MAXWELL v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC.

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by JUDGE JAMES A. BEATY, JR on 11/07/2014 as set out herein. ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is hereby affirmed and adopted, and that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 12 is GRANTED, and this matter is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to file Class Certification [Doc. # 22 is DENIED as moot.(Taylor, Abby)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RONNIE MAXWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant.

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1:10CV918

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BEATY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge [Doc.
#34] in the consolidated cases of 1:12-cv-477 (Yancey, lead case), 1:12-cv-437 (Henderson,
member case) and 1:10-cv-918 (Maxwell, member case) that Plaintiffs’ Complaints be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted. The Recommendation was filed on September 30, 2013, and notice was served on
the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). On October 17, 2013, Plaintiff Ronnie Maxwell filed
Objections [Docs. #36, #37]. Plaintiffs William S. Yancey and David C. Henderson filed
stipulations of dismissal thus terminating their respective cases, therefore, only the case of
Maxwell v. Remington Arms Company, LLC, case number 1:10-cv-918, remains before the
Court.
Upon a de novo review of Plaintiff Ronnie Maxwell’s Objections and relevant portions
of the Recommendation, the Court finds that the Objections do not change the substance of
the Magistrate Judge’s ruling. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will affirm and adopt
the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation as to the case of Plaintiff Ronnie Maxwell (“Plaintiff”).

In doing so, the Court will also deny as moot Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Extension of Time
to file Class Certification [Doc. #22].
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2010, Plaintiff Ronnie Maxwell, a citizen of Texas, filed a Complaint

[Doc. #1] against Defendant Remington Arms Company, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Middle
District of North Carolina. On December 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc.
#8]. Plaintiff brought the case as a class action and asserted claims of breach of warranty under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, unjust enrichment, and unfair and deceptive conduct under
the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Plaintiff’s claims stem from his purchase of two of Defendant’s model number 597 17
HMR semi-automatic rifles (the “597 17 HMR”). Plaintiff alleged that he purchased the two
firearms, but he did not specify when, where, or from whom he made the purchases, or how
much he paid for each 597 17 HMR. Plaintiff listed several advertising statements attributed
to Defendant without any further context and without stating that Plaintiff received or
encountered such statements prior to his purchases. Next, Plaintiff alleged “Remington’s
representations concerning the Remington Model 597 17 HMR rifles and ammunition were
false, misleading and deceptive.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleged that Defendant recalled all 597 17
HMRs “[d]ue to safety and performance concerns,” and that Defendant directed owners to
immediately cease using any 597 17 HMR and corresponding ammunition. (Id. at 4) Plaintiff
concluded his factual allegations by asserting that due to this recall, he could not use or sell his

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two 597 17 HMRs, and thus the rifles are now worthless.1
Under his claim for breach of express warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312, Plaintiff alleged that “[w]ith respect to all Remington 597
17 HMR rifles sold, Remington made a written limited warranty as defined by 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301
(6) and 2303(a).” (Pl.’s Am. Compl.[Doc. #8], at 6.) Plaintiff, however, did not provide any
details as to the alleged contents of this warranty or as to Plaintiff’s specific knowledge of the
warranty before purchasing the firearms. Plaintiff further alleged that “Remington made known
its breach of the limited warranty on or about August 2009 when it issued a recall of all
Remington 597 17 HMR rifles.” (Id.) Plaintiff further asserted that Defendant failed to “remedy
the warranty” under the MMWA. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff sought actual damages for the
purchase prices of the 597 17 HMRs.
In Plaintiff’s second claim for unjust enrichment, he made general allegations that
“Plaintiff and the Class paid for their rifles purchases in cash or its equivalent,” and that
“allow[ing] Remington to keep the cash or its equivalent . . . would unjustly enrich Remington
at the expense of the innocent Plaintiff and Class.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff’s third and final claim
filed pursuant to the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”)
alleged that “Defendant represented that the Model 597 17 HMR rifles and ammunition would
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint did not elaborate upon the reason for the recall beyond
safety and performance issues and a brief allegation that “Remington also cannot sell a . . . 597
17 HMR rifle due to inherent problems with the ammunition in semi-automatic weapons.” (Pl.’s
Am. Compl. [Doc. #8], at 8.) However, Defendant explained and the Magistrate Judge observed
that the recall was prompted when Defendant received notice from Federal Cartridge, the only
manufacturer of ammunition for the 597 17 HMR, that the ammunition was not safe for use
with any semi-automatic gun. Although Mr. Yancey brought independent claims against Federal
Cartridge, Plaintiff did not include Federal Cartridge as a defendant in the present case.
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be free from defects and fit for their intended purpose, under normal conditions of use, wear,
and exposure.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserted that Defendant knew or should have known that the 597
17 HMR and ammunition “did not or would not conform to Defendant’s representations and
promises” in its marketing materials. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that Defendant intended for
consumers to rely on these representations, and that because of these “misrepresentations,
material omissions, and business practices, Plaintiff and the Class believed that Defendant was
selling and providing a safe and reliable rifle for hunting and/or target practice.” (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff also alleged that the transactions at issue were in or affecting commerce, and that the
alleged unfair or deceptive acts of Defendant would lead reasonable consumers to believe that
the 597 17 HMR and its ammunition “would be free from defects and fit for their intended
purpose.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff did not make any allegations as to his use of the 597 17
HMRs since he purchased them. Plaintiff complained that consumers were never informed
what Defendant’s response would be in the event of a recall, and that the coupons Defendant
offered to owners of a 597 17 HMR “do not necessarily provide a full refund . . . and . . . require
consumers to buy another Remington product.” (Id.) Plaintiff concluded with general
allegations that Defendant’s “misrepresentations, material omissions, and business practices .
. . constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts or practices” under the UDTPA, which “proximately
caused actual injury/damage” to the class, including Plaintiff. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff nowhere
specified any injury or how such an injury was caused by Defendant.
On January 20, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #12] based upon
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint’s failure to state a claim. On June 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a

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Motion for Extension of Time to File Class Certification [Doc. #22]. On June 25, 2013,
Magistrate Judge Joe L. Webster issued an Order [Doc. #33] consolidating Plaintiff’s case with
Henderson v. Remington Arms Company, LLC, case number 1:12-cv-437, and Yancey v.
Remington Arms Company, LLC, case number 12-cv-477, and the Magistrate Judge designated
Yancey as the lead case. Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss in all three cases. On September
30, 2013, Magistrate Judge Webster issued his Memorandum Opinion and Recommendation
[Doc. #34] recommending that all three cases be dismissed.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
In evaluating a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Fourth Circuit instructs that

“[w]e ‘take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ but ‘we need not accept the legal
conclusions drawn from the facts.’ ” Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, 714 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir.
2013) (quoting E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir.
2000)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S.Ct. 1955, 1974 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Such “facial plausibility” is satisfied when “the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to constitute
well-pled facts,” and a court does not consider “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments” when evaluating the legal sufficiency of a complaint on a 12(b)(6)

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motion. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation as to his breach of warranty

claim under the MMWA and his claim under the UDTPA.2 Plaintiff’s objections are largely
restatements—sometimes verbatim—of his arguments offered in his Response in Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #16]. Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
arguments do not alter the nature or substance of the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation, as
more fully discussed below.
A.

Breach of Warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

In objecting to dismissal of his MMWA claim, Plaintiff argues that (1) reliance is not
required for a breach of express warranty claim3 and (2) regardless, Plaintiff did plead reliance.
When a party brings a breach of warranty claim under the MMWA, courts apply state law for
the breach of warranty action unless expressly altered by the federal statute. Carlson v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1989); Baldwin v. Jarett Bay Yacht Sales, LLC, 683
F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (“Where a ‘consumer’ seeks relief for breach of a ‘written
warranty’ from a ‘warrantor’ or ‘supplier,’ Congress expected courts to look to state warranty law
except as expressly modified in the MMWA.”).

“The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

Plaintiff does not contest the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss his unjust
enrichment claim.
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In his Objections, Plaintiff argues only that he pled an express warranty and does not
appear to argue that he pled or intended to plead an implied warranty of merchantability.
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supplements, rather than supplants state law.” Doll v. Ford Motor Co., 814 F. Supp. 2d 526,
545 (D. Md. 2011).
Under North Carolina law,4 a breach of express warranty claim requires a showing of the
following elements: (1) an express warranty of fact or a promise as to the product, (2) the
plaintiff’s reliance on the warranty in choosing to purchase the product, and (3) the defendant’s
breach of the warranty. Earp v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 5:11-CV-680-D, 2013 WL
4854488, at *5 (E.D.N.C. September 11, 2013); Prichard Enters. v. Adkins, 858 F. Supp. 2d 576,
584-85 (E.D.N.C. 2012); Harbour Point Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. DJF Enters., Inc., 206 N.C.
App. 152, 162, 697 S.E.2d 439, 447 (2010). An express warranty may be a written document,
or it may take the form of an “affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes the basis of the bargain.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2313(1)(a). However, an “affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting
to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.”
Id. at § 25-2-313(2). In determining whether a seller’s affirmation or description becomes the
“basis of the bargain,” North Carolina courts look to certain factors, including “whether the
buyer knew of the seller’s statements.” Pake v. Byrd, 55 N.C. App. 551, 553, 286 S.E.2d 588, 590
(1982).
Plaintiff challenges the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Plaintiff failed to
adequately plead the element of reliance. In making this objection, Plaintiff argues that reliance

The Magistrate Judge determined that application of North Carolina law was
appropriate for all claims, and Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s choice of law
analysis or conclusion.
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can be inferred from purchase or use of a product. However, even the portion of the case
quoted by Plaintiff in making this argument undermines Plaintiff’s position: “[T]he element of
reliance can often be inferred from allegations of mere purchase or use if the natural tendency
of the representations made is such as to induce such purchase or use.” Bernick v. Jurden, 306
N.C. 435, 448, 293 S.E.2d 405, 413 (1982).5 Plaintiff’s allegations, however, are not sufficient
to merit such an inference. Even more so, Plaintiff did not allege any of the circumstances of
his purchase or use of the 597 17 HMRs.6 Although Plaintiff alluded to Defendant’s written
limited warranty in his Complaint, Plaintiff never alleged the terms of that warranty, that he
received the warranty prior to purchase, or that he otherwise relied on the warranty. To the
extent that Plaintiff intended to premise his breach of warranty on Defendant’s representations
in its marketing materials, such allegations are likewise insufficient. For example, Plaintiff did
not make any allegations of being induced into his purchase by Defendant’s advertisements.
Indeed, Plaintiff never alleged that he even observed Defendant’s advertisements. Even viewed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the mere fact that he purchased two 597 17 HMRs, along
The Court notes that Bernick is also distinguishable from the present matter.
Procedurally, Bernick was decided at the summary judgment stage and thus did not consider the
legal sufficiency of the complaint. 306 N.C. at 447-48, 293 S.E.2d at 413-14. Second, there was
evidence of the plaintiff’s purpose in purchasing the warranted product and the plaintiff’s
subsequent use of the product. Id. Here, Plaintiff did not make any allegations as to why he
purchased the 597 17 HMRs nor did he describe what was his intended use of the rifles.
Moreover, Bernick was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s Iqbal and Twombly decisions
which demand greater specificity in pleading actions than previously required.
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Plaintiff’s citation to Bussian v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 614 (M.D.N.C.
2006), is likewise misplaced. The plaintiff in Bussian specifically alleged that he “reasonably
relied on Defendants’ representations and warranties regarding the quality, durability, and other
material characteristics . . . and that those representations became a basis of the bargain between
Defendants and Plaintiff.” Id. at 621. Plaintiff did not make any such allegations here.
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with the fact that Defendant made certain statements in its advertising materials, provides an
insufficient basis in and of itself to support drawing an inference of reliance or inducement.
Instead, the statements Plaintiff focused upon tend to be more of a “seller’s opinion or
commendation,” see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-313(2), rather than promises of specific
performance. Simply put, under the legal standards discussed above, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks
sufficient facial plausibility as to his warranty claim with regards to the reliance element as
identified by the Magistrate Judge.
In addition, Plaintiff’s argument that he is not required to plead reliance is severely
diminished to the extent Plaintiff attempts to simultaneously argue that he did indeed sufficiently
plead reliance. This is true especially in view of Plaintiff citing to multiple cases discussing
reliance as an element of a breach of warranty claim. Regardless, as already discussed above,
reliance is indeed a required element of a breach of warranty claim. E.g., Earp, 2013 WL
4854488, at *5.
The Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation focused on Plaintiff’s failure to adequately
allege the reliance element of a breach of an express warranty claim. In reviewing the
Recommendation, the Court finds that this fact alone is sufficient reason to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claim without the need to evaluate the other elements of Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff nonetheless
argued that he sufficiently pled both breach of warranty and or a product defect. However, as
it relates to the requirement of alleging a breach of warranty, Plaintiff never alleged a specific
warranty term that was relied upon nor did he explain how such a term was breached. Instead,
Plaintiff only provided the conclusory allegation that the fact of Defendant issuing a recall notice

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provided sufficient evidence of a breach of the purported express warranty.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint can be read to assert a claim of product defect,7
the Court notes that Plaintiff did not make any allegation that his 597 17 HMRs manifested a
defect, nor did Plaintiff allege any injury as a result of the defect. Even liberally construing his
allegation that the guns are valueless, “[u]nder North Carolina law . . . prospective class members
whose [products] have not manifested any defects and who merely allege that they have suffered
diminished resale value . . . will not sufficiently allege actual injury.” Bussian v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 614, 630 (M.D.N.C. 2005). Without any assertion of a defect and in view
of the absence of an allegation for injury, Plaintiff’s product defect claim must fail. For these
reasons, the Court affirms and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that under the
circumstances of this case, Plaintiff’s MMWA claim should be dismissed.
B.

North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act

Plaintiff nevertheless claims that he has sufficiently pled aggravating factors so as to
sustain his allegation of a valid UDTPA claim. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he sufficiently
pled that Defendant’s acts were deceptive and unfair so as to place Defendant’s conduct within
the scope of the UDTPA and beyond a mere allegation of a breach of contract or breach of
warranty claim. Nevertheless, the Court finds that to sufficiently allege an UDTPA claim, a
The parties appear to conflate claims of product liability and breach of warranty. The
Court notes that product defect is not an element of a breach of express warranty, as previously
outlined above. Product defect may indeed be key to a claim of breach of implied warranty or
a products liability claim. See e.g., Harbour Point, 206 N.C. App. at 162, 697 S.E.2d at 447
(listing elements for claims of breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, and products liability based on negligence). However, Plaintiff did not allege
such causes of action, but rather Plaintiff explicitly pled a breach of express warranty claim
under MMWA.
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plaintiff must plead that “(1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice;
(2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce; and (3) the act proximately caused injury
to the plaintiff.” Becker v. Graber Builders, 149 N.C. App. 787, 794, 561 S.E.2d 905, 910
(2002). An act or practice is “unfair” under the UDTPA “when it offends established public
policy and is unethical or unscrupulous,” and an act is deceptive under the Act “if it has a
tendency to deceive.” Id.; see also Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific LLC , 671 F. Supp. 2d 785, 798-99
(E.D.N.C. 2009) (“The conduct must be immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or
substantially injurious to consumers.”). A plaintiff must specifically allege “some type of
egregious or aggravating circumstances” beyond the mere allegations of a breach of warranty
claim in order to have a viable UDTPA claim. Kelly, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 799.

In evaluating

potentially unfair or deceptive conduct, the proper measurement is the effect of such conduct
on an average consumer. Becker, 149 N.C. App. at 794, 561 S.E.2d at 911.
The Recommendation recommended that Plaintiff’s UDTPA claim be dismissed as well.
In objecting to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s advertising
statements attesting to the 17 597 HMR’s quality, arguing that “[i]n direct contrast to
Remington’s representations, the rifle and ammunition in actuality had performance and safety
concerns that were causing property damage and personal injuries . . . .” (Pl.’s Mem. [Doc. #37],
at 14.) However, Plaintiff never alleged that the 17 597 HMRs had caused any injury to Plaintiff
or his property. Plaintiff also did not make any allegations showing how any of the statements
listed within his Amended Complaint that Plaintiff attributed to Defendant were false or
deceptive. Indeed, Plaintiff made conclusory allegations labeling Defendant’s advertising

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statements as false, misleading, or deceptive without any allegation to support such an assertion.
As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to allege the requisite level of unscrupulous,
unethical conduct, or aggravating circumstances to adequately state an UDTPA claim.
As previously noted, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s UDTPA
claim based on Plaintiff’s failure to adequately allege aggravating factors. The Magistrate Judge,
however, also briefly addressed the difficulty in construing Plaintiff’s claim as one based upon
a misrepresentation so as to create an unfair or deceptive act. The Magistrate Judge noted in a
footnote that a misrepresentation claim fails because Plaintiff did not allege the necessary
element of “actual reliance.” (Mem. Op. [Doc. #34], at 20 n.12. (citing Sunset Beach Dev. Inc.
v. AMEC, Inc., 196 N.C. App. 202, 211, 675 S.E.2d 46, 53 (2009)). Indeed, “[w]here an unfair
or deceptive practice claim is based upon an alleged misrepresentation by the defendant, the
plaintiff must show ‘actual reliance’ on the alleged misrepresentation in order to establish that
the alleged misrepresentation ‘proximately caused’ the injury of which plaintiff complains.”
Tucker v. The Blvd. at Piper Glen LLC, 150 N.C. App. 150, 154, 564 S.E.2d 248, 251 (2002);
Sunset Beach, 196 N.C. App. at 211, 675 S.E.2d at 53. As already discussed above, Plaintiff
failed to allege he relied on any of Defendant’s advertising statements.
Plaintiff also argued that Defendant’s statements constituted misrepresentations in the
form of omissions, and that “[i]t would be impossible for Plaintiff to rely on information that
was not disclosed to him.” (Pl’s Mem. [Doc. #37], at 16). This argument is circular at best.
Plaintiff argued that he alleged reliance on Defendant’s representations that the 597 17 HMR
was safe and reliable, while simultaneously arguing that he could not possibly allege reliance

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because Defendant failed to disclose that its rifles did not conform to those representations.
Plaintiff’s attempt to construe as omissions Defendant’s alleged failures to inform consumers
that the 597 17 HMR was actually unsafe and unreliable are the very characteristic that would
qualify Defendant’s representations as affirmative misrepresentations. Regardless of the nature
of the alleged misrepresentation, Plaintiff never alleged reliance upon a misrepresentation, and
thus any UDTPA claim based on misrepresentations fails.8
Finally, although the Magistrate Judge did not reach the issue of injury under the UDTPA
because Plaintiff’s claim failed for lack of aggravating circumstances, Plaintiff renews his
arguments that he adequately pled injury. However, Plaintiff’s bare, conclusory allegation that
his rifles are now valueless, standing alone, is insufficient to allege that Defendant’s conduct
injured Plaintiff in the context of what is required to state an UDTPA claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. #8] is subject to

dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon the Court reviewing the
Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation [Doc. #34] and Plaintiff’s Objections [Doc. #36, #37], the
Court finds that the objections do not alter the nature or substance of the Magistrate Judge’s
reasoning and conclusions. As such, the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation is hereby affirmed

To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert a failure to disclose claim, Defendant correctly
noted in its Response to Plaintiff’s Objection [Doc. #38] that such a duty to disclose arises only
in specific contexts, such as that of a fiduciary relationship. E.g. Salmons, Inc. v. First Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., No. 2:10CV72, 2011 WL 4738656, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2011) (explaining
that under the UDTPA, an omission may be actionable only if material and if there is a legal
duty to disclose) (citing Kron Med. Corp. v. Collier Cobb & Assoc., 107 N.C. App. 331, 340, 420
S.E.2d 192 (1992)). Plaintiff made no such allegations here.
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and adopted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #12] is
GRANTED, and this matter is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Extension of Time to file Class Certification [Doc. #22] is DENIED as moot.
This, the 7th day of November, 2014.

United States District Judge

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