BROOKS v. BARNES et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION & RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD signed on 8/22/2012, recommending that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 34 ) be granted and that the instant action be dismissed. (Daniel, J)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLES RAY BROOKS, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHERIFF B.J. BARNES,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
1:09CV214
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The instant matter comes before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for a recommended ruling on Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 34).
For the reasons that
follow, the Court should grant the instant Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an Amended Complaint
asserting constitutional violations against Guilford County Sheriff
B.J.
Barnes,
in
his
individual
capacity,
for
Conditions/Lack of outside recreation 21 hour lock down.”
Entry 26 at 2.)1
“Living
(Docket
The entirety of the facts section in the Amended
Complaint provides:
Plaintiff states that he was housed at the High
Point Guilford County Jail from October 1 2007 thru [sic]
1
Plaintiff’s original Complaint also named “Montgomery
(Major),” “C. Williamson (Captain),” “Hairston (Sgt.),” “R. Tinsley
(Sgt.),” “D.S. Robertson (Capt.),” “Rollins (LT.),” and “Robert
Lanier (Sgt.)” as Defendants.
(Docket Entry 2 at 2-3.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint abandoned Plaintiff’s claims against
those individuals, naming “Sheriff B.J. Barnes” as the sole
Defendant. (Docket Entry 26 at 1-2.)
December 17, 2009.
While housed at this facility,
Plaintiff lived in a cell that was approximately Nine (9)
Feet by Seven (7) Feet and was only allowed out of his
cell for three (3) hours a day. Furthermore, Plaintiff
states he was not allowed outside recreation whatsoever
in the whole Twenty-Six and a half months he was held in
custody. Plaintiff states, [sic] that this treatment was
not due to his misbehavior. Policy at the said [sic]
facility dictates inmates [sic] time out of cell.
(Id. at 3 (errant capitalization in original).)
Defendant has now filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Docket
Entry 34), contending that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and thus should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (see Docket Entry 35 at 2-3).
Plaintiff has filed a
Response (Docket Entry 39) and Defendant has replied (Docket Entry
40).
DISCUSSION
A plaintiff fails to state a claim when the complaint does not
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009)
(emphasis
Ashcroft v.
added)
(internal
citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to
relief.”’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
This standard
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”
Id.
In other words, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
-2-
inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”
Id.2
Moreover, the Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however
inartfully
pleaded,
must
be
held
to
less
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
stringent
Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
However, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s
requirement
that
a
pleading
contain
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly
standard in dismissing pro se complaint); accord Atherton v.
District of Columbia Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (“A pro se complaint . . . ‘must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’
But even a
pro se complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the
court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’”
(quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679,
respectively)).
Because Plaintiff’s allegations relate to the conditions of
his confinement as a pretrial detainee (see Docket Entry 39 at 2),
2
“[D]etermining whether a complaint states on its face a
plausible claim for relief and therefore can survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion . . . requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588
F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
-3-
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes the
framework for evaluating Plaintiff’s claim.
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
See Bell v. Wolfish,
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law.” Id. at 535-36. “However, not
every hardship encountered during pretrial detention amounts to
‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.”
F.2d
987,
991
restriction
impermissible
(4th
of
Cir.
1992).
confinement
‘punishment’”
A
amounts
if
it
Hill v. Nicodemus, 979
particular
to
was
a
“(1)
condition
or
“constitutionally
imposed
with
an
expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an
intent to punish may be inferred.”
Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d
863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-40).
Moreover, the challenged condition must have imposed restrictions
of sufficient severity so as to implicate the Constitution.
See
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21 (“‘There is, of course, a de minimis
level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.’”
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)).
Under this standard, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim because his allegations regarding “21 hour lock down”
and a general “[l]ack of outside recreation” (Docket Entry 26 at 2)
do not rise to a level of constitutional concern.
See, e.g.,
Callicutt v. Panola Cnty. Jail, No. 98-60193, 200 F.3d 816 (table),
1999 WL 1095663, at *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 1999) (unpublished)
(“[T]he magistrate judge’s report correctly noted that neither
-4-
prisoners nor pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to
outdoor exercise or recreation.” (citation omitted)); Jones v.
Kelly, No. 89-6651, 900 F.2d 252 (table), 1990 WL 33936, at *1 (4th
Cir. Mar. 8, 1990) (unpublished) (“It is well settled that jails
may
provide
space
for
indoor
exercise
and
recreation
as
an
alternative to outdoor recreational facilities, absent medical
evidence demonstrating a need for outdoor exercise.”); Kinser v.
County of San Bernardino, No. ED CV 11-0718-RGK (PJW), 2011 WL
4801899, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (unpublished) (“[The
plaintiff] alleges that she has been confined to her cell more than
22 hours a day and that she has had to eat all her meals in her
cell in close proximity to her toilet.
These allegations by
themselves do not state a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim.”); O’Mara v. Hillsborough Cnty. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 08-cv-51-SM, 2008 WL 5077001, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 24, 2008)
(unpublished) (“[The plaintiff’s] allegations are insufficient to
state a cognizable constitutional claim. His complaint that he was
afforded only two hours of out-of-cell time a day does not state a
claim of constitutional dimension.”).
In addition, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not state a
plausible claim to relief because it does not allege facts, which,
if accepted as true, could establish that Defendant implemented the
restrictions of which Plaintiff complains “with an expressed intent
to punish” or that such restrictions were “not reasonably related
to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective,” from which the
Court might infer an intent to punish, Martin, 849 F.2d at 870.
-5-
See, e.g., Kibwika v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 453 Fed.
App’x 915, 919 (11th Cir. 2012) (“In his amended complaint, [the
plaintiff] failed to state a plausible claim for relief because he
provided no factual allegations which, if accepted as true, show
that jail officials imposed the lockdown for the purpose of
punishment.”); Santana v. Aviles, Civil No. 11-2611 (FSH), 2011 WL
6002260,
at
*4
(D.N.J.
Nov.
30,
2011)
(unpublished)
(“[The
plaintiff] complains that the pretrial detainee unit on which he
was housed was on lockdown for over 270 days, during which time
detainees had no outdoor recreation.
Although [the plaintiff’s]
allegations are consistent with a finding that the lockdown and
denial
of
access
to
outdoor
recreation
were
arbitrary
and
purposeless, [the plaintiff’s] allegations are also consistent with
restrictions that constitute a rational response by jail officials
to an incident or other circumstances warranting a need for
heightened security during this period.”).3
CONCLUSION
Because the conditions Plaintiff describes in his Amended
Complaint do not amount to a constitutional violation and Plaintiff
has
failed
to
sufficiently
allege
any
intent
to
punish
or
circumstances from which an intent to punish might be inferred,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
3
In fact, Plaintiff’s only allegation which the Court can
construe as addressing this issue appears to suggest the contrary:
“Plaintiff states, [sic] that this treatment was not due to his
misbehavior. Policy at the said [sic] facility dictates inmates
[sic] time out of cell.” (Docket Entry 26 at 3.)
-6-
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 34) be granted and that the instant
action be dismissed.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
August 22, 2012
-7-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?