GOODWIN v. COOPER
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE L. PATRICK AULD on 6/6/2013, that Petitioner's Motion to Reverse Judgment (Docket Entry 47 ) be denied. (Lloyd, Donna)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MARLON GOODWIN,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioner,
v.
ALVIN W. KELLER,
Respondent.
1:10CV679
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
case
comes
before
the
undersigned
United
States
Magistrate Judge for a recommended ruling on Petitioner’s pro se
Motion to Reverse Judgment (Docket Entry 47). For the reasons that
follow, the Court should deny Petitioner’s instant Motion.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner instituted this action by filing a pro se Petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
(Docket Entry 2.)
On September 16, 2011,
the Court (per Senior United States District Judge N. Carlton
Tilley,
Jr.,
adopting
the
recommendation
of
United
Magistrate Judge Wallace W. Dixon) denied the Petition.
Entry 25, 26; see also Docket Entry 22.)
States
(Docket
Petitioner thereafter
filed a Notice of Appeal on September 22, 2011. (Docket Entry 27.)
On September 30, 2011, Petitioner moved, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), for the Court to alter, reconsider,
and amend that denial.
(Docket Entry 31.)
The appeal proceeded
prior to any action by the Court on that Rule 59(e) Motion and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered an
order of dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal as follows:
[Petitioner] seeks to appeal the district court’s
order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)
petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit
justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of
appealability will not issue absent “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006).
When the district court
denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would
find that the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district
court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner
must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural
ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a
debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right.
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85.
We have independently reviewed the record and
conclude that [Petitioner] has not made the requisite
showing.
Accordingly, we deny a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal.
(Docket Entry 38 at 2.)
Petitioner subsequently filed a document objecting to the
failure of the Court to address his Rule 59(e) Motion.
Entry 41.)
(Docket
By Order dated March 11, 2013, the Court (per Judge
Tilley) denied Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) Motion, by adopting a
recommendation by the undersigned Magistrate Judge over objections
by Petitioner.
(See Docket Entries 43, 45, 46.)
On March 26,
2013, Petitioner filed the instant Motion and supporting brief.
(Docket Entries 47, 48.)
Petitioner also noticed an appeal “from
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the final Judgment and or Order refusing to reinstate Petitioner’s
Rule 59(e) Motion entered in this action on or about the 11th day
of March 2013.”
(Docket Entry 49 at 1.)1
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends that, “pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3); or
60(b)(6) of the Fed. R. Civ. P., . . . this [C]ourt [should]
reverse it [sic] Final Judgment . . . .”
(Docket Entry 48 at 1.)
The provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 referenced by
Petitioner state as follows:
“On motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (3) fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; . . . or (6) any other reason that
justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “In determining whether
1
Despite the fact that said Notice expressly references the
Order entered by Judge Tilley on March 11, 2013, Petitioner dated
said Notice as signed on “the 10th day of March 2013.” (Docket
Entry 49 at 1.) The Clerk stamped said Notice as filed on April
15, 2013 (id.), a date consistent with stamps on the envelope
Petitioner used to convey said Notice reflecting its receipt by
this Court on April 15, 2013, its receipt by North Carolina prison
officials on April 11, 2013, and its postmarking on April 11, 2013
(Docket Entry 49-1 at 1).
Further, although said Notice
characterizes the Order of March 11, 2013, as having “refus[ed] to
reinstate Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) Motion” (Docket Entry 49 at 1),
said Order, in fact, documented the Court’s “de novo determination
in accord with the [undersigned] Magistrate Judge’s report” (Docket
Entry 46 at 1) and the Court’s action “adopt[ing] the [undersigned]
Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” (id.). Said Recommendation, in
turn, expressly considered Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) Motion on the
merits (see Docket Entry 43 at 4) and recommended its denial
because “Petitioner ha[d] failed to provide a valid basis under
Federal Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the Court’s prior Order and
Judgment dismissing his Petition” (id. at 5).
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to exercise the power to relieve against a judgment under 60(b),
the courts must engage in the delicate balancing of the sanctity of
final judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the
incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in
light of All the facts.”
Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d
96, 102 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (capitalization
for effect in original).
Accordingly, “certain requirements have
been established by the Rule and the courts that must be met by
those seeking relief under this extraordinary remedy.”
Id.
First, a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) must “have a
meritorious claim or defense . . . .”
496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011).
Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d
Second, “[a] motion under Rule 60(b)
must be made within a reasonable time – and for reasons (1), (2),
and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or
order or the date of the proceeding.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Third, Rule 60(b)(6) and Rule 60(b)(1)-(5) are mutually exclusive;
where a claim could arise under subsections (b)(1)-(5), a movant
may not invoke subsection (b)(6).
See Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 n.11 (1988). Fourth, “[w]here
the motion is nothing more than a request that the district court
change its mind, . . . it is not authorized by Rule 60(b).”
United
States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1982); see also
Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501 (ruling that Rule 60(b) cannot serve as
“substitute for an appeal”).
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As grounds for his instant Motion, Petitioner asserts that
“misconduct of the Respondent and their agents took place in the
form
of
having
a
policy
that
denied
[p]ro-[s]e
[h]abeas
[p]etitioners whom were to [sic] poor to hire their own attorney to
represent them on collateral review of their convictions a law
library and also denying such indigent [p]etitioners access to a
law library after the [p]etitioner[s] had their case rejected by
North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services . . . .”
at 2.)
(Docket Entry 48
Petitioner further contends that, as a result, he “failed
to understand the applicable laws to be applied to IAC [ineffective
assistance of counsel] claims . . . [and he] failed in properly
learning of and understanding the prejudice part of [such claims]
. . . and what to assert and allege in [his] Petition for Habeas
Corpus, which thereafter lead [sic] this Court to deny [him] relief
on [his] claim of IAC in failing to investigate and assert the
defense of self-defense.” (Id. at 5.) Petitioner also argues that
the state trial court’s “ruling as to [his] claim #3 was in err
[sic].
Also
this
Court[’s]
decision
to
apply
the
highly
deferential standards of review of § 2254(d) is also in err [sic].”
(Id. at 10; see also id. at 11 (requesting that Court “give
[Petitioner] the de novo standard of review of this claim as well
as claim #5 an [sic] #7” and asserting that state trial court “did
not address [claim #7] at all nor did this Court did not [sic]
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address this claim properly as well”).)
These contentions do not
provide proper grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) or (6).
First, Petitioner has failed to show that he has a meritorious
claim as required, see Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501; in other words,
after a thorough review, the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes
that nothing presented by Petitioner in connection with his instant
Motion would alter the determination by the Fourth Circuit, based
on its own, independent review, that reasonable jurists could not
debate the decision of this Court to deny the Petition and/or that
the Petition failed to present a debatable claim (see Docket Entry
38 at 2).
within
a
Second, Petitioner did not file the instant Motion
reasonable
time,
as
required,
see
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
60(c)(1), but instead waited over 18 months after entry of judgment
(and even beyond adjudication of his appeal by the Fourth Circuit)
before raising a matter (i.e., the absence of a law library at his
prison) about which he had knowledge when he filed his Petition;
moreover, to the extent Petitioner seeks to proceed under Rule
60(b)(3), he failed to file the instant Motion within a year of the
Court’s judgment, as required, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Third, to the extent Petitioner bases his instant Motion on alleged
misconduct by Respondent, a matter specifically addressed by Rule
60(b)(3), Petitioner cannot invoke Rule 60(b)(6).
486 U.S. at 864 n.11.
See Liljeberg,
Fourth, to the extent Petitioner asserts
that the Court made legal errors in adjudicating his Petition, he
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cannot proceed via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Williams, 674 F.2d at 313.
See
As a final matter, Petitioner’s
assertion that North Carolina must provide both law libraries and
access to North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services (“NCPLS”) lacks
merit.
See Coil v. Peterkin, No. 1:07CV145, 2009 WL 3247848, at
*10 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2009) (unpublished) (citing collection of
cases in Wrenn v. Freeman, 894 F. Supp. 244, 248 (E.D.N.C. 1995),
recognizing that NCPLS “satisfies the Constitution’s requirement
that inmates be given meaningful access to the courts”).
CONCLUSION
Petitioner has failed to provide a valid basis for relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) or (6).
IT
IS
THEREFORE
RECOMMENDED
that
Petitioner’s
Motion
Reverse Judgment (Docket Entry 47) be denied.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
June 6, 2013
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