MCFADYEN et al v. DUKE UNIVERSITY et al

Filing 411

ORDER signed by JUDGE JAMES A. BEATY, JR on 5/30/2014; that Defendant Wilson's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. #406 ] is DENIED. FURTHER that Defendant Wilson's Motion for a Certification of Appealability [Doc. #410 ] is DENIED. (Sheets, Jamie)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RYAN MCFADYEN, MATTHEW WILSON,
and BRECK ARCHER
Plaintiffs,
v.
DUKE UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:07CV953

ORDER
Beaty, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
[Doc. #406] and a Motion for a Certification of Appealability [Doc. #410], filed by Defendant
Linwood E. Wilson (“Defendant Wilson”), pro se, with respect to his appeal of this Court’s May
20, 2014 Order, which denied Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [Doc. #367].
In its Order, the Court declined to impose sanctions against Plaintiffs Ryan McFadyen, Matthew
Wilson, and Breck Archer (“Plaintiffs”) and their counsel.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial
court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” Under this statute, “good faith” is
judged by an objective standard, and an appeal is not taken in good faith if “the issues raised are
so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant .” Liles v.
South Carolina Department of Corrections, 414 F.2d 612, 614 n.1 (4th Cir. 1969) (citing
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S. Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962)). In the present
case, the Court determined that Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [Doc. #367]

did not set forth adequate grounds for this Court to impose the requested sanctions1 in this case.
(May 20, 2014 Order [Doc. #401], at 22.) The Court determined that it did not find that
Plaintiffs’ claims in this case were “frivolous or vexatious2 so as to warrant the imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions.” (May 20, 2014 Order [Doc. #401], at 22.) The Court further noted that
many of the claims asserted against Defendant Wilson in this case were dismissed in this Court’s
March 31, 2011 Memorandum Opinion [Doc. #186] and Order [Doc. #187]; however, just
because a claim does not survive a motion to dismiss “such a flaw will not in itself support Rule
11 sanctions.” (May 20, 2014 Order [Doc. #401], at 23 (quoting Hunter, 281 F.3d at 153).)
Specifically, the Court noted that Plaintiffs’ claims, as asserted against Defendant Wilson, were
not so frivolous or groundless that they would have “absolutely no chance of success” so as to
warrant the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. (See id. (quoting Morris v. Wachovia, 448 F.3d
268, 277 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).) The Court also noted that “the Fourth Circuit has
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Defendant Wilson’s primary request for sanctions consisted of a request for
$3,000,000.00 in attorney’s fees. However Defendant Wilson did not provide the Court with
any basis for imposing such a large monetary sanction on Plaintiffs, or their counsel, nor did he
provide the Court with a basis to determine that such an amount was reasonable in order to
serve the deterrence purposes for imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Additionally, to the extent such
a request sanctions could have been construed as a request for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 for the section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims asserted against Defendant Wilson
in this case, the Court notes that the same rationale that the Court applied in declining to award
Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions in this case also would apply to any request
that could have been made for attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 in this case. See Unus v. Kane,
565 F.3d 103, 127 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the district court should only award attorney’s fees
when a plaintiff’s claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.”); Young v. Annarino, 123
F. Supp. 2d 943 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (applying similar standards when declining to award both Rule
11 sanctions and attorneys fees pursuant to § 1988).
In considering Defendant Wilson’s allegations that Plaintiffs’ claims were vexatious,
which the Court did not find, the Court notes that Defendant Wilson did not provide an
adequate basis for the Court to infer that the claims brought by Plaintiffs were brought
vexatiously or with any intent to harass or intimidate Defendant Wilson.
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‘recognized that [c]reative claims, coupled even with ambiguous or inconsequential facts,3 may
merit dismissal, but not punishment.’ ” (Id. (quoting Hunter, 281 F.3d at 153 internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).) Also, the Court notes that Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule
11 Sanctions was also purported to be made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(c)(3), in that Defendant Wilson requested that the Court issue a show cause order on its own
initiative,4 which the Court declined to do. See In re Bees, 562 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2009)

Thus, to the extent Defendant Wilson alleged that Plaintiffs should have been
sanctioned because their claims lack evidentiary support or that they would not lead to a
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the Court notes that the factual
allegations in the Complaint asserted against Defendant Wilson are sufficient to preclude the
imposition of sanctions. Specifically, while Defendant Wilson’s general allegations that
Plaintiffs’ claims were groundless and lacked factual support, the Court has determined that
Defendant Wilson had not provided an adequate basis to infer that Plaintiffs’ and their counsel
did not conduct the proper prefiling investigation to warrant the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions. Additionally, while Defendant Wilson has subjectively determined that his individual
conduct and his conduct in working with other defendants in this case was innocent and thus
did not support Plaintiffs’ claims against him in this case, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ factual
allegations against Defendant Wilson in the Second Amended Complaint [Doc. #136] appear
to be at least objectively reasonable as a basis for their claims, prior to any pretrial discovery in
this case. Edmonds v. Gilmore, 988 F. Supp. 948, 957 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“When the court is
considering sanctions on a factual claim, ‘the initial focus of the district court should be on
whether an objectively reasonable evidentiary basis for the claim was demonstrated in pretrial
proceedings or at trial.’ ” (quoting Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2d Cir.
1988, rev’d on other grounds, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S. Ct. 456, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989))); see also
Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir. 1991) (“To be reasonable, the
prefiling investigation must uncover some information to support the allegations in the
complaint.” (emphasis added)).
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It appears that Defendant Wilson originally filed a motion for sanctions (see [Doc.
#218]) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2), which requires a party to adhere
to the 21-day safe harbor provision, contained therein, before filing a motion for sanctions with
the Court. Defendant Wilson subsequently withdrew his original Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
and later filed a similar Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [Doc. #367], however requesting that the
Court act on its own initiative to issue a show cause order to pursue sanctions. Nevertheless,
the Court notes that when a party moves for sanctions, “by definition, a court responding to a
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(“Court’s generally should reserve [sua sponte] sanctions for ‘situations that are akin to contempt
of court.’ ” (quoting Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Finally, the Court notes that the decision to impose sanctions or award attorney’s fees under
Rule 11 is within the sound discretion of the district court, the court that is in the best position
to determine whether sanctions should be imposed. See Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm P’ship, 850
F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he decision whether to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11
is within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1), (3); cf. Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 407, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2462, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990)
(“Indeed, because the district court has broad discretion to impose Rule 11 sanctions, appeals
of such sanctions may frequently be frivolous.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note
(1993) (“[T]he court should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for sanctions.”).
Therefore, the Court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith because the Court finds
the appeal to be frivolous, based on the nature of the issue sought to be raised on appeal by
Defendant Wilson and the specific Order from which appeal is sought based upon a denial of
Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [Doc. #367].
Defendant Wilson, appearing pro se, has also filed a Motion for Certification of
Appealability [Doc. #410]. On whatever basis Defendant Wilson has sought to appeal the

motion is not acting sua sponte.” Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). However,
it is not clear whether Defendant Wilson complied with the safe harbor provisions of Rule
11(c)(2), which is Plaintiffs’ contention, for the Court to impose sanctions pursuant to the
Motion filed by Defendant Wilson. In its May 20, 2014 Order [Doc. #410], the Court noted the
possibility of procedural defects regarding Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
[Doc. #367], however, the Court alternatively determined that it would not impose sanctions,
sua sponte or otherwise, based on the allegations asserted in Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule
11 Sanctions [Doc. #367].
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Court’s Order denying his Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [Doc. #367], either as a perceived
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), or as an attempted appeal of a final
judgment with respect to the denial of his request for sanctions, for reasons similar to those
stated above in the Court’s denial of Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis [Doc. #406], the Court will deny Defendant Wilson’s separate Motion for Certification
of Appealability [Doc. #410]. Furthermore, the Court is not of the opinion that the reasons that
the Court has given for the denial of Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions involve
a controlling question of law that raises a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to
whether Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Sanctions should have been denied, given that the
denial of Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions was totally within the Court’s
discretion to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). For all of these reasons, the Court will deny
Defendant Wilson’s Motion for Certification of Appealability [Doc. #410].5
For all of these reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Wilson’s
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. #406] is DENIED.

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The Court notes that as a result of rulings by the Court, or by way of concession by
Plaintiffs, that certain claims previously asserted against Defendant Wilson should be dismissed,
Defendant Wilson has been completely terminated as a litigant in this action, even though the
case continues toward trial involving certain remaining litigants. Defendant Wilson nevertheless
has filed a Notice of Appeal [Doc. #405] to the Court’s denial of his Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions [Doc. #367] against Plaintiffs and their counsel.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Wilson’s Motion for a Certification of
Appealability [Doc. #410] is DENIED.
This, the 30th day of May, 2014.

United States District Judge

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