JONES v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 9/28/12, Recommending that NCDOT's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 12 ) be granted in part, in that all claims against NCDOT should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment and in that Claims One and Two should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, such that Claims Three, Four, and Five should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the Court's exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Recommending that Goodwill's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 15 ) be denied as moot because, as a result of the disposition of NCDOT's Motion to Dismiss, no federal claim surv ives and Claim Four (the only claim against Goodwill) should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the exercise of the Court's discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Ordering that Plaintiff's Motion to Reissue Summons is DENIED AS MOOT. (Law, Trina)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MICHAEL FORREST JONES,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and GOODWILL
INDUSTRIES OF NORTHWEST NORTH
CAROLINA, INC.,
Defendants.
1:09CV1009
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
matter
comes
before
the
undersigned
United
States
Magistrate Judge on the Motion to Dismiss Submitted by Defendant
North Carolina Department of Transportation (Docket Entry 12),
Defendant Goodwill Industries of Northwest North Carolina, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 15), and Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reissue Summons (Docket Entry 21).
21, 2010.)
(See Docket Entry dated Dec.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss
should be granted and Plaintiff’s Motion to Reissue Summons will be
denied.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff Michael Forrest Jones claims to be
“domiciled in Pennsylvania, but [] currently residing in the state
of North Carolina contemplating a permanent relocation.”
Entry 2, ¶ 1.)
(Docket
The Complaint offers no facts in support of his
claim of “domicile” in Pennsylvania.
(See id.)
It describes
Defendant North Carolina Department of Transportation (“NCDOT”) as
“an agency of the State of North Carolina” and Defendant Goodwill
Industries of Northwest North Carolina, Inc. (“Goodwill”) as “a
private, not-for-profit charitable organization operating out of
Winston-Salem, North Carolina.”
The
Complaint
Services,
¶ 3(c).)
Inc.”
describes
(“Mohawk”)
(Id.)
“Mohawk
as
Flooring
Plaintiff’s
and
Janitorial
“employer.”
(Id.
According to the Complaint, “Plaintiff was employed by
Mohawk on or about July 17, 2009 as an attendant at the rest area
[on
Interstate
40
in
Davie
County,
North
Carolina,
between
Mocksville and Winston-Salem], to perform cleaning and maintenance
duties at the rest area pursuant to a contract between [NC]DOT and
Mohawk . . . .”
(Id. ¶ 4.)
The Complaint lays out a series of
objections to the contract and working relationship between Mohawk
and NCDOT. (See id. ¶¶ 7-10.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges
that:
(1)
NCDOT
employees
“directly
supervise[]
and
control[]
the
[Mohawk] employees at the rest areas . . . and demand[] that
specific work be done, whether or not the work is called for
in the contract” (id. ¶ 8(a); see also id. ¶ 8(d) (“[NC]DOT
regularly
and
habitually
gives
orders
directly
to
the
employees of the rest area; and cites problems at the rest
area . . . directly to the employees at the rest area without
2
going
through
Mohawk’s
management,
or
without
informing
Mohawk’s management until some later time if at all.”));
(2)
NCDOT employees “set the thermostats in the rest area’s
buildings at 68 degrees - resulting in an uncomfortably low
temperature in the working area because the readout on the
thermostat is probably inaccurate or malfunctioning - and
stated that any modification of the thermostat by employees
will result in ‘immediate termination’” (id. ¶ 8(c));
(3)
NCDOT requires Mohawk employees to fill out extensive time
sheets such that “[t]he specific activities of any Mohawk
employee from moment to moment are directly accountable to the
[NC]DOT” (id. ¶ 8(e));
(4)
the
contract
negotiated
between
between
Mohawk
the
and
[NC]DOT
NCDOT,
and
which
Mohawk
“was
nor
open
not
to
negotiation” (id. ¶ 9(f)), specifically sets the hourly rate
of pay for Mohawk employees, the times at which each employee
begins and ends his or her shift, job duties of each employee
and the days and times for completion, and disciplinary
actions for NCDOT (id. ¶ 9(a)-(e)); and
(5)
NCDOT
generally
“refused
to
permit
necessary
and
proper
maintenance of items within the rest area that is [sic] easily
within the capability of Mohawk and its employees, then sought
to fault Mohawk and its employees for inadequate maintenance”
(id. ¶ 10(d)).
3
In light of the foregoing allegations, the Complaint asserts
that “[t]he rest area employees are employed by the [NC]DOT [rather
than Mohawk] by every standard used to define ‘employment’ by the
Fair Labor Standards Act [], the courts, and the Internal Revenue
Service . . . .”
(Id. ¶ 11(a).)
The Complaint goes on to allege
that NCDOT manufactured a rationale for terminating the contract
with Mowhawk (see id. ¶¶ 12-14) and then entered into negotiations
with
Goodwill
“without
going
through
any
bidding
process
as
required by law” (id. ¶ 16).
Based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff first asserts a claim
against
NCDOT
for
“Violation
of
Fourteenth
Constitution, by [NCDOT]” (see id. ¶¶ 19-26).
Amendment,
U.S.
In this claim,
Plaintiff asserts that his allegations show that he and other
Mohawk employees were constructively employees of the State of
North Carolina, and that the contract between NCDOT and Goodwill
will perpetuate that status.
(Id. ¶¶ 19-24.)
As a result, he
claims that:
pursuant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; so
long as he is working under the direct control and
supervision of the [NC]DOT . . . he and the other rest
area employees are entitled to the same compensation and
the same benefits . . . as provided by law to other
employees of the state of North Carolina and on the same
terms.
(Id. ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff next asserts a claim for “Failure by the [NC]DOT to
treat plaintiff and other Mohawk employees similarly situated in a
4
manner similar to all other state employees as required under the
Equal Protection clause.”
(Id. ¶ 27.)
This claim in its entirety
states:
For a second claim, [P]laintiff repeats and realleges the
facts set forth in Paragraphs 19 through 25; and on the
basis of the facts set forth therein, asserts that he is
entitled to compensation for any difference in pay and
benefits as set forth in Paragraph 26 and accumulating or
having accumulated from his original date of hire on or
about July 17, 2009.
(Id. ¶ 27.)
The paragraphs Plaintiff cites in support of this
claim (paragraphs 19-25 and 26) form the entirety of Claim One.
There is no apparent legal distinction between Plaintiff’s first
and second claims.
In the first, Plaintiff claims entitlement to
compensation and benefits comparable to those of State employees;
in the second, he essentially seeks relief as a result of that
entitlement.
Plaintiff also asserts the following state law claims in his
Complaint: “Wrongful termination of employment” against NCDOT (id.
¶ 28); “Improper business interference by [NCDOT] and Goodwill []”
(id. ¶¶ 29-33); and “Public nuisance by [NCDOT]” (id. ¶¶ 34-37).
NCDOT and Goodwill separately moved to dismiss the claims against
them.
(Docket Entries 12, 15.)
Plaintiff responded in opposition
(Docket Entry 23) and both Defendants replied (Docket Entries 25,
26).
Plaintiff has also moved to reissue his Summons.
Entry 21.)
5
(Docket
DISCUSSION
Defendant NCDOT argues that it “is shielded from Plaintiff’s
claims by Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .”
9.)
(Docket Entry 13 at
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
Const. amend. XI.
U.S.
Furthermore, “‘an unconsenting State is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as
by citizens of another state.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quoting Employees v. Missouri
Pub. Health & Welfare Dep’t, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973)).
“This
immunity extends to any State instrumentality that is considered an
‘arm of the State.’” Blackburn v. Trustees of Guilford Tech. Cmty.
Coll., 822 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (Schroeder, J.)
(quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30
(1997)).
NCDOT is an arm of the State of North Carolina and, therefore,
the Eleventh Amendment shields it from suit in federal court unless
it consents.
See Weaks v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 761 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 296 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (Schroeder, J.) (“Defendants
[NCDOT, NCDMV] are arms of the State of North Carolina.”); see also
Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 705
6
(4th Cir. 1999) (NCDMV, “as a department of the state, is immune
from suit . . .”).
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that
either the State of North Carolina or NCDOT have consented to suit
in federal court brought under the Equal Protection Clause or the
state law causes of action at issue in this case.
(See Docket
Entry 2.)
Under these circumstances, the claims against NCDOT are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.
See, e.g.,
Joseph v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746,
748 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We find that the district court properly
dismissed [the plaintiff’s] complaint [asserting a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause against a state agency] because it is
barred
by
the
Eleventh
Amendment
of
the
United
States
Constitution.”); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars the state law and federal Equal
Protection claims against the State of Ohio and we DISMISS those
claims.”); Houck & Sons, Inc. v. Transylvania Cnty., No. 93-1462,
36 F.3d 1092 (table), 1994 WL 175527, at *1 (4th Cir. May 10, 1994)
(unpublished) (affirming district court’s ruling that “Eleventh
Amendment barred [the plaintiff’s] equal protection claim against
the defendants because [they] are state agents entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity”).
Even without the Eleventh Amendment bar, Plaintiff’s claims
under the Equal Protection Clause fail on the merits for the
7
reasons
stated
in
the
undersigned’s
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
5-8.)
denial
of
Plaintiff’s
(See Docket Entry 11 at
The only remaining claims arise under state law.
Docket Entry 2, ¶¶ 28-37.)
(See
Given the absence of a viable federal
constitutional or statutory claim and of grounds for the exercise
of diversity jurisdiction,1 any remaining state law claim should
not proceed in this Court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a [state] claim . . . [when] the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)
(“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though
not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims
should be dismissed as well.”); Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., Md.,
528 F.3d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 2008) (“With all its federal questions
1
Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no facts to support the legal
conclusion that he is “domiciled” in Pennsylvania, despite residing
in North Carolina (Docket Entry 2, ¶ 1).
The only allegations
concerning Defendants’ citizenship support the conclusion that both
are citizens of North Carolina.
(See id.)
Under these
circumstances, no diversity of citizenship exists. Furthermore,
the Complaint does not allege damages of more than $75,000. (See
id. ¶¶ 38-39 (requesting actual damages “of no less than ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) from each defendant” and punitive
damages “of no less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) from each
defendant”).)
“[Where] [t]he stated demand is for damages in
excess of $10,000 . . . [and the plaintiff] asks for both
compensatory and punitive damages, the value of th[e] claim is
speculative. A finding of jurisdiction cannot be premised on such
speculation.” Gwyn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 44, 46
(M.D.N.C. 1996).
8
gone, there may be the authority to keep [the case] in federal
court . . . but there is no good reason to do so.”).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s claims against NCDOT may not proceed in this Court
under the Eleventh Amendment and his federal law claims would fail
on the merits regardless.
Under such circumstances, any remaining
state law claim should not proceed in this Court.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that NCDOT’s Motion to Dismiss
(Docket Entry 12) be granted in part, in that all claims against
NCDOT should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment and in that
Claims One and Two should be dismissed with prejudice for failure
to state a claim, such that Claims Three, Four, and Five should be
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the Court’s exercise of its
discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Goodwill’s Motion to Dismiss
(Docket Entry 15) be denied as moot because, as a result of the
disposition of NCDOT’s Motion to Dismiss, no federal claim survives
and
Claim
Four
(the
only
claim
against
Goodwill)
should
be
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the exercise of the Court’s
discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
9
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reissue Summons is
DENIED AS MOOT.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
September 28, 2012
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