55, 257 S.E.2d at 678 ("Plaintiff has alleged, and proof submitted by defendant supports, that defendant conducted his interviews and made his report as a witness in the due course of a judicial proceeding. Accordingly,
defendant's report is absolutely privileged and cannot be made the basis of a cause of action for either medical malpractice or libel."); see also Kutilek v. Gannon, 766 F. Supp. 967, 973 (D. Kan. 1991) (granting absolute immunity for retained experts' role in
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reviewing evidence, interviewing parties and preparing expert reports before administrative hearing; "Absolute immunity extends to an expert witness's pretrial activities taken in preparation for testimony."); Kahn v. Burman, 673 F. Supp. 210, 212 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[W]itness immunity encompasses experts' reports prepared either before or during litigation."), aff'd, 878 F.2d 1436 (6th Cir. 1989). Indeed, immunity applies if the expert never testifies, his report is never provided to the court, and he is never identified as an expert at all. Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 472, 80 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1954) (recognizing witness immunity for expert witness statement provided to party but never subsequently submitted by party when litigation abandoned). In Sharp v. Miller, the Superior Court not only dismissed the claims but imposed Rule 11 sanctions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings. Id. at 618, 468 S.E.2d at 801-82. Relying on Williams v. Congdon and Briscoe v. LaHue, among other cases, the Court of Appeals held that the application of absolute immunity to claims about irregularities in expert witness reports was so well-established as to justify Rule 11 sanctions. Id. Under this settled authority, the DSI Defendants are absolutely immune from Plaintiffs' claims in this case -- both federal and state. Even if Plaintiffs had valid constitutional and tort claims (which they do not, as discussed below), the DSI Defendants nevertheless have absolute immunity from each of Plaintiffs' claims.
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B.
Plaintiffs Cannot Avoid Absolute Witness Immunity Through Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiffs' conspiracy allegations cannot alter the absolute immunity that the DSI Defendants otherwise enjoy: [A]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent the Briscoe rule by alleging a conspiracy to present false testimony would undermine the purposes served by granting witnesses absolute immunity from damages liability under § 1983. Absolute witness immunity is based on the policy of protecting the judicial process and is "necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation." . . . "[A]ny other holding would eviscerate absolute immunity since a witness rarely prepares her testimony on her own." Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added; quoting Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, and district court decision in Franklin); Collins, 613 F. Supp. at 1315 ("The witness's immunity, which applies even if the testimony is false, would be meaningless if the witness could be held liable under a conspiracy theory based on the collaboration with counsel").8 Therefore, a plaintiff cannot evade a witness's absolute immunity by arguing that his claims do not concern the witness's testimony but instead
8
See also, e.g., Safouane v. Fleck, 226 Fed. Appx. 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2007) ("allegation of a conspiracy to affect the outcome [of a proceeding] is insufficient to defeat immunity"); Reasonover v. St. Louis County, 447 F.3d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 2006) ("a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a civil conspiracy charge when his alleged participation in the conspiracy consists of otherwise immune acts"); Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1992); House v. Belford, 956 F.2d 711, 720-21 (7th Cir. 1992); Crawford v. Abrams, No. 0:06-1990-TLW-BM, 2007 WL 2934904, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 4, 2007) (noting that "most circuits have rejected § 1983 claims alleging that defendants who were testifying witnesses were not entitled to absolute immunity because they were engaged in a conspiracy with each other or with the prosecutor to offer perjurious testimony in a criminal case against the plaintiff") (citing cases).
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concern an alleged conspiracy (with the prosecutor or another state actor) to testify falsely or to withhold evidence. In keeping with Briscoe, and because the courts recognize that "a witness rarely prepares her testimony on her own," Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 277-78 (5th Cir. 2001), expert witnesses are immune from Section 1983 claims -- for conspiracy as well as for underlying constitutional violations -- based on their conversations with government investigators or prosecutors. Mowbray, 274 F.3d at 277-78 (laboratory
expert had absolute immunity under Section 1983 when, after discussions with prosecutors and officers, he failed to disclose that two tests for victim's blood on defendant's clothing were negative and instead testified that tests were positive); Lyles, 79 F.3d at 378; see Holmes v. Eddy, 341 F.2d 477, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (witness was immune from state law tort and conspiracy claims based on allegations made to S.E.C. investigators and affidavit executed before case was instituted); Griffin v. Walker, No. 1:04CV918, 2006 WL 2023148, at *3 (M.D.N.C. July 18, 2006) (dismissing claims against individual who identified defendant during police investigation as barred by absolute witness immunity; claims were "legally frivolous"). Indeed, because claims arising from the witness's anticipated testimony are foreclosed by Briscoe, an alleged discussion or "conspiracy" about that presentation between the witness and the prosecutor cannot open the witness to liability. See Lyles, 79 F.3d at 375, 378 (finding that witness had absolute immunity from claims, including that he "conspired to make, and made, false representations about [plaintiffs] in . . . judicial
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proceedings"); Burke, 580 F.2d at 108 (finding that witness had absolute immunity from claims, including allegations of "conspiracy by [witness] with the prosecuting attorney to deprive [criminal defendant] of a fair trial"); Hawkins v. Webster, 78 N.C. App. 589, 59192, 337 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1985) (absolute immunity applied to claims that witness conspired to give false information to investigators and to make false statements both on the stand and in other documents submitted in litigation). Plaintiffs' suggestion that the meetings between the DSI Defendants and Nifong reflected the DSI Defendants' participation in a conspiracy is precisely the sort of interaction between witness and prosecutor that is fully protected by absolute witness immunity.9 * * *
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Plaintiffs' "conspiracy" claims against the DSI Defendants are insufficient in any event. As a rule, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In particular, mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim for violation of Section 1983. Ballinger v. North Carolina Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1987). An allegation of lawful conduct coupled with "a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice." Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1966. Plaintiffs offer only conclusory allegations that the DSI Defendants "conspired" with Nifong, based on three meetings between Nifong and the DSI Defendants and DSI's generation of the May 12 Report at Nifong's direction. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207-11, 223-27, 229-35.) The fact that the prosecutor met with his retained expert on more than one occasion does not dictate the conclusion that the DSI Defendants "conspired" against Plaintiffs. To the contrary, Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims describe precisely the sort of ordinary and expected interaction between witness and prosecutor that is protected by absolute witness immunity. Indeed, if every interaction between a lawyer and his retained expert invited a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, it would be difficult to imagine any case in which prosecutors and witnesses alike would not operate under the specter of civil liability for their actions -- precisely the result witness (and prosecutorial) immunity is intended to avoid.
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In sum, as an expert witness retained by the State, Meehan, and therefore DSI and Clark, are entitled to absolute immunity from all of Plaintiffs' claims, including their conspiracy claims. At all times, DSI's scientific analysis, preparation of reports, and communication with Nifong and other State officials were undertaken pursuant to Meehan's role as an expert witness. The DSI Defendants should be dismissed from this case. II. PLAINTIFFS' SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT PREMISED ON ANY DUTY OWED BY THE DSI DEFENDANTS Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims suffer from a second--and equally fatal--flaw: Plaintiffs' claims stem from the allegation that DSI effectively deprived them of allegedly exculpatory evidence by failing to include all of its expert opinions in the May 12 Report. Even if one assumes that failing to discuss evidence in an expert report is tantamount to withholding that evidence (even if that evidence is later produced prior to trial), neither the Constitution nor state law imposes any duty on the DSI Defendants to disclose potentially exculpatory information directly to Plaintiffs. Under settled law, that duty belongs to the prosecutor alone. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court declared that prosecutors are constitutionally obligated to produce exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants before trial: "[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87 (emphasis added). In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally
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that the decision whether evidence must be disclosed "is the responsibility of the prosecutor." 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The Brady doctrine reflects "the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). In light of that "special role," the imposition of a duty of disclosure on the prosecutor alone makes perfect sense: "The Brady duty is framed by the dictates of the adversary system and the prosecution's legal role therein. . . . The prosecutor must ask such lawyer's questions as whether an item of evidence has `exculpatory' or `impeachment' value and whether such evidence is `material.'" Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J.); accord, id. at 664, 669 (Murnaghan, J.); see also Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It is appropriate that the prosecutors, who possess the requisite legal acumen, be charged with the task of determining which evidence constitutes Brady material that must be disclosed to the defense."). Thus, in this case as in every other, the prosecutor alone was constitutionally charged with disclosing any exculpatory evidence. The Constitution imposes no duty on non-prosecutorial parties, especially expert witnesses, to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant. Instead, at most, those witnesses should disclose potentially exculpatory information to the prosecutor, whose duty it becomes to determine, in the exercise of legal judgment, whether disclosure is warranted.
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In Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)10, every judge on the Fourth Circuit agreed that a witness (such as a police officer) owes no duty of disclosure to a criminal defendant. Instead, at most, "the police officer's duty is to disclose to the prosecution rather than to the defendant directly." Id. at 668 (Murnaghan, J.); see also id. at 660 (Wilkinson, J.) ("to speak of the duty binding police officers as a Brady duty is simply incorrect. The Supreme Court has always defined the Brady duty as one that rests with the prosecution"); id. at 678-79 (Luttig, J.). In Jean, half of the en banc Fourth Circuit joined Judge Murnaghan's opinion, declaring that a witness would "comply with Brady" and therefore would not be subject to Section 1983 liability if he delivered information to the prosecutor, who would then "make a discretionary legal judgment about whether the evidence is material and exculpatory, such that Brady compels its disclosure to the defendant." Id. at 664; see also id. at 669 ("The police officer's duty is not to determine whether the evidence is material and exculpatory. His duty is simply to collect the evidence and to disclose all of it to the prosecutor, who then makes the discretionary legal judgment about its material, exculpatory attributes."). The other half of the court joined Judge Wilkinson's opinion, ruling that the witness generally would not face liability under Section 1983 even for withholding evidence from the prosecutor. Id. at 660-62. See also Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701 (W.D. Va. 2004)
10
Jean was an equally divided decision of the en banc court. The opinion for affirmance, joined by half of the members of the court, was authored by Judge Wilkinson. Judge Murnaghan wrote a separate opinion (denominated a dissent) for the remaining members of the court. Judge Luttig dissented separately.
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("the Fourth Circuit does not currently recognize a cause of action under Brady against police officers" for withholding evidence). Numerous other federal courts also have concluded that a witness's duty is, at most, to disclose evidence to the prosecutor, who then is charged with determining whether the evidence is material, potentially exculpatory, and should be produced.11 A witness is not liable under Section 1983 if he discloses evidence to the prosecutor but the prosecutor determines that the evidence is not subject to production. Even police officers are not charged with Section 1983 liability for breach of the broad disclosure obligations that Plaintiffs would impose on purely private parties like the DSI Defendants.12 Plaintiffs' claims against the DSI Defendants stem from the allegation that the May 12 Report purportedly failed to detail the presence of DNA from unidentified males in the rape kit evidence. Even if one were to assume that this evidence was somehow
11
See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Investigators satisfy their obligations under Brady when they turn exculpatory and impeachment evidence over to the prosecutor."). See also Harrison v. Abraham, No. 96-4262, 1997 WL 256970, at *18 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1997) ("[T]he only courts found by this Court to have addressed this issue have held that police officers do not have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant but, rather, have a duty only to disclose such evidence to the prosecuting attorney.") (citing cases), aff'd, 151 F.3d 1025 (3d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
12
See, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1992) (witnesses have no "obligation with respect to exculpatory evidence beyond disclosing that evidence to the prosecutor;" dismissing Section 1983 claims against police department); Mowbray, 274 F.3d at 278 (although "Brady imposes a duty on prosecutors to share exculpatory evidence with the defense," court was unaware of any "case extending Brady to police officers or lab technicians"; affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of Section 1983 Brady claim against laboratory technician and police officer).
21
withheld from Plaintiffs (notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiffs admit that the evidence was given to them before any scheduled trial), the DSI Defendants simply cannot be held liable for that nondisclosure. As a private testing laboratory, DSI had no duty to make disclosure to Plaintiffs directly. At most, DSI was required to make full disclosure of the DNA testing results to the prosecutor -- which it did. Plaintiffs affirmatively and
repeatedly allege as much. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207, 224, 275, 296.) Indeed, the gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that Nifong persisted with the prosecution notwithstanding his full knowledge of the DNA testing results (as well as additional evidence that called into doubt the criminal charges against Plaintiffs). In short, DSI fully satisfied any possible obligation it might have had when it informed Nifong of the results of its DNA testing. The law is clear that the decision about what evidence to provide to Plaintiffs and when to provide it was Nifong's alone to make. In the absence of any duty to provide evidence directly to Plaintiffs, and having satisfied any arguable duty to provide evidence to Nifong, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for any breach of duty by the DSI Defendants. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against the DSI Defendants must be dismissed. III. PLAINTIFFS' SECTION 1983 CLAIMS WOULD FAIL EVEN IF THE DSI DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE TO PLAINTIFFS A. Plaintiffs Cannot State a Claim for Concealment of Evidence Because the Charges Against Them Were Dismissed
Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Section 1983 for another, and independently determinative, reason: Even if DSI had an independent duty under Brady to disclose
22
potentially exculpatory evidence directly to Plaintiffs, no Brady violation arose here because the evidence was provided and the charges against Plaintiffs were dismissed before trial. Brady is violated only if "the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "[U]nless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation . . . and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108; see Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 (no Brady violation unless criminal defendant shows "result of the trial would have been different" if evidence disclosed). Because no constitutional violation occurs unless the criminal defendant is convicted in an unfair trial, no Section 1983 claim lies where either the evidence is provided before trial, or the charges are dismissed and no trial occurs, or both. The Fourth Circuit has made that rule crystal clear. In Jean, the en banc court agreed that there is no Brady violation -- and so no Section 1983 claim -- unless the "failure to disclose the exculpatory information deprived the § 1983 plaintiffs of their right to a fair trial." 221 F.3d at 659 (Wilkinson, J.); accord, id. at 674 (Murnaghan, J.) ("no court has ever recognized [a] freestanding liberty interest in exculpatory evidence"; instead, defendant has only liberty interest in "avoiding incarceration" based on withheld material evidence). Jean followed the Fourth Circuit's prior decision in Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429 (4th Cir. 1996), in which the Court rejected claims based on an investigator's
23
failure "to disclose exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor in a more timely manner" where the charges were dismissed before trial. Id. at 432, 435-37. Taylor found no Brady violation when it was "undisputed that [the criminal defendant] was not subjected to trial." Id. at 436 n.5; see Friedland v. City of Charlotte, No. 3:98 CV 122, 2001 WL 1360436, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2001) (Brady does "not provide a criminal defendant an absolute right to all potentially exculpatory evidence [but] [i]nstead, it provides a remedy where a criminal defendant can show that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted if the state had disclosed the exculpatory evidence."). Here, there was no Brady violation giving rise to a Section 1983 claim. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they were provided with all of the alleged DNA Brady material well before trial was scheduled (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 267, 302-03, 319), which is all that Brady requires. United States v. Neely, 76 F.3d 376, 1996 WL 60329, at *5-6 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (no Brady claim stated absent claim that government failed to provide evidence "in sufficient time for it to be used at trial"; indeed, "Brady does not necessarily require that exculpatory information be produced prior to trial" so long as defendant has it in time to use it during trial); United States v. Smith Grading & Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[n]o due process violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial;" finding no constitutional violation where exculpatory information was disclosed through
24
testimony of first trial witness).13 Moreover, all criminal charges against Plaintiffs were dismissed before trial (and after the testing data was produced), so Plaintiffs suffered no deprivation of the constitutional "fair trial" rights that Brady protects. Taylor, 81 F.3d at 436 n.5.14 B. Plaintiffs Cannot State a Section 1983 Claim for Malicious Prosecution Against the DSI Defendants
Because Plaintiffs' claims based on the alleged Brady violation are foreclosed by settled precedent, Plaintiffs attempt to recast their claims related to the DNA evidence as constitutional claims for "malicious prosecution" in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (First Cause of Action; Am. Compl. ¶ 335). But the Fourth Circuit has held that "there is no such thing as a `§ 1983 malicious prosecution' claim." Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs have no Fourteenth Amendment claim for any injury styled "malicious prosecution." Taylor, 81 F.3d at 436 (allegation that police investigator failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutor
13
See also United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Where the prosecution delays disclosure of evidence, but the evidence is nonetheless disclosed during trial, Brady is not violated."); United States v. Banda-Gutierrez, 28 F.3d 109, 1994 WL 274055, at *5 (9th Cir. June 20, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (exculpatory information "need not be disclosed prior to trial . . . so long as the defense receives the information at a time when the disclosure would be of value to the accused").
14
See also, e.g., Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 924 (10th Cir. 2007) (criminal defendant "never proceeded to trial, and she cannot therefore rest her § 1983 claims on a Brady violation") (applying both Jean and Taylor); Nygren v. Predovich, 637 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (D. Colo. 1986) (dismissing Section 1983 claims where charges were dismissed before trial; "the Brady rule only implicates a criminal defendant's due process right to a fair trial . . . There simply is no constitutional violation unless suppression of the evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial.") (emphasis in original).
25
"does not allege a deprivation of any right guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Instead, "[w]hat is conventionally referred to as a `§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation." Lambert, 223 F.3d at 260. (following Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)); see Taylor, 81 F.3d at 436. Plaintiffs can state no Fourth Amendment claim against the DSI Defendants under settled law. Once a criminal defendant has been indicted, no Fourth Amendment claim arises from arresting him or continuing the ongoing criminal prosecution. Taylor, 81 F.3d at 436 & n.5; Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 1995); see Jean, 221 F.3d at 660 (applying Taylor). Thus, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against the DSI Defendants for any supposed constitutional harm arising after their indictments, as it is well-settled that a defendant has no Fourth Amendment right to "avoid[] prosecution upon less than probable cause." Brooks, 85 F.3d at 184 (dismissing Section 1983 claims challenging defendant's "fail[ure] to attempt to terminate the criminal proceedings after it became clear that [criminal defendant] was innocent"); Taylor, 81 F.3d at 436-37 (dismissing Section 1983 claims alleging that defendant "fail[ed] to disclose exculpatory evidence after a determination of probable cause ha[d] been made by a neutral detached magistrate"). Nor can Plaintiffs state any Fourth Amendment claim against the DSI Defendants arising prior to their indictments. Any such claim necessarily would be premised on the argument that the DSI Defendants provided allegedly exculpatory information to Nifong
26
that Nifong chose not to have provided to the grand jury.
Such an argument is
unavailing, for several reasons. First, DSI made full and accurate disclosure of the results of the DNA testing to the prosecutor. Second, as discussed above, the DSI Defendants had no duty to make disclosure to or otherwise ensure the presentation of evidence before the grand jury.15 And third, there is no requirement that the prosecutor or grand jury witnesses themselves provide any exculpatory evidence to the grand jury in the first instance. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992) ("Imposing on the prosecutor a legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence in his possession would be incompatible with [the "accusatory" grand jury] system."). If Nifong had no obligation to have the grand jury witnesses disclose known exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, Plaintiffs have no Fourth Amendment claim against the DSI Defendants for somehow failing to ensure that such a disclosure was made. In short, Plaintiffs cannot state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the DSI Defendants because Plaintiffs were never subjected to a criminal trial, and they cannot state a Fourth Amendment claim for unconstitutional seizure under any conceivable interpretation of their claims. dismissed. Their Section 1983 claims should be
15
Nor did the DSI Defendants have an opportunity to do so: According to the Amended Complaint, the DSI Defendants played no role in the grand jury process, and Plaintiffs make no claim that the DSI Defendants testified before the grand jury or otherwise presented evidence for consideration in the probable cause determination. Indeed, DSI had not even completed its analysis or prepared the May 12 Report when the indictments of Finnerty and Seligmann were handed down (on April 17, 2006).
27
IV.
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT STATE CLAIMS BASED UPON RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR OR SUPERVISOR LIABILITY A. DSI Cannot Be Held Liable Under Section 1983 on a Theory of Respondeat Superior
It is settled law that a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992); Gantt v. Whitaker, 203 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509 (M.D.N.C. 2002), aff'd, 57 Fed. Appx. 141 (4th Cir. 2003). That rule applies equally to private corporations: "[A] private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for torts committed by [employees] when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior." Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999); see Po well v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982) (rule that "a municipal corporation cannot be saddled with section 1983 liability via respondeat superior alone" is "equally applicable to the liability of private corporations"). Therefore, DSI cannot be held liable under Section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior for any constitutional tort allegedly committed by Meehan or Clark. The Fourth Circuit has held emphatically that "a private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights." Austin, 195 F.3d at 728 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs do not claim, however, that the injuries they allege resulted from any "official policy or custom" of DSI. See Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 338 F.3d 348, 355-56
28
(4th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff offered no evidence that "an official policy or custom of the corporation caused the alleged deprivation of federal rights").16 Nor do Plaintiffs claim that either Clark or Meehan exercised "final policymaking authority" on behalf of DSI. Austin, 195 F.3d at 728-29 (principles governing whether municipality can be liable for single decision of policymaking official "are equally applicable to a private corporation" "when an employee exercises final policymaking authority concerning an action that allegedly causes a deprivation of federal rights"; question is whether employee, "as a matter of state and local positive law, or custom or usage having the force of law . . . exercised final policymaking authority concerning" the alleged wrongdoing). allegations, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against DSI must be dismissed. B. Clark Cannot Face Supervisory Liability Absent such
Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against Clark are also flawed, because they do not plead the necessary elements of supervisory liability: [T]hree elements [are] necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to
16
See also, e.g., Breen v. Pendergraph, No. 3:0CV148, 2007 WL 4591868, at *7-8 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of private corporation on Section 1983 claims where corporation's "policy" was not constitutionally infirm); El Bay v. Celebration Station, No. 3:02CV461, 2006 WL 2811497, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2006), aff'd, 242 Fed. Appx. 917 (4th Cir. 2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of private corporation on Section 1983 claims where "plaintiff does not allege, nor does the record reflect, a policy or custom by the corporation . . . to effectuate any of the alleged constitutional violations the plaintiff asserts").
29
show "deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices"; and (3) that there was an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).17 Even assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs' bare-bones allegations as to Clark (which describe nothing more than Clark's physical presence at three meetings with Nifong) suffice to plead the first two elements required to impose supervisory liability on Clark, Plaintiffs' claims fail at the third prong. There can be no "affirmative causal link" -- and thus no supervisory liability -- where the plaintiff has not suffered a constitutional injury. See e.g., Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 630-31 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Because the Appellants have failed to demonstrate a constitutional injury . . . their supervisory liability claim fails on the third prong of the Shaw test, i.e., there is no affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and any constitutional injury suffered by the Appellants."); Phillips v. Bailey, 337 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 (W.D.Va. 2004). Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Section 1983 for a violation of their rights under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiffs' supervisory liability
17
Moreover, "[u]nder the first prong of Shaw, the conduct engaged in by the supervisor's subordinates must be `pervasive,' meaning that the `conduct is widespread or at least has been used on several different occasions.'" Randall v. Prince George's County, Md., 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002). In addition, a plaintiff ordinarily cannot satisfy the "deliberate indifference" prong of the Shaw test "by. . . pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents" "for a supervisor cannot be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct." Id. (quotation omitted) ("deliberate indifference" may be established by showing "supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses"). The Amended Complaint simply fails to plead "widespread" or "pervasive" conduct by any DSI employee under Clark's supervision.
30
claims against Defendant Clark should be dismissed. Phillips, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 807.18 V.
Tigrett, 290 F.3d at 630-31;
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH CAUSATION FOR ANY OF THEIR CLAIMS Plaintiffs' claims require them to establish proximate causation between the DSI
Defendants' acts and their alleged injuries. "Proximate cause is a cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the plaintiff's injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred." Weaver v. Sheppa, 651 S.E.2d 395, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quotation omitted); Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 177 N.C. App. 595, 613, 630 S.E.2d 221, 233 (2006) (proximate cause is one that "directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred") (quotation omitted). Proximate causation is a requirement for liability for Plaintiffs' state tort claims. See, e.g., Weaver, 651 S.E.2d at 398; Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 352-53, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1964). Similarly, traditional notions of proximate cause apply in Section 1983 actions. See, e.g., Carter v. Barker, 225 F.3d 653, 2000 WL 1008794, at *7 (4th Cir. July 21, 2000) (unpublished table decision); Blue v. Bigos, 89 F.3d 827, 1996 WL 325316, at *1 (4th Cir. June 7, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 911 (10th Cir. 2000) ("plaintiff must allege factual causation -- i.e., `but for' causation -- in order to state a claim under § 1983"); Russo v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 2d 450, 4554
18
In addition, as discussed elsewhere in this Brief, Plaintiffs have failed to plead a causal link between any conduct by the DSI Defendants and any damages suffered by Plaintiffs.
31
n.3 (E.D. Va. 1999). Thus, a plaintiff states a claim for relief under Section 1983 only when he alleges the necessary causal nexus between the defendant's actions and the constitutional harm the plaintiff claims to have suffered. An unadorned allegation of proximate causation will not suffice, however, where the facts alleged make clear that the defendant's wrongdoing was not the cause of the plaintiff's harm. Where it is plain on the face of the complaint that such a causal nexus is lacking, dismissal is appropriate. See Scott, 216 F.3d at 911; Ford v. Peaches Entm't Corp., 83 N.C. App. 155, 156, 349 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1986). In the American criminal justice system, the grand jury serves an "accusatory" rather than an "adjudicative" function. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51. Accordingly, the grand jury hears only the witnesses whom the prosecutor decides to present -- and the prosecutor is not constitutionally constrained to present any witnesses or any particularly type of evidence. Id. at 51-52; Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 236 (1788) (it is grand jury's function not "to enquire . . . upon what foundation [the charge may be] denied" or otherwise to examine suspect's defenses, but only to examine "upon what foundation [the charge] is made" by the prosecutor) (quoted in Williams, 504 U.S. at 5152); Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 503 (2d Cir. 2004) (decision about presenting evidence to grand jury lies "at the very core of a prosecutor's role as an advocate"). A witness -- indeed, even a suspect -- has no right to present any evidence to the grand jury or to cause its presentation. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51-52; see State v. Morgan, 9 N.C. App. 624, 627, 177 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1970); State v. Jones, 85 N.C. App.
32
56, 69, 354 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1987) (defendant cannot challenge evidence presented to grand jury; his rights are protected by "his right to object to improper evidence and crossexamine witnesses at trial") (quotation omitted). In this system, the prosecutor's decision to seek an indictment and his decision about what witnesses to present to the grand jury intervene between a witness who does not testify before the grand jury and the indictment. In particular, no tort claim
predicated on a non-prosecutorial party's alleged withholding of evidence can lie against that party when he has disclosed all evidence to the prosecutor: [C]ourts . . . hold that police officers may be liable under section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause if they fail to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, make false or misleading reports to the prosecutor, omit material information from the reports, or otherwise interfere with the prosecutor's ability to exercise independent judgment. . . . Although the converse principle is variously stated, it is equally well established that where an officer [or other non-prosecutorial party] presents all relevant probable cause evidence to an intermediary, such as a prosecutor, a grand jury, or a magistrate, the intermediary's independent decision to seek a warrant, issue a warrant, or return an indictment breaks the causal chain and insulates the officer from a section 1983 claim based on lack of probable cause for an arrest or prosecution. Rhodes v. Smithers, 939 F. Supp. 1256, 1274 (S.D.W.Va. 1995) (emphasis added; citing numerous cases). The prosecutor has the sole responsibility to present witnesses to the grand jury; others have no right to intervene in the grand jury proceedings. Therefore, the most that the witness can do is to provide accurate information to the prosecutor who then has the sole power to decide what to do with it.
33
Plaintiffs concede that DSI made full disclosure to the prosecutor, so it is plain that the prosecutor's role in the grand jury process broke the causal chain. In particular, no act by the DSI Defendants could have caused or contributed to the indictment of Plaintiffs Finnerty and Seligmann, who were indicted on April 15, 2006, just ten days after DSI was retained to analyze the rape kit evidence, before DSI had even analyzed all of the evidence, and nearly a month before the May 12 Report issued. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 198-203, 212, 213, 230.) Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that DSI accurately provided the prosecutor all of the results of the tests that had been completed at the time of the indictments, and the prosecutor and his grand jury witnesses decided not to present that information to the grand jury. (Id. ¶¶ 207-08, 210, 212-14.) By the plain allegations of the Amended Complaint, the prosecutor's discretionary decision not to provide that information to the grand jury breaks any causal link between the DSI Defendants' actions and the alleged injuries to Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Evans' claim should not be treated differently. Evans was not indicted until May 15, 2006, three days after DSI presented the May 12 Report to the prosecutor (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 230, 238). The Amended Complaint acknowledges that -- in addition to the information in the May 12 Report -- the prosecutor knew all of the results of the tests that DSI performed at that time, but he and the grand jury witnesses independently determined not to present that information to the grand jury. (See id. ¶ 241 (alleging that "Gottlieb, Himan, and Nifong agreed in advance of the May 15 Indictment that they
34
would mislead the grand jury as to the evidence concerning Evans and not reveal to the grand jury the evidence of Evans' actual innocence").) Because the Complaint makes clear that Plaintiffs' alleged injuries were not proximately caused by any action of the DSI Defendants, their claims must be dismissed. VI. PLAINTIFFS' SECTION 1985 AND 1986 CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SATISFY SEVERAL ELEMENTS OF THOSE CLAIMS Plaintiffs allege that the DSI Defendants should be held liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (eighth cause of action), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (tenth cause of action), and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (twelfth cause of action) for conspiring to deny Plaintiffs equal protection of the laws (and for failing to prevent such a conspiracy). None of those claims can withstand the DSI Defendants' motion to dismiss, for a number of reasons. A. Plaintiffs Fail to Satisfy Section 1985's Requirement of Alleging That the DSI Defendants Were Motivated by a Discriminatory Animus Based on Plaintiffs' Membership in a Qualifying Class
Plaintiffs attempt to state claims under both the second clause of Section 1985(2) (which prohibits participating in a conspiracy to obstruct justice "with the intent to deny any citizen the equal protection of the laws") and Section 1985(3) (which prohibits participating in a conspiracy to deprive any person "of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"). Congress did not intend Section 1985 to "apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). Section 1985(3), the "Klu Klux Klan Act," was enacted for the specific purpose of quelling post-Civil War violence against
35
African-Americans: "Congress enacted § 1985(3)" "[a]gainst [a] backdrop of political terrorism" in order to "afford[] a remedy for the vindication of the civil rights of those being threatened and injured, notably blacks and advocates for their cause." Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1985). In Griffin v.
Breckenridge, the Supreme Court thus held that in order to state a claim under the statute, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was motivated by a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, indiviously discriminatory animus." Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995).19 In Griffin, the Supreme Court refused to find that there might be "class-based" groups deserving of protection other than African-Americans. 403 U.S. at 102 & n.9. The Court left open the possibility that it "perhaps" might do so in the future, id., but in the years since, it has never extended the protection of the second clause of Section 1985(2) or Section 1985(3) beyond animus directed toward African-Americans. See Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993) ("We have not yet had occasion to resolve the `perhaps' [of the existence of other protected classes left open in Griffin]."); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983) ("it is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause"; rejecting economically or politically motivated animus as grounds for claim).
19
403 U.S. at 102; see
As the second clause of Section 1985(2) is similarly geared toward the "equal protection of the laws," the prohibition of 1985(2) is limited to the same invidious discriminatory animus required by 1985(3). See King v. Jeffries, 402 F. Supp. 2d 624, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
36
The Fourth Circuit has extended the scope of protection of the Klu Klux Klan Act only to religious minorities, Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981) (member of Unification Church), and that decision came before the Supreme Court twice refused to extend the Act's scope beyond animus directed toward African-Americans in Scott and Bray. See Bloch v. Mtn. Mission Sch., 846 F.2d 69, 1988 WL 45433, at *1-2 (4th Cir. May 2, 1988) (unpublished table decision) (orphans not protected class); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir. 1985) (whistleblowers not protected class); Harrison, 766 F.2d at 161 ("[s]ince the Court in Griffin provided blacks a remedy under § 1985(3), . . . no other group or class has achieved similar status"); Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 1985) (military prisoners not protected class).20 While some courts in other jurisdictions have extended the scope of protected classes, it is "obvious that . . . the class protected can extend no further than to those classes of persons who are, so far as the enforcement of their rights is concerned, `in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence,'" and that the class must be "discrete" and "insular." Buschi, 775 F.2d at 1258 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 851). Plaintiffs simply cannot claim the protection of Section 1985, because they do not allege that they are members of a protected clas
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